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Interdependence between the United States and Japan
increases daily and with it concern over the relative economic role of
each country during the 1990s. As a result, the two countries will
remain high on each other's corporate and public policy agendas for
the foreseeable future.
Concern increasingly is being expressed differently than in the
past as the United States and Japan reach a new stage in their
trade relationship. American domination of the relationship has
ended, and overt Japanese tariff and nontariff barriers have been
largely eliminated. The outstanding issues now revolve around
deeper structural and cultural issues, including how industrial
policies and government-business relationships affect global
competitiveness and flexibility. At the beginning of the 1980s, it
was the U.S.-Japan automobile crisis that presaged the new stage
of bilateral trade relations by bringing the issue of industrial policy,
and with it that of government-business relationships, to the
forefront of the trade debate.
Despite the economic and political importance of the U.S.-
Japan relationship and the extensive attention paid to automotive
trade, few American scholars or policy makers are familiar with the
history of Japanese government-business relations, either generally
or for specific industries such as passenger cars. This book hopefully
helps in a small way to fill that gap in our knowledge and, thus, to
help strengthen the foundation from which we make public policy
decisions about bilateral trade.
The few existing English-language books about the Japanese
automobile industry contain little discussion of government-business
relations. Japanese-language books contain even less. Michael
Cusumano's book, The Japanese Automobile Industry, focuses
primarily on the development of corporate strategies and tech-
nology. It is valuable in helping us understand how business posi-
tioned itself but tells us little about the formation of public
policy. While C.S. Chang's study, The Japanese Auto Industry and
the U.S. Market, briefly discusses certain policy actions, it contains
no framework of how Japan arrived at decisions. In addition, it does
not cover the important events of the American Occupation. Other
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books such as William Duncan's U.S.-Japan Automobile Diplomacy
and David Halberstarn's The Reckoning provide useful information
on particular aspects of the industry's history.
This book represents with some minor modifications my
doctoral dissertation. I particularly acknowledge the support and
guidance of Eleanor M. Hadley, to whom I owe the great majority of
my knowledge about the Japanese economy. I am indebted to my
other professors at George Washington University, especially
Gaston Sigur and Benjamin Nimer, who helped oversee my disser-
tation. I also thank Takafusa Nakamura for sponsoring my study at
the University of Tokyo and for allowing me to be part of his
graduate seminar.
In addition, I am grateful for the support received from my
friends and former colleagues at the Japan Economic Institute who
generously allowed me the time necessary to pursue my doctorate
and later provided needed workspace to write the original disserta-
tion after I returned from Japan.
I also appreciate the generosity of many people in Japan who
made my research possible: the Matsumoto and Takasaki families
who allowed me to share their homes, Yoshio Nakamura and others
at Keidanren, Kazuko Maekawa, Kyoko Nakamura, and Hiroshi
Ando. Many individuals in the Japanese government, automobile
industry, and academia willingly shared their time and knowledge
with me.
My dissertation also could not have been completed without the
support provided by a Fulbright Fellowship that funded my
research in Japan. I am especially proud to have received one of the
first two grants funded by the GARIOA/Fulbright Alumni Associa-
tion of Japan. The Association for Asian Studies aided by providing




During the 1980s, American policy makers repeatedly raised
the issue of the Japanese government-business relationship as part
of the industrial policy debate. Some portrayed the relationship as
more effective than that of the United States and stressed the
Japanese government's ability to intervene in, and restructure, the
economy. At the same time, other policy makers continued
staunchly to defend the separation of government and business as
the essential ingredient of a strong market economy. They claimed
that Japanese industrial policies with their special government-
business relationship have been ineffective at best and
counterproductive at worst. These opposing perceptions were used
to help to justify both interventionist and free trade policies in the
United States. By doing so, a debate arose over whether or not
certain government-business relationships can provide advantages
in global competition by making public policies more effective and
business more competitive.
This book examines the debate by investigating interactions
between the Japanese government and the Japanese automobile
industry from the industry's origins to the implementation of volun-
tary restraints on automobile exports to the United States in
1981. It starts with the premise that government-business relation-
ships exist and are far more complex than usually depicted by those
who attempt to use them either to justify or to counter government
intervention. It defines the relationships as institutional structures
within which states and private companies interact and work
together, or fail to work together, to formulate and implement
commercial policy. It finds that, while relationships differ across
nations and across industries within nations, the need to define
competition globally necessitates understanding how and why
specific interactions occur.
The Japanese automobile industry's experience adds to our
understanding of the role and competitive implications of
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government-business relationships. This book sheds light on the
effects of Japanese government and automobile industry interac-
tions over time on Japanese economic development and thence on
global competition.
The Automobile Industry
Although there are inherent limitations in using a single
industry to understand Japanese government-business relations
overall, it is only possible to understand these complex interactions
when individual industries are studied in enough detail to create a
broad base of knowledge. And, it is the discovery of interactive
patterns in individual industries through which the nature of
government-business relationships are revealed.
The Japanese automobile industry is important to investigate
because it is central to American and Japanese manufacturing
economies. As such, it exerts tremendous influence on both nations'
economic health. In addition, automobiles and automotive parts
have grown increasingly important in U.S.-Japan trade since the
early 1960s and are currently the most important items, in mone-
tary terms, in bilateral trade. The United States imported
approximately $33.7 billion of these products in 1989, which
accounted for 68.7 percent of the $49 billion U.S. trade deficit
with Japan.1 Thus, the automotive industry also exerts a
tremendous influence on the health of the U.S.-Japan bilateral
trade relationship.
Another reason to investigate government-business relations in
the Japanese automobile industry is this issue's close ties to the
U.S. debate over industrial policy. Although The Economist broached
the industrial policy issue as early as 1962 in a series of articles
and some Japan specialists studied it, the issue did not become
popular in the United States until the time of the automobile crisis
in 1979.2
Industrial policy became a trade issue at the time of the
automobile crisis in large part because of the existing hostile rela-
tionship between the U.S. automobile industry and the press—and
thus consumers—that grew out of earlier conflicts over safety and
emissions standards.3 Automobiles are also visible consumer
products that create feelings of economic vulnerability that earlier
conflicts over textiles and steel had not. The importance of the
automobile industry to the economy and the mystique that makes
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the industry the ultimate symbol of American capitalism added to
the depth of the shock. It was reasoned that, if the automobile
industry was in trouble, perhaps something more was wrong than
simply the unfair trade practices of other nations; maybe the Amer-
ican system needed to be revamped.
The concept of industrial policy that initially emerged out of
the automobile crisis focused on what was seen as one of the
elements of Japan's success—the existence of a close, cooperative
government-business relationship that led to increased competitive-
ness through judicious use of public policies. An immediate result of
the new perception was the Carter Administration's attempt to set
up a tripartite committee between government, business, and labor
in 1980 to address the U.S.-Japan automobile trade
issue. Exemplifying an introspective use of the concept, attempts
such as this sought the basis for the U.S. automobile industry's lack
of competitiveness within the U.S. economy, and a number of
articles, books, and conferences on learning from Japan were
published. While this perception of Japanese industrial policy has
not disappeared, it has been supplemented by the negative connota-
tions applied to industrial targeting.4
The targeting argument was a new basis for blaming trade
problems on factors outside the United States and for protecting its
market. In the industrial policy context, it rejected introspection and
returned to the more conventional view that the major source of
U.S. trade problems was external. Despite this fundamental
difference, the targeting argument also assumed that cooperative
and state-directed government-business relationships in Japan
affected international competitiveness. For example, the
"successful targeting" of the Japanese automobile industry was
seen as reason enough to impose import restrictions on U.S.-Japan
automotive trade. At a hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Trade in March 1980, Chairman Charles Vanik stated:
Japan has a great auto industry and it grew to strength
and prosperity behind some of the most protectionist
walls in modern industrial history.
Now, the industry has been unleashed; it is surging
all over the world, wrecking havoc on our industry which
for fifty years has been totally supportive of world trade.5
At the same hearing, Douglas A. Fraser, president of the United
Auto Workers union at the time, after quoting George Ball that
Japanese trade responds to government decisions and not simply to
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the decisions of industry, stated, "Unfortunately, our auto industry
must also be included in the list of industries /incisively targeted' by
Japan."6 Although first gaining prominence in U.S. trade policy
during the debate on U.S.-Japan automobile trade, the targeting
concept was refined and used again quite effectively in later debates
over machine tool, semiconductor, computer, and other sectoral
issues.
A third reason the Japanese automobile industry's case is
particularly provocative and instructive from a policy perspective is
that it has become an example of an industry that reveals the effec-
tiveness as well as the ineffectiveness of Japanese industrial policy.
One side argues that government-business interactions in the
Japanese automobile industry are characterized by an adversarial
relationship and the triumph of the private market.7 The
automobile industry in Japan did receive much less government
attention, especially financial, than other industries such as
steel. Automobiles are the consummate consumer good in a society
that values saving more than spending, and the industry does have
many exemplary entrepreneurs such as Shoichiro Honda. In addi-
tion, the industry's experience in the 1960s has been used as the
prime example of the triumph of the private market over the
attempts by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) to change Japan's industrial structure.
The other side cites the Japanese government's successful
targeting and protection of the automobile industry as the prime
reason for the industry's postwar success. The government had
forced the American automobile companies out of the market in the
1930s through extensive restrictions. After World War II the
automobile industry was identified as a key industry by the
Japanese government. In the 1950s and 1960s the Japanese
government carefully controlled technology inflow and foreign direct
investment to try to influence the character of the industry. These
factors support the primacy of the government, not of the market,
in economic development.
It has been possible to use this government-business relation-
ship to support opposing positions in the trade debate and in
analyses of the role of industrial policy in Japanese economic
development precisely because interactions in the Japanese
automobile industry reflect so many different patterns. Thus, it is
possible to understand government-business relations only as
complex interactions between government and business and not
primarily as the ability of government to influence business or the
ability of business to resist government intervention.
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For these three reasons, the automobile industry is a prime
example of how the issue of government-business relations is used
in the U.S.-Japan trade debates and, further, how industrial policy
and government-business relations became one and the same issue
in the minds of many policy makers.
Perspectives on Government-Business Relationships
The differing perceptions about industrial policy and the role of
government-business interactions are rooted in the way we analyze
the nature and role of the international, American, and Japanese
economies. These analyses provide a foundation from which to
explore the complex interactions between the Japanese government
and the Japanese automobile industry. They approach the issue
from several different perspectives, each of which contributes to our
understanding.
Since the late 1960s, awareness of international economic
issues has increased substantially among American scholars and
policy makers. Attention focused first on how the activities of global
actors, such as multinational corporations and regional economic
associations, affected the power of nations. For example, writers
argued over whether there was a newly emerging phenomena of
economic interdependence that might partially supplant the nation-
state.8 A few writers pointed out that the economic issues always
existed; awareness had simply increased. Yet, there was an
implicit assumption by most policy makers that economic issues
were important because they affected political relationships. In the
study of international relations, economic issues were not assigned
the same importance in and of themselves as were political and
defense issues. This assumption has been accepted by many
scholars and policy makers and has reemerged in discussions over
appropriate trade policies and the weight that should be given to
economic versus political considerations in relationships between
nations.
As a result, policy makers paid little attention to how interac-
tions between government and business within nations affected
global trade competition or to how the international economy in turn
affected such interactions. There was little recognition that such
interactions changed over time or of the factors that led to change.
When attention did turn to these interactions during the
industrial policy debate, another conceptual problem arose. Many
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scholars were unable to separate their study of government-
business relationships in global competition from their preferences
concerning the role of the government in the American
economy. Many studies sought proof of existing preferences rather
than looking at how and why interactions occurred in Japan at
different times. Again, these studies dealt primarily with the ability
of government to influence business or the ability of business to
resist government intervention.
The Domestic Perspective
Scholars who study American government-business relations
often refer to the relationship as a static condition facilitating or
hindering economic development by positing a fundamentally adver-
sarial relationship in the United States versus a cooperative rela-
tionship in Japan.9 These scholars tend to transfer the way the
relationship is dealt with as a domestic issue—primarily as the
effect of regulatory policies on the economy—to the international
arena. Since regulatory relationships involve the imposition of costs
to achieve social goals or to control undesirable behavior, the studies
do not have the tools to analyze instances of mutual coopera-
tion. They are helpful in looking at interactions that occur when
legislated regulatory solutions to social problems exist by pointing
out that such interactions tend to be adversarial.
In depicting U.S. government-business relations as adver-
sarial, scholars almost exclusively discuss interactions as effects of
the domestic environment—legislation, culture, and historical
experience. This perception leads them to trade policy options that
stress that if weaknesses resulting from domestic, social, and tech-
nological changes are resolved, American businesses would be
competitive and as such would resolve any international trade
problems.
Because of the emphasis on the domestic environment, some of
these scholars discount the relevance of comparative studies of
government-business relations in foreign countries altogether.
Michael Blumenthal stated:
A comparative study of business-government relation-
ships in other countries is a fascinating field of study, but
I doubt that many insights useful in the United States
could be derived from it. Whether one considers Japan, or
France, or another nation, the business-government
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relationships are part of the total fabric of their
societies. They reflect their own histories, philosophies,
and social structures, and would not be a guide to action
in the United States.10
This perception reflects a weakness in using concepts developed in
studies of American government-business relations to study the
effect of such relationships in trade because they ignore the impact
of the international environment and disregard relevant experiences
in foreign countries.
Thus, while the traditional approach to studies of American
government-business relations does shed light on regulatory interac-
tions, it is not suitable by itself to a study of the role of government-
business relations in international trade. It is limited in its ability to
incorporate variables external to the domestic environment and to
deal with other than regulatory policies. It shows that interactions
can be adversarial but fails to discuss instances of cooperation or
the existence of mutual goals. It also assumes an idealized laissez-
faire environment with static relationships that do not change over
time.
The Japan Perspective
Scholars have discussed government-business relations in the
context of U.S.-Japan relations. For the purpose of examining and
simplifying concepts that help to understand government-business
interactions, these studies fall into three basic groups. The first
group views the relationship as a reflection of cultural and historical
factors. The second group concentrates on the concept of industrial
policy and the role government plays in economic growth. The third
group looks at Japanese government-business relations as an inter-
active partnership.
Historical and cultural determinants. Studies in the first group
describe the relationship as the "missing element" that explains
Japan's postwar economic performance.11 They stress the "special
and unique way in which the Japanese government has guided the
economy's development," a way influenced by Japan's history and
culture.12
Historically, it is the close communication between the govern-
ment and the business community that these writers believe has
existed since the Meiji era (1868-1912). Because Japan was forced
to open its market, it had to design policies to achieve the rapid and
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forced growth of industry to avoid being partitioned like
China. Thus, the unique relationship between government and busi-
ness—a special coalition between the bureaucracy and the private
sector—grew out of the Meiji government's attempts to foster
modern industry through various subsidies such as the sell-off of
government factories.
The cultural elements stem from Confucianism and native
traditions. They often are behind references to "consensual decision
making," the "group spirit," or "the vertical society."13 In the
context of government-business relations, this view implies that
Japanese leaders are conditioned by their culture to preserve
harmony in their relations, as for example in the postwar practice
of consensual decision making, ringi sei. It also implies that
horizontal mergers are difficult to achieve because they go against
cultural predispositions toward vertical relationships and group
cohesiveness.
This group of studies, like the studies of American
government-business relations, provides only a partial insight into
government-business interactions as a trade issue, but policy
makers are guided to some extent by cultural norms and historical
experiences. These factors offer insights into such practices as the
formation of coalitions, provide policy makers with historical
lessons, and remind us that culture can affect how events and
concepts are perceived. But, if cultural and historical contexts are
the primary shapers of the government-business relationship, we
would expect the relationship to change quite slowly and we would
be able to explain all current behavior as extensions of some
previous patterns. These patterns, however, are often overridden by
other considerations.
Industrial policy perspective. This category of study examines
the Japanese government-business relationship within the context
of industrial policy and the role of government policy in economic
development. It asks whether government or business is primarily
responsible for Japan's rapid economic development. This category
includes two perspectives; one supports the supremacy of the state,
the other the importance of the market.
The statist perspective often presents political institutions,
such as MITI, as the primary determinants of the government-
business relationship.14 Proponents of this point of view attribute a
large role to the state in economic development and see a world "in
which bureaucrats wield exceptional power and influence."15 Some
want the United States to learn from the Japanese government's
perceived success in facilitating development; others use the concept
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as justification for an activist U.S. trade policy to offset the effects
on world trade caused by the intervention of the Japanese state.16
Political institutions can help predispose a relationship to be
cooperative or adversarial and can place constraints on business
actions. As such, they offer insights into how the government
perceives and attempts to carry out its role in economic develop-
ment. However, these studies often fail to pay sufficient attention to
the actions and initiatives of the private sector and so fail to fully
account for variations in government-business relationships across
industrial sectors and for instances in which public policies fail to
achieve their stated purposes.
Advocates of the market perspective depict political institutions
as playing only a small role in promoting economic development.17
Their studies correctly point out the existence of a strong private
sector in Japan and the developmental effects of competition. They
stress that Japan's economic development resulted from a free
market typified by intense competition and successful entrepreneurs
and cite instances where the Japanese government failed to impose
its ideas on business. In this context, the only legitimate govern-
ment roles are the creation of a macroeconomic environment
conducive to business and the imposition of regulations to achieve
social goals. However, in their attempt to demonstrate the
supremacy of the private sector, they discount the role of states,
and thus the importance of government-business interactions in
shaping economic development.
The separation of politics and economics reflects an academic
tradition dating to eighteenth-century classical economic theories
and to late nineteenth-century neoclassical economists such as
Alfred Marshall.18 Theorists separated the two disciplines by
arguing that while economics is a system based on production,
distribution, and consumption that operates under natural laws,
politics is a system of power, influence, and public decision making
that disrupts natural laws but is necessary to provide essential
services such as defense. Therefore, the disruptive influence of
government should be excluded from the harmonious economy. This
underlying assumption obviously hinders the study of government-
business interactions by imposing an ideal in which there is as little
interaction as possible.
Interaction perspective. This group looks at interactions between
government and business over a period of time. Richard Samuels
terms this interaction "the politics of reciprocal consent/' in which a
partnership exists in a constant state of negotiation and renegotia-
tion.19 Yasusuke Murakami's theory of compartmentalized
10 Global Competition
competition recognizes interactions between "the economy, the
polity and the culture" in creating economic development during
Japan's high growth period.20
Two other studies emplo}̂  an interactionist perspective. David
Friedman's case study of the Japanese machine tool industry, while
centering on flexible manufacturing and the role of small-scale firms
in Japan, defines political economy broadly. He states that "politics
is much more than just the actions of the state" and records
instances of political conflict and compromise among government,
business, and other affected actors.21 Frank Upham discusses
attributes conducive to cooperative Japanese government-business
relations that include a consultative policy-making process.22
These studies record instances of government and private
initiatives that result in market transformations but try not to
presuppose the supremacy of the state or the market. Theĵ  rely
heavily on a detailed knowledge of interest group interactions within
specific industries. They propose that no monolithic government or
business exists; rather there are many players and levels of interac-
tion. Because a detailed knowledge of each industry is necessary,
these studies sometimes are dismissed as presenting concepts that
are unique to a specific industry and not transferable to others or to
economic development in general.
By looking at specific case studies, however, they do delineate
factors that place constraints on, or encourage, interaction. They
recognize that no single factor, such as culture or the market, can
explain fully either the interactions themselves or economic develop-
ment. They also indirectly imply that changing circumstances can
alter both the interactions themselves and the role of individual
factors in determining outcomes. Thus, the case studies taken
together provide a framework within which to analyze interactions.
This book complements the third group of studies by adding a
case study of government-business relations in the Japanese auto
industry to previous work on other Japanese industries, including
energy, machine tools, and textiles.23 It attempts to systematically
present the circumstances in the automobile industry that
surrounded public policy actions. By doing so, it finds that Japanese
government-business relations in the case of the automobile
industry were interactive, that government and private initiatives
existed, and that relations changed with variations in needs and the
external environment.
The changes in and the types of interactions depended on
several major factors, which will be discussed further in the conclu-
sion and which are revealed in the history of the relationship from
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its origins to the 1980s. These factors are (1) cultural and historical
lessons that influenced the behavior and decisions of policy makers;
(2) administrative rules, the perimeters agreed to by consensus or
imposed by force within which the government made and carried
out policy; (3) the competitiveness of an industry; and (4) the impor-
tance, real or perceived, of an industry to economic development.
Conclusion
As international economic policy is accorded a significance
equal to political and security policies, policy makers must step back
and come to terms with how interactions between government and
business affect the strength and competitiveness of nations.
This book seeks insights into government-business relations as
interactions, and thence as possible factors in economic develop-
ment. As new nations emerge and challenge the supremacy of older
industrialized countries in technology-intensive products, perceived
differences in government-business relationships and their roles in
economic development have become an important aspect of the
trade debate that rarely has been examined. Because policy makers
frequently use these perceived differences to support domestic
industrial policies and to justify protectionist or free trade actions, it
is essential to examine and to understand the realities involved.
The realities in turn help determine how and if the Japanese
government-business relationship is relevant for other nations'
economic development policies and what role, if any, it should play
in trade policy.
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CHAPTER 2
THE INDUSTRY'S EARLY YEARS
Origins
TheMeijiEra
After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan underwent a
profound transition caused by industrialization and internationaliza-
tion, trends that stemmed from changes within Japan and from fear
of Western domination. The changes affected all aspects of
Japanese society, including government-business relations.1
The Meiji government felt compelled to design and implement
policies to achieve the rapid and forced growth of industry in order
to avoid domination by Western powers. Beginning in the 1870s, it
implemented the shokusan kogyo (develop industry and promote
enterprise) policies that centered on development of a national
banking system; infrastructure investment in railroad, postal, and
telegraph networks; the sale of publicly built factories; and the
lending and sale of equipment to the private sector.2 These policies
resulted in a short period of direct government ownership and
control of business and, after the early 1880s, in a special partner-
ship between the bureaucracy and the developing zaibatsu. Many
reasons have been posited for the development of the partnership.
William Lock wood states that as the influence of the zaibatsu
rose, they became makers of national policy along with the military,
bureaucrats, and politicians.3 By the 1930s, the government and
the zaibatsu were so closely affiliated that it was difficult to tell
where one left off and the other began.
While the zaibatsu gained increasing power, they never
attained a decisive position in prewar Japanese politics because
they disagreed among themselves. Until the imposition of military
controls in the 1930s, the government also did not hold a decisive
position and was dependent upon its relationship with busi-
ness. Lockwood writes: "When the national government stepped in
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with its financial resources or its coercive powers it was more as a
protector or partner of large-scale business than ds a policeman or
competitor."4
G.C. Allen also depicts the relationship as growing out of
security needs. While Allen presents a stronger role for government
than does Lockwood, both stress the development of a government-
business partnership.
Moreover, she (Japan) feared for her security, and her
leaders could not neglect the strategic aspect of economic
development. Hence the active part played by the State in
the early and middle years of Meiji in the founding of new
industries; hence the continued concern of the Govern-
ment and of the business families through which it
worked with enterprises that touched on national power.5
Johannes Hirschmeier presents another theory as to why a
government-business partnership developed.6 He stresses that rela-
tionships in Japan are culturally determined. He believes there is a
lack of individualism in Japanese business that arose from
traditional cultural values. He states that a vertical value order
(individual-family-emperor) combined with groupism (individual-
firm-nation) to make economic leaders and commercial activities
susceptible to government leadership.
In yet another view, Keiichiro Nakagawa believes that the
partnership developed primarily because of a "peculiar foreign trade
situation," the inability to charge import duties higher than 5
percent because of unequal treaties imposed by Western powers.7
He states that "in Japan, the government had no authority to inter-
vene in foreign trade, and thus freely engaged in [domestic]
activities promoting and regulating private industrial enterprises."
None of these explanations can fully explain the partner-
ship. The government-business relationship in the Meiji period
evolved because of both culture and the existing environ-
ment. Existing cultural values gave strength to a partnership that
evolved in reaction to a strong international threat and the need for
industrialization. The domestic environment continued to create
pressures on the relationship as it evolved and changed.
The central partnership and the experiences it grew out of had
little direct effect on most companies. The government-business
partnership was most active in heavy industries such as steel and
shipbuilding. Light industries and new sectors, such as the
automobile industry, were developed by private entrepreneurs
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without much government involvement because they had no direct
relationship to national security.8
Until the 1930s, relations between the automobile industry and
the government fell into this category. As a result, the government
paid no attention to the fledgling automobile industry as part of its
industrial promotion efforts. The industry's production was so small
that no potential contribution to the industrial base was
apparent. Cars seemed to be only toys for the rich. Yet, indirectly,
the growing industrial base did provide a foundation of
entrepreneurial and technological skills for early efforts to create a
motor vehicle industry, as did increasing political stability. The lack
of a market for domestically produced vehicles, however, heavily
outweighed these benefits.
The Early Entrepreneurs
Motor vehicle use in Japan began in 1899 when an American
living in Yokohama imported a three-wheeled electric vehicle called
the Progress.9 Over the next few years, the number of registered
vehicles grew slowly as Japan imported cars from Europe and
America. Imports rose from 16 in 1907 to around 500 in
1912. These imports were primarily steam- and electric-powered
passenger cars.10
The Japanese quickly established domestic production and
assembly operations, but these efforts were mainly attempts at trial
production in small family shops. Many of these shops, as in the
United States, originally produced and repaired bicycles. The
earliest known domestically assembled vehicle was a twelve horse-
power, two-cylinder steam-powered car made by the Automobile
Trading Company in 1902 from imported parts.11 In 1904 Torao
Yamada built the first vehicle, a bus, that was built entirely of
domestic parts, many of which he made himself.12 The first
gasoline-powered car was built in 1907.
The best known early producer was Masujiro Hashimoto, the
founder of Kaishinsha.13 He was a graduate of Tokyo Technical
High School and worked as an engineer in mines and ironworks. In
1902, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce sent him to a
steam engine plant in the United States to work as a trainee. After
returning, he established Kaishinsha in April 1911. He first
repaired and imported cars from the Swift Company in England and
later went on to produce the DAT (Datsun) car line, making seven
DAT cars between 1914 and 1917. Kaishinsha merged in 1926
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with another early company, Jitsuyo Motors, to form DAT
Motors. In the 1930s, Tobata Casting Company, ĵ he parent
compan}' of Nissan Motor Corporation, acquired the production
rights to the DAT car line. The DAT car line ultimately became the
foundation of Nissan's passenger car production in the 1950s along
with a knock-down version of the British Austin.
The early producers possessed a strong entrepreneurial spirit
but had little effect on later developments in the industry. Without
government support, they had a difficult time surviving and were
unable to establish a domestic automobile industry. The low overall
technological level of the machinery industry and other support
industries inhibited mass production. Mass production also was
limited by the small market for domestic vehicles. Consumers still
preferred the status afforded by a more advanced imported
automobile.
The Military Subsidy Program
The government did show some interest in the automobile
industry in the early 1900s, not for its economic development poten-
tial but for its military applications. A relationship began as the
military and industry cooperated to produce trucks. This relation-
ship remained outside the close partnership that existed between
the government and the zaibatsu because the companies involved
were small and their interaction with the government was limited to
the military subsidy program.
After the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the Japanese
army began to investigate possible military applications of motor
vehicles.14 In 1906 and 1907 the army imported one truck each
year from France to study. In the next few years, it imported
additional vehicles from France, England, and Germany. By 1910
the army had made two experimental trucks and concluded that
trucks could be produced domestically.
In 1912 the army established the Military Motor Vehicle
Evaluation Committee, which was set up to create a policy to
support truck development. This committee determined that it was
too difficult for the army to produce and maintain a large number of
trucks. Instead, it suggested following the European model where
subsidies were given to private producers with the stipulation that
subsidized vehicles could be requisitioned by the army in times of
war.
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There was a major difference in orientation between the early
independent producers and the army. The producers were interested
in building passenger cars and the army, in trucks only. Until the
end of World War II, the army's interest in truck production helped
to stifle the research and production of passenger cars, beginning
with the passage of the Military Vehicle Subsidy Law (Gunyo
Jidosha Hogoho) in 1918.
This law enacted the recommendations of the Military Motor
Vehicles Evaluation Committee and provided manufacturing, main-
tenance, and purchasing subsidies to producers and buyers of
qualified vehicles.15 (See table 1.) In order to qualify, the vehicle
had to be made by a government authorized manufacturer. In
order to be authorized, over 50 percent of the capital and voting
rights of a company had to be held by Japanese nationals and most
motor vehicle parts had to be supplied from within Japan. Any use
of foreign-made parts required special authorization. Initially, the
production of four-wheeled trucks was subsidized. Six-wheeled
trucks were added in March 1930 for use in Manchuria. After the
Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931, only six-wheeled
trucks were eligible for the subsidy.
Seven companies were authorized under this law.16 These
companies were mainly divisions of shipbuilders and weapons
makers and reflected the entry of larger firms into the market.
From these firms, three emerged as the prime domestic producers of
motor vehicles into the 1930s. The others, including Mitsubishi
Shipbuilding, Kawasaki Shipbuilding, Okumura Denshi Shokai, and
Ikegu Iron Works, dropped out after producing only a few
vehicles.17 The remaining three companies and their dates of
authorization were Tokyo Gas and Electric (1919), Ishikawajima
Shipbuilding (1924), and Kaishinsha (1924).
Tokyo Gas and Electric Co., Ltd. (Tokyo Gasu Denki Kogyo
Kaisha or TGE) was founded in 1910. In 1917 it created an
automobile division in order to produce five four-ton trucks for the
Osaka Arsenal, becoming the first subsidized manufacturer.
Ishikawajima Shipbuilding bought a license to produce the British
Wolseley CP-model truck and set up an automobile division in
1920. In 1929, Ishikawajima Shipbuilding sold its automobile divi-
sion to a private owner and the name changed to Ishikawajima
Motor Works, Ltd. (Kabushiki Kaisha Ishikawajima Seisakujo).
Kaishinsha merged with Jitsuyo Motors to become DAT Motors two
years after receiving its authorization.
These companies became dependent upon the military
subsidies to make a profit in their vehicle production and never
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developed mass production techniques. Between 1918 and 1924,
160 vehicles were produced under the Military Vehicles Subsidy
Law, compared with total domestic production of 884 vehicles
between 1914 and 1926. Imports during the same period totaled
15,771.
Taizo Yakushiji attributes great importance to the military
subsidy program. He discusses how "the early recognition of the
potential use of trucks for military purposes by military
engineers . . . later led to the birth of Japan's automobile
industry."18 He believes that the strongest effect of the law was not
"in the increase of production, but in the reduction and absorption of
the weak enterprises. This first experience seems to create the
industry's immunity to government interventions which was to last
for the next 60 or so years."19
While he is correct that the strongest effect of the law was not
in the production numbers but in the formation of the three major
companies, he overstates the law's impact. There was a difference
between other early producers and these three major
companies. The early producers, and Kaishinsha initially, were
more interested in building passenger cars than trucks. They failed
not just because they did not switch to trucks and so would receive
subsidies, but because they could not compete with European
imports. The three companies that did survive were barely helped
by the subsidies. They failed when the post-World War I economic
boom ended and stronger producers entered the market. Military
support did not create a strong industry; it only created a dependent
industry with inherent obligations, obligations that the three
companies could not meet in the 1930s. Thus, the foundation of the
automobile industry cannot be attributed to this law.
The Military Vehicle Subsidy Law also was not a precursor of
adversarial interactions between government and business. The
companies continued to work with the military in a dependent rela-
tionship throughout their various reincarnations. The two successful
domestic automobile companies that developed in the 1930s, Toyota
and Nissan, were not initially antagonistic toward the govern-
ment. They reaped great benefits from the government authoriza-
tion program in the 1930s and the expulsion of foreign companies
from the Japanese market. The pattern of cooperation between the
industry's major producers and the government continued into the
1950s.
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The Arrival of Ford and General Motors
The tremendous weakness of the early Japanese motor vehicle
producers and the strength of foreign producers, especially Ford and
General Motors, became readily apparent during reconstruction
after the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. The earthquake brought
to the forefront economic problems that had been building since
World War I. Japan's exports had grown rapidly during the war as
the}' replaced many European exports to Asian markets. This
development led to increases in income and inflation, which
contributed to the country's financial instability.
The earthquake also was responsible for Ford's and General
Motors's decision to build onshore assembly plants in Japan.
Because the earthquake had disrupted trolley transportation in
Tokyo, the city government decided to buy buses.20 But, they could
not obtain the required buses in Japan because the three main
producers had all been heavily damaged by the earthquake. The
domestic producers, in any case, would not have been able to
produce enough vehicles to fill the demand. Therefore, the city of
Tokyo ordered 2,000 Model T truck chassis to be refit as buses from
Ford Motor Company. They bought American vehicles rather than
European vehicles because they were cheaper and shipping time
was three months quicker.
Prior to Tokyo's bus order, Ford and General Motors thought
China had the greatest market potential in East Asia. Until 1923
imports of Ford and General Motors cars had been handled by their
agents, Sale and Frazer Company and Yanase Shokai, respec-
tively.21 But, in 1924 and 1925 after the Great Kanto Earthquake,
Ford and General Motors rushed to establish their own
offices. Japan Ford initially was capitalized at 4 million yen
($952,381), which was raised in 1929 to 8 million yen ($1,739,130)
in order to match Japan General Motors's capitalization level.22
The vehicles assembled by the American automobile companies
in onshore assembly plants began to dominate the market. The
American vehicles replaced European imports in the Japanese
market and soon overwhelmed the existing domestic producers.
Initially, the American companies were welcomed because they
brought cheap products and advanced technology into Japan. Many
Japanese important in the postwar automobile industry, such as
Shotaro Kamiya, originally worked for Ford and General Motors.23
By 1934 American vehicles held an almost 90 percent market
share. By the time Ford and General Motors were forced out of the
Japanese market, they had assembled approximately 250,000
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cars. The assembly operations had strong repercussions on the
trade balance because of the large number of imported parts
required for the plants. The effect on the trade balance, when
combined with the fact that General Motors and Ford retained 100
percent ownership of their Japanese subsidiaries, became an issue
in the growing nationalist movement.
Tokyo's purchase of Ford chassis signified that vehicles for
civilian use were no longer viewed as just luxury toys but also as
practical answers to mass transit. In September 1929, the Ministry
of Railways (MOR) set up the Committee to Survey the Motor
Transportation Network to explore potential uses for buses.24 This
investigation led to the development of trial models and the opening
of a bus line in 1930 by MOR. The Law Regarding Motor Vehicle
Transportation Enterprise, passed in 1932 to regulate buses,
included provisions that prohibited high-floor, American-style buses
from operating on MOR bus routes. This decision, along with the
growth of the taxi industry, helped ensure the use of domestic motor
vehicles in mass transit.
General Motors's and Ford's assembly operations represented
the first major foreign threat to the development of the Japanese
automobile industry. The imports from Europe had inhibited the
development of the early producers but less so than Japan's lack of
technology and its small market. The large scale onshore production
by the American producers was a more visible threat. As a result,
the government began to take much more interest in the industry.
Impact of the Early Era
The experience of the Japanese automobile industry prior to
the early 1930s was important to later developments. It revealed
the existence of an extremely weak domestic motor vehicle
industry. Ford and General Motors quickly overran the three major
producers—Tokyo Gas and Electric (TGE), Ishikawajima, and DAT
Motors—at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake. It
demonstrated that in the presence of a technologically backward
domestic industry, imports and onshore foreign capital would
dominate the market. Such domination in turn could result in a
chronic trade account deficit and shortage of foreign exchange. This
period also showed a government that was interested in the motor
vehicle industry only in terms of buses and trucks; private sector
interest in passenger cars was not encouraged.
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Interactions between the government and the automobile
industry during this early period were limited because there was no
mutual interest in developing the industry and no strong foreign
threat until Ford and General Motors began production. (Chrysler
also began limited production in Japan as Kyoritsu Motors.) The
only exception was the army's continuing interest in developing
trucks through its subsidy program. While very few vehicles were
produced under the subsidy program, the authorized manufacturers
did have a small guaranteed market. Several other small companies
attempted to begin operations, but they invariably failed or were
absorbed into other firms. But, when Ford and General Motors
entered the market, it soon became evident that authorization and
military purchases by themselves were not enough to ensure
success.
Government Intervention
Economic and Political Context
By the late 1920s Japan's economic and political situation had
greatly changed; nationalism was on the rise, and the economy was
in trouble. Japan entered a period during which the government
actively tried to influence the economy and, at the same time,
became less tolerant of foreign presence through imports and invest-
ments in its economy. These circumstances created the economic
and political context for the next stage of development in the
automobile industry.
Two changes in the economy affected relations between the
government and the automobile industry. First, the balance of
payments became a significant issue by 1926 as Japan's financial
crisis deepened. In June 1926 the Committee for the Promotion of
Domestic Products (Kosan Shinko linkai) was organized within the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) to reduce the trade
deficit by promoting import substitution. Second, the world depres-
sion spread to Japan and created an economic slump from 1929 to
1931. The government responded with a series of relief measures,
which included the formation of the Bureau of Industrial
Rationalization in 1930 to help stricken industries improve their
efficiency and lower costs and the passage of the Major Industries
Control Law of 1931 that allowed MCI to allocate domestic market
quotas and control prices and production with the agreement of at
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least two-thirds of the firms in an industry. While the effectiveness
of these actions can be questioned, they did increase the govern-
ment's role in the economy.
Changes in the political arena also affected the automobile
industry. Nationalist-militarist thinking spread, a trend not unique
to Japan. By the late 1920s, the military increasingly became disil-
lusioned with parliamentary democracy. With the outbreak of the
Manchurian Incident on September 18, 1931, it became clear that
the civilian leaders could not control the military. The assassination
of Premier Tsuyoshi Inukai on May 15, 1932 and the subsequent
light sentences given to his assassins proved the power of the mili-
tary. The major effect of these events on industrial development
was that economic relief measures increasingly became vehicles of
control and were used to create a wartime economy.
The "Isuzu" Standardized Car
The relationship between Japan's motor vehicle industry and
the government changed radically as the health of the industry
became important to the military offensive in Manchuria and China,
as well as to the solution of the balance of payments problem. As
the 1930s progressed, MCI and the army became involved in the
automobile industry, with the army gaining greater control than
MCI. Efforts by MCI and the army to obtain the voluntary coopera-
tion of existing producers and to entice new producers into the
sector failed and were replaced by more coercive measures in the
mid-1930s.
On September 25, 1929, the MCI Minister asked the
Committee for the Promotion of Domestic Products for recommenda-
tions on the best method to establish a domestic motor vehicle
industry in order to offset the national security and foreign trade
implications of the rapid increase in automobile imports.25 This
committee found that, while demand for motor vehicles was rising
rapidly, local production of vehicles was only about 500 per
year. Demand was being filled through imports that totaled over 40
million yen ($8,695,652) per year. It also determined that the
establishment of a local automobile industry was necessary for
balance of payments advantages, linkages to other industries, and
the strengthening of national defense. The committee also found
that, while the domestic industry was stagnant and uncompetitive
because of high costs resulting from low production volumes,
adequate promotion policies could encourage its development.
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In May 1930 the committee made its recommendations.26
Priority should be given to the production of trucks and buses
because the model changes required in the passenger car industry
were too expensive. Subcontracting practices should be encouraged
to utilize the excess capacity in existing automobile producers as
well as in shipbuilding, forging, and other related industries. Even-
tual domestic production of parts would be necessary, but foreign
designs and production methods should be studied first. The govern-
ment should adopt protective measures, such as subsidies and high
import tariffs, and encourage the use of domestic vehicles by
government officials. This group also suggested that a research
committee be formed to complete a detailed study of the industry
and that a test model be made to confirm the efficiency of domesti-
cally produced vehicles. In response, the Survey Committee for the
Establishment of the Automobile Industry (Jidosha Kogyo
Kakuritsu Iinkai) was formed in May 1931.27
The survey committee included the business, government, and
academic communities and consisted of eighteen regular members,
one temporary member, and eight staff members.28 The eighteen
regular members included two professors from Tokyo University;
the presidents of Ishikawajima, TGE, and DAT Motors; and thir-
teen government officials—Home Affairs (2), Finance (2), Army (3),
Commerce and Industry (1), Railways (4), and other (1). The
committee formalized interaction between government and business
in the automobile industry to create policy.
The committee announced specifications for five standardized
models in September 1931 and then ordered TGE, Ishikawajima,
and DAT Motors to make nine vehicles of two truck and three bus
types. These companies had little choice but to comply because they
were in financial difficulty and dependent on the military vehicle
subsidy. These test vehicles were then studied to obtain a single
standardized model, and the prototype was completed in March
1932.
The standardized car eventually became known as the "Isuzu,"
and 3,000 were to be produced every year.29 The Isuzu was to be a
truck, weighing between 1.5 and 2 tons, and therefore not directly
in competition with smaller vehicles produced by Ford and General
Motors in Japan. In addition, the tariff on engines was raised from
28.1 percent to 35 percent ad valorem and on parts from 30 percent
to 40 percent in 1932.
At the same time that MCI became involved in the motor
vehicle industry because of the balance of payments deficit, the
army's interest increased. The army needed a large number of
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trucks for its land operations in China after the Manchurian Inci-
dent in 1931. The army had continued to subsidize vehicles through
the 1920s under the Military Vehicle Subsidy Act, but was dissatis-
fied with the small number of vehicles produced.
The joint interest of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
and the army resulted in a search for a domestic company that
could build the Isuzu. MCI approached three zaibatsu (Mitsui,
Sumitomo, and Mitsubishi), and each turned down the proposal as
too risky.30 Mitsubishi Shipbuilding had built a bus in 1932 and
continued to build a few vehicles on its own but did not want to
participate in the government project.
MCI and the army encouraged the formation of the National
Automobile Union (Kyodo Kokusan Jidosha K.K.) in June 1932.31
Consisting of representatives from Tokyo Gas and Electric
Company, DAT Motor, and Ishikawajima Motor, the Union was
essentially an administrative organ in charge of supervising the
sales and subsidies related to the Isuzu project. Because the
companies were in small size, uncompetitive, and suffered internal
conflicts, it soon became apparent that this organization could not
produce the required number of vehicles.
The government next tried to merge these three companies.
Yoshisuke Aikawa of Nissan became involved because his company,
Tobata Casting Company, bought DAT Motors in 1931. He was
instrumental in merging DAT Motors and Ishikawajima in 1932 but
became dissatisfied with this arrangement because he wanted the
new company to produce more than just the buses and trucks
needed by the army. He pulled Tobata out and in 1933 formed a
separate automobile company, Nissan Jidosha K.K., retaining the
manufacturing rights to the original DAT line of passenger cars.
Eventually, Tokyo Gas and Electric Company joined the
remaining portion of the DAT Motors/Ishikawajima merger in 1934
to form Jidosha Kogyo, initially capitalized at 3.2 million yen
($1,084,746). During the next few years, Jidosha Kogyo underwent
more transformations and name changes, eventually becoming
Diesel Jidosha Kogyo in April 1941. This company later separated
to form the postwar companies of Isuzu Jidosha and Hino Jidosha
Kogyo.
By late 1934, it was obvious that the attempt to manufacture
the standardized vehicle through either a merger scheme or volun-
tary cooperation would not work—only 450 vehicles had been
produced.32 Taizo Yakushiji attributes the failure of the standar-
dized car to the fact that its technical specifications neglected
changes in market demand. A more important reason was that
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Jidosha Kogyo was too weak and the new, stronger companies were
not interested. The Japanese government was not able to force the
stronger companies to comply with its plan in the early 1930s. Most
importantly, General Motors and Ford still dominated the market.
The government's attempts to foster a domestic industry did
not end with the failure of Jidosha Kogyo to produce the
standardized vehicle. Rather, they were redirected as the need for
trucks in the military mobilization effort increased.
The Emergence of Toyota and Nissan
During the reorganization of the existing car companies, in the
1930s, two major new entrants appeared in the motor vehicle
market: Nissan and Toyota. The emergence of these two companies
was important because they initially entered the market with the
idea of building passenger cars, not just trucks and buses, and each
became a major postwar producer. They were established by excep-
tionally talented entrepreneurs who believed that they could carry
on with the private production of passenger cars while catering to
the militar}^. The two companies realized that they would need some
government subsidies and protection to survive competition with the
American companies, but each tried to maintain some independ-
ence. Yoshisuke Aikawa stated that:
Automobiles must be produced at the level of 10,000 to
15,000 units a year in order to constitute a viable busi-
ness. Under existing circumstances, however, the
industry needs a rather generous government subsidy and
protection in order to grow.33
Thus, Nissan and Toyota were able to enter the market at this time
because of the steadily growing demand from the army (Toyota
purposely began to produce a truck along with its passenger car for
this reason) and the rising tide of protectionist sentiment.
Aikawa established a motor vehicle department as part of
Tobata Casting Company that initially made passenger cars using
DAT's manufacturing rights and that produced automotive parts for
Ford and General Motors in a plant in Osaka.34 After Aikawa
decided to pull out of the government-sponsored merger in 1933, he
set up Motor Industries with a joint investment of 6 million yen
($2,380,952) from Nihon Sanyo K.K. and 4 million yen
($1,587,302) from Tobata Casting. In 1934, he changed the name
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of the venture to Nissan Motor and decided to build an additional
plant in Yokohama by importing a disassembled plant from the
Graham-Paige Company and obtaining technical guidance from
several American engineers. By 1937, two years after the first
Datsun rolled off the Yokohama assembly line, total production
from the two plants reached 10,000. Plans were made to create an
additional line of passenger cars using imported technology.
Toyota Motor Company was established on August 27, 1937
as a separate entity from its parent, Toyoda Automatic Loom
Works, Ltd. The name of the company was officially changed from
Toyoda to Toyota.35 The founder of Toyoda Automatic Loom,
Sakichi Toyoda, had been interested in motor vehicles since he
visited the United States in 1910 and witnessed the early impact of
the Ford Model T. In 1930 he sold a textile machinery patent for 1
million yen ($202,593) to Platt Brothers Inc. and gave the money to
his son, Kiichiro Toyoda. Kiichiro Toyoda used the money to begin
research on passenger cars, which took place in secret from 1930 to
1933. A formal automobile division was established in late 1933,
after overcoming considerable objection from within the company
about the wisdom of producing automobiles when the large zaihatsu
found it too risky. While Toyota developed its own designs, it did
extensive studies of foreign vehicles, parts, and manufacturing tech-
niques. Initially capitalized at 3 million yen ($1,190,476), self-
capitalization was expanded to 6 million yen ($2,097,902) in August
1935 and to 9 million yen ($3,146,853) in late 1936. Later, in
1937, Toyota received a loan from the Mitsui Bank for 20 million
yen ($7,722,008) and in 1939 was able to increase its capitalization
to 30 million yen ($11,583,011). The first prototype passenger car
"Al" model was completed in May 1935 and the first prototype
truck "Gl" in August. A new assembly plant, completed in 1936 in
Koromo (Toyota City), was expanded to produce 10,000 units.
Masaru Udagawa and Seishi Nakamura cite the emergence of
Toyota and Nissan as typical of the appearance of "outsider" firms
in emerging industries during the 1930s. They state that "these
entrepreneurs were independent and innovative in their behavior,
and their enterprising spirit was clearly indistinguishable from the
'Japan Incorporated' mentality of collective interdependence."36
They point out that the automobile industry had a different relation-
ship with the government than industries, such as steel, that were
part of the "collective interdependence" and had more interac-
tions. Udagawa and Nakamura are correct in that the strong,
private initiative of Nissan and Toyota helped them to be successful
while the dependency of Jidosha Kogyo on the government
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prevented it from becoming the center of the industry. But, because
they set out to prove that the independent companies rather than
government-sponsored rationalization and merger programs caused
industrial growth in the 1930s, they depict the interests of govern-
ment and the outsider firms as "diametrically opposed." Rather,
the actions of Toyota and Nissan show that they saw advantages in
working with the government. Udagawa and Nakamura also
attribute the failure of Jidosha Kogyo to the failure of the
government-sponsored rationalization policy, but in truth it failed
primarily because of the inherent uncompetitiveness of the
company.
The emergence of Toyota and Nissan, along with their adop-
tion of mass production, signified the first solid step toward building
a domestic automobile industry. The industry's beginning was based
on private initiative and government interest. The major domestic
motor vehicle manufacturers that emerged during the 1930s were
Toyota, Nissan, and Jidosha Kogyo. In addition, Mitsubishi
continued to produce a few heavy trucks, and three-wheeled vehicle
manufacturers, such as Toyo Kogyo (Mazda) and Daihatsu, were
able to enter the market because of growing demand and the 1931
yen devaluation that raised the price of imports.
The Automobile Manufacturing Law
The government attempted to intervene in the industry again
with the August 9, 1935 Cabinet announcement of the Outline of
the Automobile Manufacturing Law (Jidosha Kogyo Ho Yoko). This
announcement in part stated:
At the same time as the automobile industry occupies an
important position in industry it also has an important
significance for national defense. Entrusting such an
important indust^ pure and simply to the complete
control of foreigners is an extremely unsatisfactory situa-
tion. Regardless of previous limitations, we think that it
should be placed in the hands of Japanese both in name
and reality, now and in the future.37
The statement revealed the government's twofold objective: the
completion of the national defense and the development of
industry.38 The national political situation was becoming increas-
ingly tense because of the growing military needs in Manchuria and
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the continued strength of General Motors and Ford in the Japanese
market.
The government felt pressure to act quickly because Toyota
and Nissan were negotiating with General Motors to enter into joint
ventures to obtain needed capital and technology.39 Aikawa,
foreseeing the eventual elimination of Ford and General Motors
from the Japanese market, regarded the joint ventures as an oppor-
tunity to gain control over their assets in Japan. The Nissan-
General Motors negotiations in particular progressed quickly;
General Motors was extremely willing to enter into some type of
arrangement as the political situation worsened. The negotiations,
which lasted over four years, never succeeded because of the uncer-
tainties raised by the changing political environment and the army's
opposition to the joint venture.
Nissan courted Ford, but Ford wanted to continue on its own.
Seeking to meet the increasing nationalist pressures, Ford drew
increased capital for a new manufacturing plant from Japanese
Ford dealers and stipulated that the plant would use only domestic
parts within a few years. In April 1934, Ford attempted to buy new
land for the plant from the city of Yokohama but was prevented by
the army, which argued that to sell the land would sabotage
domestic manufacturing.40 Ford was able to buy land in July 1935
in Yokohama from a subsidiary of the Asano zaibatsu, but its
application for a building permit was rejected under pressure from
the army.
After the Cabinet announcement on August 9, the army again
approached the major companies with a plan to produce the stan-
dardized car on a scale of at least 3,000 units per year.41 They
were rejected in turn by Jidosha Kogyo, TGE, Nissan, Mitsui, and
Mitsubishi. At this point, the army began to consider setting up its
own national car company while MCI, as well as the Foreign
Ministry, preferred to support the Isuzu project and to encourage
Nissan's joint venture efforts as a method to hasten the develop-
ment of the domestic industry and to prevent damaging trade rela-
tions with the United States.42 The dispute between those
advocating the two different approaches was resolved with a deci-
sion to approach Toyota—the new company not under earlier
consideration. Toyota saw an opportunity and presented an alterna-
tive plan based on a smaller production amount.43 Toyota's interest,
along with the army's growing political power, put the army in a
position to make policy decisions that MCI opposed.
The final result of the Cabinet decision was the Diet's passage
of the Automobile Manufacturing Law (Jidosha Seizo Jigyo Ho) on
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May 29, 1936.44 This law sought to exclude foreign capital, shut
down the foreign onshore assembly plants, and prevent Japanese
firms from entering into joint ventures with foreign firms. These
goals were accomplished by prohibiting Ford and General Motors
from increasing their production above current levels (12,360 for
Ford and 9,470 for General Motors), by exacting a 50 percent tariff
on imports of engines and parts, and by banning joint ventures
under the Exchange Control Law. Finally, government authoriza-
tion was required for automotive parts companies producing parts
for more than 3,000 vehicles annually, a move to keep General
Motors and Ford from entering this segment of the motor vehicle
industry. These actions, combined with another yen devaluation
caused by the Sino-Japanese War, forced the American manufac-
turers out of the market by 1940.
The law gave the Ministry of Commerce and Industry the
power to reorganize producers into a coordinated national group to
manufacture standardized parts and vehicles for the war effort in
Manchuria. The industry was controlled through a licensing system
that was mandatory for production over a certain level. This
system required majority ownership and control by Japanese
nationals, and obedience to the government's operational orders.
Economic incentives included five-year income and corporate profit
tax holidays, tariff exemptions for machinery and material imports
for five years, and relaxed recapitalization requirements.
Nissan and the automobile division of Toyoda Automatic Loom
submitted proposed production plans to MCI in July 1936.45 These
companies became the first authorized manufacturers under the
new law on September 19, 1936. In order to achieve this status, the
two companies had to greatly curtail their private activities in the
area of passenger cars in favor of making trucks. Without
authorization from the army, however, it is doubtful that they could
have survived for long as motor vehicle manufacturers given the
political environment.
The Automobile Manufacturing Law, combined with the
establishment of Toyota and Nissan, created a viable domestic
motor vehicle industry based on the manufacture of trucks. It also
symbolized a period of government-business relations based on




The period of government intervention began with efforts by
both MCI and the army to encourage production of a standardized
vehicle that could displace the automobiles being assembled by Ford
and General Motors. These efforts were intertwined but not parallel
in either motive or implementation. With the passage of the
Automobile Manufacturing Law in 1936, the army gained control
over policy decisions related to the automobile industry. The law
also signified the virtual end of the coexistence of private efforts to
make passenger cars and the need for cargo vehicles for national
security purposes.
Toyota and Nissan quickly surpassed the existing domestic
makers during this period by introducing foreign technology and
mass production techniques. They were able to do this because
support from major existing companies covered their initial costs
and because of their strong entrepreneurs and an increasingly
protected environment. Domestic production of four-wheeled motor
vehicles soared, rising from 458 in 1930 to a peak of 42,813 in
1941. Production fell after 1941 as a result of materials shortages
and did not surpass this peak again until 1952. Toyota's production
rose from 20 in 1935 to a high of 16,302 in 1942 while Nissan's
went from 940 in 1934 to its peak of 19,688 in 1941. Their
combined share of total production averaged 75.5 percent between
1935 and 1940, and 84.1 percent between 1940 and 1945.
Wartime Controls
In July 1937, Japan entered the second Sino-Japanese War
(1937-1945). Military spending, which had accounted for 16.2
percent of government budget expenditures in 1930, now rose to
53.5 percent.46 The wartime economy necessitated the centraliza-
tion of control over political parties and private business interests, a
process that accelerated in late 1937 and was complete by 1940.
From the latter half of the 1930s until 1945, the Japanese
motor vehicle industry was under government control. The initial,
though admittedly slow, progress the automobile makers had made
toward the development of a passenger car industry stalled as the
companies were forced to concentrate their efforts on truck produc-
tion. Entrepreneurs like Yoshisuke Aikawa and Kiichiro Toyoda did
34 Early Years
remain interested in passenger cars and continued some limited
research but were unable to continue production.
The first step toward the implementation of controls after the
Automobile Manufacturing Law occurred with the passage of the
Temporary Measures Law Relating to Exports, Imports and Other
Matters on September 9, 1937. This law controlled the "import and
export of specific goods and controlled consumption, manufacturing,
and processing of trade-related goods," thereby controlling who
could import and what could be imported.47 As a result, General
Motors's and Ford's Japan operations received a final death blow
since they could not import the parts needed for production.
The passage of the National General Mobilization Law (Kokka
Sodoin Ho) in March 1938 allowed the government to bypass the
Diet and enact strong measures controlling the economy. With this
in hand, MCI took the next major step directly affecting the motor
vehicle industry and announced production guidelines on August 14,
1938 as part of the Materials Mobilization Plan (Busshi Doin
Keikaku).48 This plan controlled the use of materials that had no
direct relationship with production for military demand, effectively
prohibiting the production of passenger cars. In short, the guidlines
provided for the exclusive production of cargo vehicles or weaponry
(tanks) except when it was necessary to use up materials on hand
suitable only for passenger car production. Any passenger cars
produced were to be distributed according to orders received from
the military and were not sold to ordinary people. Also, production
of minicars as well as three- and two-wheeled vehicles was
prohibited.
Another area of government intervention that affected the
motor vehicle industry was the search for alternative fuels as
gasoline consumption became a major concern in the 1930s. The
government decided to encourage the production of a diesel
vehicle.49 At that time, several smaller companies were
experimenting with diesel engines: Tokyo Jidosha Kogyo (the latest
name for Jidosha Kogyo), Ikegai Tecko, Mitsubishi Shipbuilding,
Hitachi Keikaku, and Nihon Diesel Kogyo. MCI decided that it was
prudent to concentrate the research efforts in one company, Tokyo
Jidosha Kogyo, with the other companies participating by supplying
capital and technology. Thus, Tokyo Jidosha Kogyo on April 9,
1941 became the third company authorized under the Automobile
Manufacturing Law. Its name was changed first to Jidosha Seizo
before becoming Diesel Jidosha Kogyo on April 30. In May 1942,
the weaponry department was detached to form Hino Heavy
Industries.
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The other major attempt to encourage the use of alternative-
fuel vehicles revolved around charcoal-burning engines.50 The army
had imported a charcoal-burning engine from the Parker Company
in 1916 and then developed its own version in 1926. These efforts
had little effect as there were only eighteen charcoal-burning
vehicles in use in 1934. In that year, MCI together with the
Ministry for Forestry and Agriculture decided to provide a subsidy
for these cars, and their number increased to 3,000 by 1938. MCI
established a fuel department in 1938 that further promoted the
production and use of charcoal-burning cars so that their number
rose to 10,000 in 1939. After that, attention switched to the promo-
tion of gasohol.
Concern about the general technological level of Japanese
vehicles, which were notorious for their propensity to fall apart on
rough Chinese roads (partially due to steel quality), led to another
sequence of government-business interactions during the war. When
the Automobile Manufacturing Law was passed in 1936, MCI
wanted to establish a national experimental center to improve the
level of automobile technology, but could not because of financial
constraints.51 Later, when the army demanded that motor vehicle
makers improve the efficiency of their vehicles, MCI established a
Committee on Automobile Technology in August 1939. Because of a
division within the MCI Machinery Experimental Bureau in 1940,
this committee was transferred in December 1942 along with the
Bureau to the Ministry for Military Procurement.
Although the committee consisted of sixteen experts, they did
not have their own research facilities or extensive funding.52 They,
therefore, relied heavily on cooperation with the private
companies. The private companies had to cooperate given the
political circumstances, but they also believed it would help prevent
them from falling too far behind General Motors and Ford. Initially,
Nissan and Toyota each contributed one million yen ($427,350) to
pay for land, buildings, and a test course. Diesel Jidosha Kogyo
contributed 750,000 yen ($320,513) in 1941. The government
provided the operating expenses and chose a site for the facility in
Higashimurayama. The main buildings and test course were not
completed until 1943 and then were smaller than planned. In addi-
tion, cement could not be found to pave the test course. Major
results obtained by this group during the war consisted of ten
driving tests of vehicles between July 1941 and August 1944, and
examination of the quality of automotive parts after 1943. This
group continued in existence (it was moved back to MCI in 1946)
until 1953.
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The main instruments of control during the war were control
associations (Tosei Kai), established under the Major Industries
Control Ordinance (Juyu Sangyo Dantai Rei) of August 29, 1941.53
The automobile industry was designated in the first Ministerial
Ordinance issued in October 1941 as an industry in which control
associations were to be founded. The purpose of a control associa-
tion was to allow
the government [to implement] the national program for
production and distribution in the industry concerned; the
means of supplying the labor, raw materials, capital, and
other demands of the industry concerned . . . control and
guide production and distribution in the industry . . .
provide for the complete equipping of the industry . . .
develop techniques, increase efficiency, unify the regula-
tions, and reform the management of the industry.54
Within the automotive industry, the government established
seven control associations, three of which were major.55 The three
major associations were the Automobile Manufacturing Industrial
Association, which had 4 members (Toyota, Nissan, Isuzu, and
Hino) with 14 plants and was responsible for standard-sized
automobiles and their parts; the Japan Special Automobile
Industrial Association, which had 30 members with 38 factories and
was responsible for tractors, trailers, trailer trucks, dump trucks,
fire trucks, fuel trucks, plows, and harrows; and the Japan Small-
Sized Automobile Association, which was responsible for small-sized
three- and four-wheeled vehicles, motorcycles, motor scooters, and
their parts. The other four associations were the Japan Automobile
Body Industrial Association, which had 140 members with 144
factories and was responsible for truck, bus, and other types of
vehicle bodies; the Electric Automobile Industrial Association, which
had 6 members with 6 factories and was responsible for all electric-
battery operated vehicles; the Automobile Manufacturers Materials
Committee, which had 630 members with 707 factories and was
responsible for automotive-related materials; and the All Japan
Automobile Parts Industrial Association, which had 357 members
with 411 factories and was responsible for all automotive parts.56
The most important association was the Automobile Manufac-
turing Industrial Association, whose members formed the core of
postwar truck and passenger car production. This association left
control of actual production with the private companies. The
association's job was essentially to procure raw materials, a task
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that became more difficult as the war progressed. In particular, it
had problems obtaining nickel and asbestos for brakes, and carbon
black for tires. Control of raw materials for the automobile industry
began in 1938 with the enactment of the Iron and Steel Distribution
Control Regulations. The Iron and Steel Control Council established
an automobile department to regulate shipments of steel, the raajor
scarce raw material. After 1941, the Association's primary task
was not simply to control the distribution of raw materials but to
obtain them. The motor vehicle industry throughout the war was
never able to reach planned levels of production, and the drop in
vehicle production paralleled the decrease in steel allocation.
The major reason that materials were difficult to locate for the
motor vehicle industry after 1941 was that the military front had
shifted from China to the Pacific with the beginning of the war with
the United States. The need for land vehicles decreased as the need
for ships and aircraft increased, and then increased again as a
possible invasion of the home islands drew near. This change is
reflected in the army's priority rating for the use of raw materials
in the industry.57 Industries that had highest priority were rated
Al, those with less, A2 and so on. The rating for the motor vehicle
industry changed as follows:
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945
Bl B2 C C B5
The switch to a Pacific front also created another task for the
automobile control associations. The automotive makers, both major
assemblers and major parts firms, were ordered to begin the
production of other products, especially aircraft.58 Toyota started an
aircraft department as early as November 1938, which became a
separate company in June 1942 upon the recommendation of the
Military Air Force Center (the army's air force). Other sections of
Toyota produced aircraft parts either within Toyota or in coopera-
tion with other firms. The army air command told Nissan to
produce aircraft engines and parts as of December 29, 1942. The
industry produced less and less of all types of products as the war
drew to a close, and raw materials became difficult to obtain. By
1945, auto executives such as Kiichiro Toyoda were already
thinking ahead about how to survive after the war ended.
The major characteristic of the wartime period was the subor-
dination of the automobile industry to military demand. One
government priority of the interventionist period—the development
of industry—disappeared, leaving onty interest in building a strong
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national defense, and leading to a halt in passenger car production
and in technology imports.
This period saw Nissan's and Toyota's rise to dominance.
Many small makers were pushed out of the market because they
could not meet authorization requirements and so could not obtain
raw materials. Some attempted to reenter the market after the war
but few were successful. Government-business interactions geared
to protecting the industry increasingly meant protecting the large
companies, not all the producers in the industry. Nissan and Toyota
have remained dominant producers to the present day.
Government-business relations at this time were weighted in
favor of control rather than a partnership based on joint coopera-
tion. It would be wrong, however, to describe the relationship as
adversarial because many automobile industry executives, such as
Yoshisuke Aikawa and Risaburo Toyoda, were strongly nationalistic
and supportive of the war effort. The government and industry also
cooperated to develop technology.
Conclusion
Prewar and wartime developments had significant effects on
the postwar government-business relationship in the Japanese
automobile industry. Many of the decision makers responsible for
policy in the earlier period were key figures after the war. More
importantly, the emergence of Toyota and Nissan combined with
the removal of foreign competition by the Automobile Manufac-
turing Law formed the foundation of a viable domestic truck
industry. The removal of foreign competition also helped indirectly
by encouraging General Motors and Ford dealers in Japan to switch
to the domestic manufacturers.59
Japan's government and industry decision makers learned four
economic lessons that affected their actions in the postwar era.
These lessons were applied to the economy in general and to the
automobile industry specifically. First, in the presence of a tech-
nologically backward and weak domestic industry, imports and
onshore foreign capital would dominate the market to such a degree
that potential domestic producers would be crowded out, or severely
hindered in their development. Second, Japan's continued high
dependence on imported manufactured goods would result in a
chronic trade deficit and foreign exchange shortage. Third, the
success experienced in increasing production with government
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support during the 1930s demonstrated that government promotion
of industry in conjunction with private sector involvement in
developing policies could potentially have positive effects on
industrial development. And fourth, government control was not an
effective substitute for private sector decisions.
These periods also saw the tentative beginnings of a passenger
car industry, but it was by no means clear that the visions
developed in the minds of the entrepreneurs could be carried to frui-
tion in the postwar period. Immense foreign superiority of tech-
nology and production in almost all areas would have to be over-
come. There was still not a large market for passenger cars in
Japan, and the road network was extremely poor. There was not a
tradition of governmental interest in passenger cars: the interest
that had existed was only in the area of trucks and buses. On the
positive side, two relatively strong companies had emerged out of
the multitude of small and extremely weak domestic producers. The
industry had gained considerable experience in truck production
that, while not directly transferable to passenger cars, provided a
foundation for the growth of the companies. Most importantly, a
postwar industry now existed that was capable of lobbying in
support of its own interests.
NOTES
1A major point of contention among scholars is whether the
Meiji Restoration was a reaction to internal discontent or to the
external threat typified by the arrival of Commodore Matthew
C. Perry in 1853. This controversy reflects the academic tendency
to separate international and domestic environments. Interestingly,
studies of the Japanese government-business relationship do accord
significance to the external environment during the Meiji period but
stress cultural and domestic variables during the postwar period as
well. In reality, both domestic and international measures had and
continue to have an effect.
2Takafusa Nakamura, Economic Growth in Prewar Japan
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 59-60.
3William W. Lockwood, The Economic Development of Japan
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 563.
4 Ibid., p. 564.
40 Early Years
5G.C. Allen, A Short Economic History of Modern Japan 1867-
1937 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963), p. 165.
6Johannes Hirschmeier and Tsunehiko Yui, The Development of
Japanese Business, 1600-1973 (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1981), pp. 125-32.
7Keiichiro Nakagawa, "Government and Business in Japan: A
Comparative Approach," in Government and Business: Proceedings
of the Fifth Fuji Conference, ed. Keiichiro Nakagawa (Tokyo: Univer-
sity of Tokyo Press, 1980), p. 221.
8Comments by Kenichiro Shoda on Sakae Tsunoyama,
"Government and Business: An Introductory Essay," in Government
and Business: Proceedings of the Fifth Fuji Conference, ed. Keiichiro
Nakagawa. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1980), p. 20.
9Miyake Sadao, "The Japanese Motor Industry," Japan
Quarterly 15.1 (January-March 1968): 99.
10Ibid.
nIbid., p. 100.
12C.S. Chang, The Japanese Auto Industry and the U.S.
Market (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 10.
13Takayoshi Miyada, "Shokosho shoki no jidosha gyosei"
[Administration of automobiles in the early period of MCI], in Nihon
jidosha kogyoshi gyosei kiroku shu [Collection of articles on the
administrative history of the Japanese automobile industry], Nihon
Jidosha Shinko Kai (Tokyo: Nihon Jidosha Shinko Kai, 1979),
pp. 1-12.
14Portions of this law are cited in Chang, The Japanese Auto
Industry, pp. 196-97 and Taizo Yakushiji, "Dynamics of Policy
Interventions: The Case of the Government and the Automobile
Industry in Japan" (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, May 1977), pp. 78-80.
15Ibid.
16Chang, The Japanese Auto Industry, p. 13.
17Miyada, "Shokosho shoki no jidosha gyosei," p. 3.
18Yakushiji, "Dynamics of Polkry Interventions," p. 70.
19Ibid., p. 86.
20Chang, The Japanese Auto Industry, pp. 14-15.
21Masami Tamaoki, "The Protective System of Domestic Car
Production in the War Time," Keizaigaku-Kiyo, no. 9 (1974): 19-39.
22Chang, The Japanese Auto Industry, p. 15.
23Seisi Kato, My Years With Toyota (Tokyo: Toyota Motor
Sales Co., Ltd., 1981). This autobiography contains a discussion of
how Shotaro Kamiya, known as the King of Sales, decided for both
nationalist and self-advancement reasons to move from General
Early Years 41
Motors to Toyoda in 1928. When recruiting Mr. Kato, also at
General Motors, Kamiya said, "As long as you stay here, working
for GM, your skills will be exploited. If you come with me to
Toyoda, there's bound to be a chance for a senior post."
24Yakushiji, "Dynamics of Policy Interventions/' pp. 108-10.
25Tamaoki, "The Protective System," pp. 19-39.
26Miyada, "Shokosho shoki no jidosha gyosei," pp. 4-6 and
Yakushiji, "Dynamics of Policy Interventions," p. 105.
27Miyada, "Shokosho shoki no jidosha gyosei," pp. 4-6.
28Chang, The Japanese Auto Industry, p. 21.
29Miyada, "Shokosho Shoki no jidosha gyosei," pp. 4-6.
30Waga kuni jidosha sangyo no tenbo [Perspectives on Japan's
automobile industry] (Tokyo: Hosei University, 1982), p. 36.
31Chang, The Japanese Auto Industry, p. 18.
32William C. Duncan, U.S.-Japan Automobile Diplomacy
(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1973), p. 66.
33Fumihiko Adachi, Keinosuke Ono, and Konosuke Odaka,
Ancillary Firm Development in the Japanese Automobile Industry—
Selected Case Studies, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Hitotsubashi University, 1981),
p. 38.
34Michael A. Cusamano, The Japanese Automobile Industry
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 27-53.
35Toyota's history is found in Toyota Jidosha Kogyo K.K.,
Toyota jidosha nijunenshi [Twenty-year history of Toyota Motor
Company] (Toyota City: Toyota Motor Company, 1958) and Toyota
Jidosha Kogyo K.K., Toyota jidosha sanjunenshi [Thirty-year
history of Toyota Motor Company] (Toyota City: Toyota Motor
Company, 1968).
36Masaru Udagawa and Seichi Nakamura, "Japanese Busi-
ness and Government in the Inter-War Period: Heavy Industrializa-
tion and the Industrial Rationalization Movement," in Government
and Business: Proceedings of the Fifth Fuji Conference, ed. Keiichiro
Nakagawa (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1980), p. 84.
37Duncan, U.S.-Japan Automobile Diplomacy, pp. 66-67.
38Tamaoki in "The Protective System" presents these two
objectives, stating that as the Sino-Japanese War progressed it
became clear that the real aim of government was solely the
"completion of national defense." However, at least in the case of
MCI, there was an apparent awareness of the impact of the
development of the automobile industry on surrounding
industries. MCFs aim fell by the wayside as the army gained
control of the government.
42 Early Years
39Udagawa and Nakamura, "Japanese Business and
Government/' p. 95.
40Masaru Udagawa, "The Prewar Japanese Automobile
Industry and American Manufacturers," in Japanese Yearbook on
Business History: 1985, ed. Keiichiro Nakagawa and Hidemasa
Morikawa (Tokyo: Japanese Business History Institute, 1985),
pp. 91-93.
41Chang, The Japanese Auto Industry, pp. 29-30 and
Yakushiji, "Dynamics of Policy Interventions," pp. 150-53.
42Cusumano, The Japanese Automobile Industry, p. 17.
43Tamaoki, "The Protective System," pp. 16-19.
44Duncan, U.S.-Japan Automobile Diplomacy, p. 67.
45Adachi, Ono, and Odaka, Ancillary Firm Development,
pp. 22, 49.
46Nakamura, Economic Growth in Prewar Japan, p. 237.
47Ibid., p. 288.
48Tamaoki, "The Protective System," pp. 27-28.
49Ibid., p. 29.
50Kuman Uchiyama, "Jidosha gyosei ichigenka koso no
tenmatsu" [Aftermath of one-dimensional automobile administra-
tion], in Nihon jidosha kogyoshi gyosei kiroku shu [Collection of
articles on the administrative history of the Japanese automobile
industry], Nihon Jidosha Shinko Kai (Tokyo: Nihon Jidosha Shinko
Kai, 1979), pp. 127-29.
51Naomitsu Shirai, "Jidosha bu no ayumi [Steps of the
automobile section]," in Nihon jidosha kogyoshi gyosei kiroku shu,
Nihon Jidosha Shinko Kai (Tokyo: Nihon Jidosha Shinko Kai,
1979), pp. 115-24.
52Ibid.
53Uchiyama, "Jidosha gyosei ichigenka koso no tenmatsu,"
pp. 129-30.
54Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruc-
tion (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), pp. 31-32.
55Supreme Commander for Allied Powers, Economic and
Science Section, Industry Division, "Automotive Industry," (Typed
Monograph, Tokyo, n.d.), pp. 33-35.
56Ibid. The figures stated for the number of these associations
seem too high, although these figures are cited in the original source
material.
57Cohen, Japan's Economy in War, p. 246.
58Tamaoki, "The Protective System," pp. 29-30.




With the public announcement of Japan's surrender by the
emperor on August 15, 1945, and the signing of the Instrument of
Surrender on September 2, Japan entered into a period of turmoil
and reconstruction that lasted into the early 1950s.
At the end of the war, the Japanese economy was in
shambles. The bombings had destroyed a large portion of Japan's
residential housing as well as its factories. Industrial production had
fallen drastically. Little foreign exchange was available to buy basic
necessities or the raw materials needed to rebuild the
country. Japan's major prewar export markets and sources of raw
materials, China and Manchuria, were cut off. Japan's future was
in limbo as she waited to see what the Occupation would bring.
What the Occupation did bring was a major shift in orienta-
tion, which grew out of American demilitarization and democratiza-
tion programs and Japan's internal reaction to the defeat. Occupa-
tion authorities carried out major reforms in the areas of labor,
land, education, and industrial organization; many top business and
government leaders were purged. Moreover, they revised the
Constitution, the most famous modification being Article 9, which
banned military and naval forces, except for a limited self-defense
force. Lastly, after the start of the Cold War, the rehabilitation of
Japan's economy became a major Occupation objective.
Continuity with the past was not lost entirely. Although much
of the physical structure of the country was destroyed, managerial
skills, educational levels, and the bureaucracy remained. The
Occupation authorities were directed to work through the existing
Japanese government, further increasing continuity. Finally, many
Japanese companies managed to survive and restart after the war.
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44 Turmoil and Reconstruction
The Automobile Industry's Status
Early Reorganization
In 1945 the automobile industry found itself in the same dire
circumstances as the rest of the economy. It was more fortunate
than other industries because it had suffered less in the bomb-
ings. It was never a prima^ bombing target except once when
Toyota's main factory was bombed on August 14, 1945 and was 50
percent destroyed. But even this action was not as much an attempt
to destroy automobile production as Toyota's aircraft parts
manufacturing.1
Much more damage was done by the attempted dismantling
and dispersal of plants ordered by the army to avoid possible bomb
damage after March 1945.2 For example, production stopped at
Nissan in May 1945 when its machine tools were shipped to a town
180 miles north of Tokyo. No buildings were constructed at the new
site, so many of the machine tools were destroyed by weather.
Toyota moved 50 percent of its machine shops but never started
production at the new location. Diesel Motors (renamed Isuzu
Jidosha in 1949) built an underground plant in Nagano, to which it
moved its machine tools, but it was unable to begin production
because there was no electric power connection. Many auto parts
companies had similar experiences.
Other problems plagued the industry. The equipment that was
available at the end of the war was outdated and worn. There was
a scarcity of parts and raw materials, especially of steel and
rubber. Many trained engineers also had been moved out of the
automobile industry to aircraft factories.
Besides the physical damage, Japanese automobile executives
had other reasons to fear that the future of the industry was in
jeopardy.3 The army had designated and used motor vehicles as a
military commodity. Executives wondered whether the Occupation
authorities would treat the automobile industry as a military or a
civilian industry. This fear gained credibility when, initially, some
motor vehicle plants were designated for possible reparations and
only limited production of trucks was permitted. Second, General
Motors and Ford had dominated the Japanese automobile market
before the war. If the American companies were permitted to
reenter Japan with their markedly cheaper and better quality cars,
Japanese firms could not compete.
In the final analysis, these two problems never material-
ized. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP)
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determined that the automotive industry was not a good candidate
for reparations.4 In a letter dated December 26, 1945 to Ambas-
sador Edwin Pauley, head of the U.S. Reparations Mission to
Japan, H.D. Maxwell, Chief of Staff for SCAP, recommended:
The automotive industry as such should not be considered
available for reparations. The Japanese should be allowed
to decide what they want to allot to their automotive
industry in the way of steel and machine tools out of what
is left to them after reparations. Under these conditions,
their automotive industry would be on a smaller scale.5
This recommendation was accepted by Ambassador Pauley. Toyota,
Nissan, and Kawasaki Engineering (originally part of Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries) were removed from the reparations list—Toyota
in July 1946, the others in May 1948—and the production of
civilian vehicles was gradually allowed to begin.6 Diesel Motors and
Kohsoku Engineering (Ota Jidosha) were never designated for
reparations.
The American companies did not rush into the market because
of import controls and, more importantly, because they could not fill
the burgeoning domestic demand in the United States.
In the initial months after the end of the war, only Toyota was
able to continue production of vehicles. On August 18, Kiichiro
Toyoda met with Ichibei Terasawa, who headed the automobile
section of the Machinery Bureau of the Ministry for Military
Procurement.7 Kiichiro Toyoda said, "The Toyota factory will
continue production" and informed Terasawa of the amount of raw
materials on hand. Toyota managed to produce 602 vehicles of
various types between August and November. Nissan and Diesel
Motors, however, were not able to restart production until
November. In addition, Toyota and the other companies directed
their employees to produce other items such as metal cookware and
furniture in order to survive. All three major companies were
ordered to help repair and refurbish vehicles for the Occupation
authorities, which also helped them to survive.
On August 21, the Tuesday after the armistice, Kiichiro
Toyoda chaired a meeting between Japanese government represen-
tatives from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the
Ministry of Transportation, including Mr. Terasawa, and the top
executives of Toyota, Nissan, and Diesel Motors to discuss the
overall situation and decide how to deal with the coming occupa-
tion.8 Similar meetings were held twice a week in the next few
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months. A formalized arrangement began with the establishment of
the Automobile Conference (Jidosha Kyogikai) on November 25 for
the purpose of rebuilding the automobile industry.9 The Japan
Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA), the industry's
current trade association, had its roots in these organizations that
were formed to lobby General Headquarters (GHQ) and then later
the Japanese government, for import protection and low cost
loans.10 This organization partially took over the role of the
Automobile Manufacturing Industrial Association, the wartime
control association for the automobile industry, which was
disbanded on November 14. While the Conference did not have
direct control of the Automobile Manufacturing Industrial Associa-
tion, it did have some authority for distribution and allotment
because of the scarcity of raw materials.
When SCAP decided that "the Tosei Kai [control associations]
performed so many undesirable functions that mere refurbishment
to perform allocation functions would only be more difficult than the
creation of a new allotment system," the industry was again reor-
ganized.11 In August 1946, SCAP directed the Japanese govern-
ment to dissolve the existing control associations. The Economic
Stabilization Board (Keizai Antei Honbu) then designated newly
created public associations as auxiliary allocation organiza-
tions. There were seven such associations designated for the
automobile industry, the most important being the Automobile
Manufacturers Association (Jidosha Seizo Kogyo Kumiai), which
had been established on December 17, 1945 by Toyota, Nissan,
Diesel Motors, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (also the core
membership of the Automobile Conference).12 This association was
the first postwar automotive trade association.
Other prewar motor vehicle manufacturers could not enter the
market as quickly as Toyota, Nissan, and Diesel Motors because
the Automobile Manufacturing Law was not rescinded until
January 16, 1946. Until it was rescinded, only the previously
authorized companies could legally produce vehicles. More impor-
tantly, the other companies did not have the resources these three
companies possessed because they had been forced to curtail their
production of vehicles during the war.
The next entrants into the market were Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries and Hino Jidosha Kogyo, both of whom produced
weaponry and tanks during the war. These companies were
followed by other manufacturers, mostly from the aircraft industry,
who could no longer legally produce their traditional products and
wanted to move into the motor vehicle sector. This movement was
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more pronounced once it became clear that the motor vehicle
industry would not be considered a military industry and would be
removed from the reparations list. Estimates indicate thirty-two
companies moved to the motor vehicle sector, most into auto parts
manufacturing.13
The companies that eventually began production of four-
wheeled vehicles included Tachikawa Aircraft, which became Prince
Jidosha in November 1946 (later merging with Nissan in 1966),
and Nakajima Aircraft, which became Fuji Heavy Industries
(producing Subaru passenger cars). In addition, the major prewar
three-wheeled vehicle producers, Mazda Motor Corporation
(formerly Toyo Kogyo) and Daihatsu Kogyo, restarted production on
December 1, 1945 and April 1, 1946, respectively. Both of these
companies began production of four-wheeled vehicles in 1958.
At the same time, the Japanese bureaucracy in charge of
motor vehicle production was reorganized. A controversy arose over
whether the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) or the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry (MCI) would have jurisdiction over motor
vehicle production.14 During the war the Ministry of Military
Procurement had jurisdiction, but before the war MOT and MCI had
automobile-related programs. Around August 20, all the staff of the
automobile section of the Machinery Bureau, except for Ichibei
Terasawa and one assistant, were recalled to MOT. When the
Ministry of Military Procurement was disbanded by imperial
ordinance on August 26, the machinery bureau was transferred to
the reestablished MCI.
MOT gained administrative authority over the distribution of
automobiles and also wanted to control their production. It justified
its position by the fact that it controlled the distribution and produc-
tion of other types of transportation equipment including railroad
carriages, ships, and airplanes. MOT formally petitioned MCI for
production control in November, although there were earlier
informal attempts to woo Mr. Terasawa. MOT officials had told
him, "You can't accomplish anything working by yourself at
MCI . . . Why don't you come to MOT if you want to work with
motor vehicles?"15 MOT also attempted to pressure MCI through
Diet hearings held by Ichizo Goto, the son of Shimpei Goto, a major
prewar political leader. MCI supported its position, by emphasizing
that the motor vehicle industry was integrally connected with the
parts and machinery industries, which were part of MCI. The
controversy ended when MCI formally established an automobile
section on January 10, 1946.
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SCAP Automobile Policy
Although automobile production after the war began through
private initiative, it was subject to limitations imposed by
SCAP. SCAP set initial policy on automobile production during the
first month of the Occupation. Ichibei Terasawa lobbied SCAP on
behalf of the automobile industry, stressing the need for trucks to
transport food and other basic goods.16 On September 25, 1945,
SCAP in GHQ Memorandum No. 58 gave Japan permission to
produce 1,500 trucks a month, which was believed to be the
minimum number required to fill the economy's transportation
needs. On September 28, SCAP approved rubber imports in the
amount needed to produce 1,500 trucks.17 The production of
passenger cars was forbidden because the scarcity of raw materials
necessitated that all resources go into truck production. Actual
production did not reach the approved level until 1948 because of
raw material and capital scarcity. Production finally increased as
supplies of coal and steel became more available and Occupation
policy was clarified. The latter point was especially important for
Nissan since its holding company had been designated for dissolu-
tion on December 7, 1946 and Yoshisuke Aikawa, the founder of
Nissan, had been purged.18
Another early result of Occupation policy was the establish-
ment of labor unions as part of the democratization program. After
the passage of the Labor Union Law on December 22, 1945, unions
were formed in each of the automobile companies starting with
Toyota on January 19, 1946 and Nissan on February 19, 1946.19
A national union, the Japan Automobile Workers Union (Zen-Nihon
Jidosha Sangyo Rodo Kumiai), was formed in March 1948. Like
many other unions at that time, its leadership was strongly leftist.
The unions did not strongly influence developments in the
automobile industry during the Occupation except for the strikes
during the recession of 1949. The major impact of the unions
occurred during the Nissan strike of 1953.20 As a result, the Japan
Automobile Workers Union was disbanded in the fall of
1954. Another national union, the Federation of Automobile
Workers Unions, was not formed until August 1962.
The automobile companies were anxious to restart vehicle
production after the war. The importance of production was
emphasized by the presence of the highly mobilized Occupation
forces, with their extensive use of noncombat vehicles such as two-
and-a-half ton trucks, jeeps, and trailers. The sight of these vehicles
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inspired the Japanese to say that the yamatosamashii (Japanese
fighting spirit) had been beaten by American butsuryo (massive
materials and equipment).
The industry's executives were especially anxious to begin
passenger car production because they saw this area, particularly
the production of small-sized cars (1,000-1,500 cc), as the most
promising for the future. In October 1945, Kiichiro Toyoda
requested that his engineers develop a new passenger car.21 This
car eventually became the first Toyopet.
The Automobile Conference submitted a petition on March 9,
1946, to the Japanese government requesting permission to restart
passenger car production.22 This request was conveyed in April
1946 by the Japanese government to SCAP in a special request to
permit the production of 200 passenger cars. SCAP rejected the
request on April 12 in GHQ Memorandum No. 977-A. SCAP's
internal memorandum for the record states the reason for the
denial:
This decision was based on the fact that the available
steel could be used to better advantage in the manufac-
ture of motor trucks than in passenger car construc-
tion. The automobile industry was allocated steel for
October, November and December 1945 but due to low
steel production, no steel was actually received. During
the last quarter of 1945 fiscal year or January, February
and March 1946, of approximately 8,000 tons allocated,
none was received. For the first quarter of 1946 (April,
May, June), the automobile industry was allocated 3,500
tons of steel, or approximately enough for one month's
production at the reduced schedules. In general, the
automobile companies had been operating to date utilizing
truck chassis, spare parts and assemblies held in
stock. Such stock parts (truck) had now been practically
depleted. Due to the insignificant steel allocation to the
automotive industry and no apparent relief in the near
future, it was considered more appropriate to utilize the
proposed metal allocations in continuing the manufacture
of truck chassis and for spare parts in order to place in
operating condition thousands of deadline
vehicles. Therefore on the basis of the overall critical steel
production and the minute allocation of steel to the
automobile industry, the authority to manufacture
passenger cars at that time was not recommended.23
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In addition, the request was denied because Nissan and Toyota used
identical engines in trucks and passenger cars, so that production of
passenger cars would automatically reduce the number of trucks
manufactured. SCAP also was concerned that passenger car produc-
tion would use spare parts needed to repair out-of-service trucks.
The Japanese government submitted a second petition on
January 23, 1947 entitled "Application for Permission to Manufac-
ture Small-Sized Passenger-Cars." This petition was accepted and
SCAP, in GHQ Memorandum No. 1715, agreed to permit passenger
car production in June 1947.24 Japan was permitted to produce 50
large-sized cars (greater than 1,500 cc) and 300 small-sized cars
(less than 1,500 cc). Private use of passenger cars was still
prohibited, with sales permitted only to hospitals, doctors, police,
government agencies, public organizations, business firms, and taxi
companies. In addition, the 1,500 production limitation on trucks
was eliminated. The petition was accepted, and the production
limitation on trucks was lifted because the supply of trucks had
increased substantially in late 1946 when the U.S. Army released
17,000 surplus trucks and trailers to the Japanese govern-
ment. Many of the surplus trucks were used to transport food and
other basic necessities and others were converted into buses to
transport workers. The supply of materials had also increased.
The fifty large-sized cars were to be produced from prewar
stocks of parts and no totally new large-sized cars were permitted
because they used the same engines and parts as trucks. The large-
sized cars could only be sold "for use as taxicabs for the transporta-
tion of accredited commercial representatives of foreign govern-
ments and foreign business firms." These cars were built by Toyota,
which made fifty-three such cars from stockpiled parts.25 Small-
sized cars, however, would not use the same parts or production
facilities as standard-sized trucks so a higher production level was
authorized although such production was not given any priority in
the allocation of raw materials.
In November 1948, MCI requested permission from SCAP to
relax the 300-per-year restriction on small-sized cars to permit the
manufacture of 4,800 vehicles.26 No response was received, and the
Ministry of International Trade and Commerce (MCI became MITI
in May 1949) again submitted requests in March and June 1949 for
the manufacture of 3,000 vehicles, out of which 600 would be
exported. Again, no responses were received. A formal petition was
filed on July 14, 1949, followed by a final request in a letter on
August 16, 1949.27
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The Motor Trade Industry Association, an export promotion
association established in March 1949 and headed by Kiichiro
Toyoda, submitted a report to SCAP in August 1949 entitled "The
Problem of Small-Sized Passenger-Cars."28 This report sought the
elimination of restrictions so that production could be increased,
thus lowering prices and expanding exports (Japan had exported
two passenger cars in early 1949 to Southeast Asia). The three
producers of small-sized passenger cars-—Toyota, Nissan, and
Kohsoku Engineering (Ota)—had by May 1949 already produced
983 cars since the relaxation of restrictions in 1947, thus exceeding
a three-year quota in only two. SCAP issued an oral directive
conveyed by Mr. Wesley Melyan of the Industry Division to MITI
on June 17 suspending production. The makers responded they had
overproduced because they expected a favorable reply to MITI's
requests since the Economic Stabilization Board had approved a
five-year plan in August 1948 to increase the production limit on
small four-wheeled vehicles. Their report asked GHQ to make a
decision on passenger car production quickly before the companies
were even further hurt by the suspension.
Production limitations on passenger cars were completely lifted
on October 25, 1949 in GHQ Memorandum No. 2053 as raw
materials and fuel became available. GHQ, however, informally told
MITI that it expected only 5,000 small passenger cars to be built in
1950; the number controlled by the allocation of petroleum
products.29 The decision to lift limitations was spurred both by the
requests from MITI and the Motor Trade Industry Association as
well as by the number of applications received from foreign inves-
tors to import American-made automobiles to use as taxis. By
1949, the majority of prewar passenger cars still used as taxis were
on the verge of complete breakdown. Because of foreign exchange
constraints, SCAP and the Japanese government felt that it would
be better to fill the demand for new vehicles through domestic
production rather than imports.
The final decision to permit unlimited production of passenger
cars was also based on the hope that the automotive industry could
develop as an exporter and so lessen Japan's dependence on U.S.
funds to pay for imports. A 1950 SCAP monograph stated:
As for Japan's foreign markets for automobiles, it can be
said that any country in the world that has an automotive
transportation system and has no automotive industry of
its own is a potential market for Japanese automotive
equipment. It is estimated that in the Asiatic areas
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remaining open to Japanese automotive equipment, there
are more than 200,000 trucks in use. This is a potential
and immediate market for 33,000 replacement vehicles
based on a 6 year life for the vehicles. If Japanese
manufacturers secure only one-third of this potential busi-
ness, there is a possible export of 11,000 trucks annually
to Asia alone. However, to capture this and other
markets, it is recognized that it will be necessary for the
automotive vehicle producers in Japan to lower the selling
prices to within a competitive range of automotive
producers in other parts of the world, and at the same
time improve and modernize these same vehicles.30
Studies of the Japanese automobile industry pay scant atten-
tion to the early Occupation although they do attribute the delay in
the start of a passenger car industry to SCAP policy in this
period.31 However, even if passenger car production had not been
prohibited prior to 1949, the companies were not in a position to
immediately restart production because of the wartime controls
restricting passenger car production and research. Therefore, it is
difficult to attribute the delay in passenger car development
primarily to Occupation controls on production. Certainly, the
controls imposed on truck production had much less impact than the
scarcity of raw materials.
Early Government Support
MCI's Five-Year Plan
The automobile industry began to recover slowly but it soon
became apparent that it would be difficult to obtain adequate
financing and raw materials without the strong support of the
government. MCI had been sympathetic to the needs of the industry
and had fought to maintain jurisdiction over automobile production,
but had been too preoccupied with the restart of basic industries like
steel and coal to do anything more. The automobile industry felt
that it had not received adequate assistance or been allocated
adequate supplies under the Temporary Law Regarding Material
Demand and Supply Adjustment. The private sector decided to take
the initiative in seeking government support under the priority
production system.
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The industry's leaders met in Tokyo at the Automobile
Industry Crisis-Relief Convention (Jidosha Sangyo Kikitoppa Taikai)
in January 1947 to decide the best way to garner concrete govern-
ment support.32 Representatives from management, labor unions,
and automobile-related industry associations attended this meeting,
which resulted in the establishment of a standing committee, the
National Automobile Industry Revival Conference (Zenkoku Jidosha
Sangyo Fukko Kaigi), in April 1947.
This Conference declared that the only way to restore the
motor vehicle industry was through the positive cooperation of
management and labor. A proposal submitted to the Economic
Stabilization Board and MCI stated that first a policy plan should be
developed for the motor vehicle industry based on the opinions of
the Revival Conference.33 Second, the motor vehicle industry should
be designated as an extra important industry like the steel and
fertilizer industries. And third, adequate capital and raw materials
should be assured. Six automobile-related trade associations
submitted supporting petitions.
The Economic Stabilization Board responded with two recom-
mendations.34 First, the automobile industry should develop
through imported technology. And second, the government should
provide assistance through the Reconstruction Finance Bank (Fukko
Kinyu Ginko). These recommendations were then given to MCI,
which responded with the Five Year Plan for the Automobile
Industry (Jidosha Sangyo Go Ka Nen Keikaku) in mid-August
1948, a part of the national five-year economic plan known as the
Economic Rehabilitation Plan.35 The details of this plan were
further clarified with the release on October 28 of the Basic Policy
for the Automobile Industry (Jidosha Kogyo Kihon Taisaku).36
The premise of this policy was that Japan's transportation
needs could not be filled by imports; therefore, the domestic industry
should be supported. For such a policy to succeed, the industry
would have to be able to obtain capital, raw materials, electricity,
and labor. In addition, technology would have to be brought in from
overseas and a council established to manage the plan. Private
companies such as Toyota, Nissan, and Diesel Motors developed
their own five-year plans to complement the MCI policy.37 The
Basic Policy itself included the following general points38:
1. In order to fulfill Japan's transportation needs, the
production of domestic vehicles will be increased
because the need cannot be fulfilled by imports. The
planned increase in transportation capacity (the
54 Turmoil and Reconstruction
amount of freight transported by truck) is from 260
million tons in 1949 to 384 million tons in 1953.
2. Used cars from Occupation personnel could not be
relied upon because their fuel consumption was inef-
ficient and replacement parts were difficult to find.
3. The main target of future exports should be the
Asian market.
4. When appropriate, officially decided automobile
prices will be abolished.
5. Controls will be gradually relaxed on the distribution
of automobiles.
In addition, there were specific plans made for each type of car39:
1. Truck and Bus Chassis — Since Japan is capable of
producing chassis comparable to foreign products,
there is no need to change the way they are
produced. Small modifications will be made to
increase efficiency, raise quality, and lower
prices. Mergers among producers such as Nissan,
Toyota, and Diesel are not suitable to achieve the
five-year plan; management should be rationalized
and mass production established step by step.
2. Small-Sized Four-Wheeled Vehicles — Both trucks
and passenger cars can fulfill the requirements of
the market. Japan needs to establish new plants and
equipment, while striving to ease the production
limitation on passenger cars, presently at 300 a
year.
3. Large-sized Automobiles — Japan should attempt to
change large cars to diesels and develop diesel
technology.
Finally, the policy outlined the targeted production levels,
which were based on the expected level of rubber imports.40 The
production level for normal-sized trucks and buses was to increase
from 19,500 in 1949 to 25,500 in 1953. Similarly, the production
level for small-sized four-wheeled vehicles was to increase from
8,070 in 1949 to 21,700 in 1953 (see table 2).
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Table 2
Ministry of Commerce and Industry's
Five-Year Production Plan
























Source: Nihon Keizai Shimbun
The Reconstruction Finance Bank
The Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB) was established on
January 24, 1947 to help restore Japan's production levels. The
automobile industry's appeal for funding was based on the following
points41: The automobile industry is indispensable in the war
recovery effort; Japan cannot depend on imports when the United
States cannot meet its own demand; the Japanese shipping industry
received heavy damage during the war and so is unable to transport
automobiles, while American shipping is filled to capacity carrying
materials needed for the Occupation; and, Japan is short of foreign
currency, which must be used first to fulfill basic needs, not to
import automobiles.
The major companies in the automobile industry obtained loans
from the RFB. They were supported in this effort by their labor
unions, which included many returning war veterans who would
have lost their jobs if the funding had not been forthcoming.42 MCI
supported the loans, but the companies' success was due primarily
to their own lobbying. Part of the debt of Toyota, Nissan, and Diesel
Motors to the city banks was changed to guaranteed RFB loans. In
fact, the very first loan given by the RFB went to Toyota. Out of
Toyota's total debt of $1,750,000 at the end of 1948, just over
$1,000,000 was owed to the bank.43 Diesel Motors received a loan
of $1,950,000. At the beginning of 1950, the automobile companies
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were still indebted to the bank for a total of $3,683,333: Nissan for
$1,388,889, Toyota for $1,344,444, Isuzu for $658,333, Hino for
$163,889, and Mitsubishi for $100,000.44
The Basic Policy had to be abandoned because of the recession
that began to develop in late 1948 and worsened with the institution
of the Dodge Line in April 1949. Therefore, the loans from the RFB
were not able to put the industry on a firm foundation.
Although the initial government effort to aid the automobile
industry was interrupted, it was significant for the government-
business relationship. The effort to obtain government support
forced the private sector to voluntarily organize into trade associa-
tions. The two most important were the Automobile Manufacturers
Association, which became the Automobile Industry Association
(Jidosha Kogyo Kai) on April 1, 1948, and the Japan Small Car
Manufacturers Association (Nihon Kogata Jidosha Kogyo Kai),
established on March 29, 1946. The automobile industry had no
previous experience in setting up this type of voluntary associa-
tion. The only industry associations before and during World War II
were in reality control associations. The new trade associations had
to learn to consolidate their members' views if they were to win
government support in an era of scarcity.
The joint effort by government and business to develop a five-
year plan and to rescind the limitations imposed by the Occupation
represented the start of a cooperative effort in economic develop-
ment. It also represented the beginning of a real commitment by
MCI and its descendant, MITI, to support a domestic automobile
industry. This support was still primarily for the production of
trucks, but the inclusion of passenger cars was now given serious
consideration. In addition to pressure from manufacturers in favor
of making passenger cars, MCI took into account the interests of
consumers who wanted their own cars.45
Hard Times
The Dodge Line
The initial government program to aid the automobile industry
was interrupted by nationwide economic problems. The Japanese
economy had suffered from chronic inflation since the end of the
war, and, as production recovered, steps were taken to bring it
under control.
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On December 18, 1948, the Nine Point Stabilization Program
was published jointly by the U.S. Department of State and the
U.S. Department of the Army. This program was precipitated by
the failure of the Japanese government to control inflation and the
downfall of the Ashida cabinet in October 1948. In February 1949,
Joseph Dodge, a Detroit banker, was sent to Japan to draft and
implement a drastic deflationary program, the Dodge Line, that had
five objectives. These were a balanced budget (actually a surplus
budget), the reduction and elimination of government subsidies, the
suspension of new loans from the RFB, a fixed foreign exchange
rate of 360 yen to the dollar, and the creation of the Counterpart
Fund Special Account.46
The Dodge Line was successful in reducing inflation, but it also
threw the nation into an economic crisis. The immediate effect was
to undermine the system of priority production and the Economic
Rehabilitation Plan. Japan suffered from massive unemployment,
widespread bankruptcies, and a stagnant economy.
The effect on the automobile industry was enormous since it
was a consumer goods industry and had relied heavily on RFB
financing. Like other industries, it experienced slack sales and large
accumulations in inventory. The companies had large, uncontrolled
debts, and the banks were refusing to honor installment sales
vouchers. In addition, sales controls on automobiles were abolished
in April, throwing the automobile companies into an intensely
competitive free market.47 Even the strongest three companies,
Toyota, Nissan, and Diesel Motors, were soon in dire straits.
Nissan was forced to lay off 1,811 employees in October 1949
and cut wages by 10 percent.48 Diesel Motors abolished its labor
union agreement, laid off 1,271 out of 5,474 employees, and shut
down factories in Aomori, Nagano, and Sugi.49 As a result, the
company suffered the greatest setbacks because it was overstaffed
with more than 8,000 workers as of April 1950 and had manage-
ment problems.50
The Toyota Reorganization
By the end of 1949, Toyota was on the verge of collapse. It
was forced to scale back production plans for 1950 from 15,840 to
3,000 vehicles and shut down two factories, Shibaura and Ikamata,
in the Tokyo area.51 Kiichiro Toyoda promised that he would not
lay off workers, but employment in subsidiaries fell by 23
percent. Toyota itself accepted the voluntary retirement of 1,600
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workers at its main office. Wages were cut by 10 percent for
everyone.
Toyota could not raise the approximately $560,000 it needed
to stave off bankruptcy so it took an unprecedented step: it asked
the Bank of Japan (BOJ), the central bank, for a loan. Mr. Shotaro
Kamiya submitted Toyota's request for $560,000 in late 1949 to
Mr. Takeo Takanashi, the Nagoya district office director of BOJ.52
This request was an unprecedented move for two reasons. First,
BOJ was not in the business of giving loans to private companies,
only to other banks or government agencies. Second, the governor
of the Bank of Japan, Naoto Ichimada, was a well-known opponent
of industrial development based on heavy industry and of the
automobile industry in particular.
Luckily for Toyota, Mr. Takanashi decided to support them.53
He conducted detailed research on Toyota's financial background
and was able to overcome tough opposition to the loan from the
main office of the Bank of Japan by stressing that the economy of
the Nagoya region would collapse if Toyota went bankrupt. BOJ
finally arranged a loan for Toyota by forming and leading a syndi-
cate of twenty-four banks including the Mitsui and Tokai Banks.
The loan was granted only after the company met four major
conditions.54 First, Toyota's sales and manufacturing divisions were
to be split into separate companies. Second, the manufacturing divi-
sion was to produce only the number of cars that the sales division
could sell. Third, personnel were to be rationalized (fired). And
fourth, outside personnel were to take over the company's
management.
The first two conditions were easily accepted. Shotaro Kamiya
was already in favor of separating the two divisions. The company
history of Toyota Motors Sales Co., Ltd. states: "In truth, this
separation was Kamiya's dream for a long time; in other words,
this plan and Toyota's previous plan matched."55 On April 3, 1950,
Toyota Motor Sales Co., Ltd. was established with Shotaro Kamiya
as its first director. It began operations on July 1 with initial
capitalization at $222,222. The second condition was imposed
because of Toyota's huge inventory, which resulted in its assets
being tied up as inventory. A plan was developed whereby produc-
tion plans would be made only after an order was received from the
sales company.
The second two conditions were much harder for Toyota to
accept. Kiichiro Toyoda initially said: "I can accept the separation
plan if I can avoid firing people and avoid bankruptcy."56
Ultimately, Kiichiro Toyoda had no choice but to give in to the bank
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and cut personnel. Employment dropped from 8,112 to 5,994, which
precipitated a major strike at Toyota that lasted from April 7 until
June 14, 1950 and brought the company to the verge of collapse for
a second time in one year.
The last condition was the most difficult to accept. Toyota was
a family-run company, but the banks and the labor union demanded
a complete change of management. A compromise resulted in the
resignation of Kiichiro Toyoda and the selection of Taizo Ishida, a
cousin of the Toyoda family and the president of Toyoda Automatic
Loom, as his successor. Bank representatives assumed management
positions in Toyota Motor Sales (Takeshi Nagai from Tokai Bank)
and Toyota Motor Corporation (Fukio Nakagawa of the BOJ). Taizo
Ishida stated that he was called to a meeting in late May with
Risaburo, Kiichiro, and Eiji Toyoda. Kiichiro Toyoda told him, "The
bank suggested using outside personnel but this is the only condition
we cannot accept."57 The banks were willing to accept Taizo Ishida
because he had established a good reputation as a manager at
Toyoda Automatic Loom and was currently helping with the strike
at Toyota Motor Company. Ishida took over the company formally
in July but was effectively in charge by mid-June. In his resigna-
tion, Kiichiro Toyoda stated:
I think that I'll quit Toyota Motor. It is my beloved child.
This child is grown up enough to no longer need parents;
me. And now, he behaves in his own way. . . . I hope that
Toyota Motor will disappear from my mind.58
Toyota and the other automobile companies were still in
trouble in June 1950 but had already begun to restructure after
surviving the initial impact of the Dodge Line. Toyota Motor Sales'
monthly installment sales plan was an example of the restructuring
process that went beyond basic cuts in production and
personnel. This process was greatly expedited by the outbreak of
the Korean War on June 25.
The Korean War Boom
The special procurement of Japanese goods by the United
Nations forces during the Korean War brought about an economic
boom not just for the automobile industry but for the economy as a
whole. Japan was the best source of emergency supplies due to its
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location and its existing industrial base. The special procurements
wiped out surplus inventories, raised production, and brought in
needed foreign exchange. Industrial production by the end of 1951
surpassed its prewar peak, and the Special Foreign Exchange
Account, which had stood at $200 million at the end of 1949, had
grown to $940 million by the end of 1951.59 Income from procure-
ment in the broad sense of goods and services for the war and the
reconstruction of the South Korean economy amounted to between
$2.4 and $3.6 billion dollars between 1950 and 1955.60 Most impor-
tantly, the boom occurred when Japan's economy, still suffering
from the deflationary policies of the Dodge Line, was at a very
crucial point in deciding the direction and success of postwar
economic development.
The automobile industry benefited greatly from the economic
boom. The U.N. forces ordered trucks and related parts and equip-
ment from the Japanese automobile and parts manufacturers.
Taizo Ishida said, "This is a good chance that comes only once in
1,000 years. Don't argue sales or manufacturing. I want to get [an
order for] one more truck or jeep than Nissan or Isuzu."61 He
succeeded in this endeavor. By the end of the war, Toyota had
received orders for 5,629 vehicles while Nissan and Isuzu had sold
only 5,035 and 1,256, respectively.62
The Military Supply Agency (MSA) ordered 10,321 trucks
from Japanese companies between 1950 and 1953, as well as
related equipment such as buses, engines, dump trucks, and weapon
carriers (see table 3). The majority of the orders came in the second
half of 1950 with a few later as needed for reconstruction
work. Toyota and Nissan received the majority of the orders, with
Isuzu and the smaller firms also receiving a share. For example,
Toyota supplied 2,750 gasoline-powered cargo trucks, 500 dump
trucks, 54 tank trucks, and 150 weapon carriers in the first and
second procurement orders.63
The procurement orders aided the Japanese automobile
industry by eliminating inventories, increasing production, and
raising profit levels. These orders also provided the funds for the
rationalization and modernization measures needed to provide the
industry with a stable base for future growth. Nissan upgraded its
plant by using $56,000 from the Counterpart Aid Fund of the
United States to import manufacturing equipment to make trucks
for use in the Korean War.64 Demand enabled the automobile
companies to charge the United Nations' forces high prices for their
products. The price for trucks rose from $1,475 in July to $2,788 in
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December 1950—an increase of 89 percent.65 Before procurement
began, the same trucks were selling on average for $l,250.66
Table 3
Procured Military Vehicles
During the Korean War, 1950-1953























Note: Available statistics vary. The actual number of procured
vehicles is probably somewhat higher than the official listings.
Source: Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association.
This rapid price increase meant that large amounts of capital
became available to the companies. It is no surprise that major
investments in plant and equipment began in 1951. From 1951 to
1956, investments in plant and equipment for seventeen companies
that produced completed cars and chassis (ordinary, small, and
three-wheeled) reached nearly $82 million (29.5 billion yen). The
price increase also engendered complaints about price gouging by
the United States soon after Japan's independence in 1952. Hear-
ings were held in Japan's National Diet that year, but the issue was
resolved in favor of the Japanese automobile companies. Taizo
Ishida testified:
In what kind of world does such a ridiculous story exist
that merchandise after it is bought is said to be too expen-
sive and the price is asked to be lowered. Should I ask for
a discount on the machinery we have already bought from
the United States? . . . Only once or so a poor Japan
profited from the rich. We should not get agitated about
this.67
On July 8, 1950, the Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) was
founded with 83,000 members and quickly became another impor-
tant customer for the automobile industry. In the twelve-month
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period from July 1950 to July 1951, the SDF bought 2,259 trucks
from Japanese automobile makers.68 While not as large as the
special procurement purchases, these purchases were important to
the revitalization of the industry. As the Korean War came to an
end, the automobile companies hoped to sell as much as 20 percent
of their production to the SDF and were optimistic about the future
once the era of large special procurements of motor vehicles came to
an end.69
Several scholars, including Chalmers Johnson, feel that the
Korean War special procurement was "the key to the revival of the
Japanese automobile industry."70 Unquestionably, the special
procurements were an enormous help because they forced
companies to restructure: a process that they were able to carry
more quickly to fruition because of purchases by the SDF and by
U.N. forces in Korea. It is important to note, however, that the
restructuring process, as evidenced by the changes at Toyota, was
already beginning before the Korean War. The war hastened the
process, but given the prior support for the industry by MCI, it is
likely that the automobile industry would have developed even
without the benefit of the special procurement, although not as
quickly. Michael Cusumano adds that the procurements were useful
experiences for the companies in learning techniques of technology
transfer and mass production.71
In addition, special procurement was only for trucks and truck-
related equipment, not passenger cars. The truck industry by 1950
was already firmly established in Japan. The procurement of trucks
did indirectly affect the development of passenger cars by providing
the companies with the funds necessary to carry out research and
development. Additional funds by themselves, however, did not
ensure the growth of a passenger car industry.
The period of hard times that ended with the Korean War had
a substantial impact on the later growth of the automobile
industry. The special procurements were instrumental in reviving
the industry. Also, by the end of this period, the government's
ability to directly control the automobile industry was weakened as
raw materials became more readily available and resource alloca-
tion controls were lifted. And, finally, it is important to note that
while the Bank of Japan opposed the idea of a passenger car
industry, it was unable to prevent its regional office from supporting
Toyota.
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Conclusion
The Occupation years form a critical period in the postwar
expansion of Japan's automobile industry. Certain private and
public policy decisions were made at this time that shaped the foun-
dation of the industry. The events of the Occupation period and the
period immediately after independence constitute the most dynamic
era of developments in the relationship between the Japanese
government and the automobile industry.
There are four specific developments that underscore this
period's significance. Decisions that changed the direction of the
economy as a whole also were reflected in specific developments in
the automobile industry.
Strong voluntary trade associations were established in
response to powerful external pressures imposed by the end of the
war and the demilitarization and democratization policies of
SCAP. Although these associations went through various
organizational changes in the ensuing years, their existence,
combined with strong leadership provided by individual executives
and the reshaping of the Japanese economy through Occupation
policies, contributed to the development of the postwar government-
business relationship. The partnership between government and
business that had characterized the relationship prior to the war
returned. Relations were different, however, because the private
sector now took a much more active role in helping decide policy
directions.
The relationship between government and business was also
affected by the joint effort to plan the long-term development of the
automobile industry. While this plan had many opponents and was
terminated because of the deflationary impact of the Dodge Line, it
represented the beginning of a new way of interacting. The strength
of this new relationship was demonstrated when it survived the
termination of various control measures over raw materials and
distribution. Initially, the partnership survived because industry
and government had to work together to overcome their perceived
vulnerability to powerful foreign automobile companies who were
capable of dominating the Japanese market and lobbying SCAP.
MCFs decision to regard the automobile industry as
fundamental to the reconstruction of the economy meant it would
receive special incentives and protection. Thereafter, MCI continued
to strongly support the automobile industry in policy debates within
the bureaucracy. Even though the makeup of the industry was as
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yet undecided and basic industries still received much more support,
MCI did not alter its essentially favorable position. This support
became much more important in the first half of the 1950s after
Japan regained total control over its economic and foreign policies.
The foundation for a stronger, restructured automobile
industry began during the Occupation. The Dodge Line fostered the
recognition of the need to restructure and provided the impetus
behind many private sector entrepreneurs' decisions on the future
direction of their companies. Certainly the automobile executives
were well aware of their weakness in comparison to the American
automobile industry, but they were forced to restructure to avoid
bankruptcy. The special procurements from the United Nations and
the SDF during the Korean War helped to ensure that this restruc-
turing process had a good chance to succeed. The major issues
remaining for the government and business to address in the 1950s
were the threat of imports and foreign capital, and whether a viable
passenger car industry, in addition to a truck industry, could be
developed.
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The enormous international success of the Japanese
automobile industry is based on a competitive passenger car
industry. Before 1950 the production of trucks and buses was the
primary concern, but as the Occupation ended, the focus of the
government and the private sector turned to passenger cars.
By the time of the Korean War, it was clear that a Japanese
motor vehicle industry based on truck and bus production could
survive, but the development of a passenger car industry was still
viewed by many as a ludicrous idea. Koichi Shirnokawa stated that
there were two options in the early 1950s: to concentrate on truck
production or to promote a strategic industry by the mass produc-
tion of the passenger car.1 As the early 1950s progressed, it was
clear that the decision was in favor of passenger cars.
The first Japanese passenger cars built after GHQ lifted
production restrictions in 1949 were little more than small
trucks. Between 1949 and 1951 Toyota sold for use as taxis about
700 SD style passenger cars that consisted of small truck chassis
with attached passenger car bodies.2 In addition, these cars only
had twenty-seven horsepower engines and, because of the truck
chassis, very high floorboards. Needless to say, their quality,
durability, and styling left much to be desired.
There were only two other companies making four-wheeled
gasoline-powered passenger cars, Nissan and Kosoku Kikan Kogyo
K.K. (renamed Ota Jidosha Kogyo K.K. in 1952).3 Together they
produced 381, 1,070, 1,594, and 3,611 passenger cars in 1948,
1949, 1950, and 1951, respectively.
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Three Challenges
Before a passenger car industry could be firmly established,
certain challenges had to be faced and overcome. Weaknesses in the
areas of technology, production, and capital were the foremost
obstacles. But, before these weaknesses could be addressed, the
industry had to tackle constraints imposed from
outside. Government-business interactions took on their greatest
significance in facing three challenges: domestic opposition, imports,
and foreign capital.
Domestic Opposition
In spite of the industry's uncompetitiveness, the movement to
establish a domestic passenger car industry had strong
supporters. The strongest of these supporters were the three
domestic producers (Toyota, Nissan, and Ota Jidosha) and MITI's
Machinery Bureau. The manufacturers had been interested in
passenger cars since prewar days and felt that it was nonsense to
have a motor vehicle industry that only produced trucks. After all,
the strength of the major world producers was based on passenger
cars. They were aware, however, that their strength in those trucks
that were not in direct competition with the products of foreign
producers would help them to eventually compete with the world's
established passenger car makers.
The Machinery Bureau supported passenger car development
primarily because it was "the pinnacle of the modern machinery
industry in our country [Japan] where there is no aircraft industry"
and could promote the overall development of the rest of the
machinery and the steel industry by providing a market, raising
technology levels, and forcing increases in quality.4 The Bureau felt
that since machinery held a great deal of promise as a future
export, "it went without saying that Japan would have to promote
manufactured exports."5 Reliance on imported passenger cars would
entail "such a gigantic amount of foreign currency consumption"
that the Bureau wondered "how could the Japanese economy which
is trying to become independent [economically] spend so much."6 It
was evident that Japan would have to have passenger cars from
some source, initially for the taxi industry and eventually for
personal use.
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The manufacturers and MITI believed that passenger cars
would add to Japan's international prestige. This belief is reflected
in an April 1952 MITI report on the prospects for passenger cars:
Our country is one of twelve countries that produce
passenger cars. These countries, except one or two, all
are strong industrial countries. It is clear that in order to
produce passenger cars a country's technical and
industrial standards must be at a high level. Therefore,
they are envied by those [countries] that cannot produce
[passenger cars]. However, our country, which is
producing passenger cars, how could we renounce their
production (whatever the reason) and how could we set
ourselves up as a second-rate technological country . . .
The lowering of technical standards is unbearable for
Japanese who have the self-pride to return to inter-
national society as a nation of culture.7
The supporters of the passenger car were influenced by concur-
rent developments taking place in Europe. The 1952 MITI report
and the trade magazines of that period detailed the development of
small passenger cars in Europe, especially the Volkswagen. Japan's
advantage was that it could watch and follow car production trends
in other countries, noting that Europe was starting to build small
mass-use passenger cars rather than large luxurious models. But,
before these groups could begin to establish a passenger car
industry, they were forced to overcome opposition from within
Japan.
The Bank of Japan was the major opponent of passenger car
development. The Ministry of Transportation and the taxi industry,
while not opposed to passenger car development, believed that
imports were needed to fill demand. A discussion developed between
opponents and supporters that lasted approximately from the
authorization of passenger car production in 1949 until late
1951. Another round of discussions took place in mid-1952 as part
of a broader debate on imports. Because it remained a policy
disagreement and "never reached a confrontation or crisis stage,"
the debate had no clear beginning and end.8
While the opponents of the passenger car never had the power
to prevent its development, the discussions revealed a lack of
consensus on the future of the Japanese automobile industry, and
on the much broader debate over the future structure of the
Japanese economy. The disagreement indicated that passenger cars
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still were seen by many Japanese as a nonessential luxury item
that should not be produced in a period of scarcity.
The opponents were led by President Naoto Ichimada of the
Bank of Japan, who was a proponent of industrial development
based on light industry. He believed that Japan's comparative
advantage in international trade was in this area, and passenger
cars definitely did not meet this criteria. It is important that opposi-
tion to passenger cars remained part of the broader economic debate
on Japan's future industrial structure and that passenger cars were
not singled out more than other areas of development.
The opponents' position is capsulized in a famous statement
Mr. Ichimada made to a reporter from Nihon Keizai Shimbun on
April 12, 1950.
In discussing increasing exports, we have to follow the
principle of the international division of industry. For
instance, developing an automobile industry in Japan does
not make much sense.9
Passenger cars were opposed for another reason. Most cars in
Japan were large fuel-hungry American cars that were not really
suited to Japan's narrow, poorly constructed roads and to its
dependence on imported oil. A misperception existed among many
Japanese that these cars were typical of those used by the rest of
the world, which contributed to the feeling that passenger cars were
not needed in Japan.10
Ultimately, the passenger car industry won support. C.S.
Chang states that "the policy conflict was finally settled in favor of
the motor vehicle industry by the outbreak of the Korean
Conflict."11 The growing demand for motor vehicles generated by
the Korean War helped demonstrate that a motor vehicle—not
necessarily a passenger car—industry could survive in Japan.
MITI also argued that if 7,000 imported passenger cars each at a
price of $2,200 were required annually, the cost in foreign exchange
would exceed $15.4 million.12
MITI used the outcome of a driving test it held for passenger
cars in November 1951 to persuade those unenthused about the
development of the industry.13 The driving test took place over a
3,000 kilometer course and was supervised by university
professors. Toyota, Nissan, and Ota each provided three passenger
cars to be tested. On the first day, the cars drove 600 kilometers
nonstop from Tokyo to Osaka in about fifteen hours. On the fifth
day of the test, British cars were pitted against the Japanese
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cars. MITI and the manufacturers proudly pointed out that all the
Japanese cars completed the course, while only two years before in
1949 many cars failed to complete a less strenuous test.
Although agreement was reached to support the passenger car
industry, the level of support was not as great as for basic
industries such as steel and shipbuilding, especially in the area of
financing. The level of support that developed, however, was suffi-
cient to ensure the growth of a passenger car industry.
Two other obstacles remained. These obstacles were imposed
from outside Japan in the form of imports of used and new cars,
and in the possibility of foreign capital investments.
The Import Problem
Imported cars, which were lower in price and higher in quality,
were the second threat to the establishment of a domestic passenger
car industry. There was considerable domestic support for
imports. But, a large number of imports could potentially impede or
prohibit the development of domestic models. Imports came into
Japan through two channels: new car imports and the transfer of
used cars. The used cars were primarily American-made models,
while the new cars increasingly came from Europe.
GHQ first permitted new-car imports in December 1948. In
February 1949, an official organization, the Overseas Automobile
Service (OAS), was established to supervise the import
dealers. Many of these dealers had been importers in the 1930s and
had organized the Federation of Foreign Car Dealers in October
1946 to lobby GHQ to lift import restrictions.
The OAS was set up by the 1949 U.S.-Japan Administrative
Agreement (Nichibei Gyosei Kyotei), which established licensing
procedures for all automobile imports. The new-car imports initially
were subject to the provisions of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Act of 1949. Import authority subsequently was
transferred to the Japanese government in March 1950. The
number of new-car imports increased slowly during the Occupation,
rising from 126 in 1948 to 4,719 in 1951. In 1948 all the imports
were from the United States, but by 1951 just over one-third were
from Europe. New-car imports were not seen as a major threat
while they were subject to controls.
This perception changed in March 1952 when, with the expira-
tion of the Temporary Materials Supply and Demand Control Law
(Ringi Busshitsu Jukyu Chosei Ho), the government removed most
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controls over the import and sale of new cars. Some foreign
exchange allocation controls did remain in place. Imported new cars
peaked in 1953 at 5,170 as part of an economy-wide expansion in
imports that year. This level was reached despite a 40 percent tariff
on automobiles. The general import expansion was primarily due to
the increase in industrial activity and employment from the Korean
War. Higher incomes and purchasing power resulted in a domestic
consumption boom that extended to imported automobiles that by
then came primarily from Europe.
The 1953 increase in new-car imports created a minor
controversy because it coincided with the general increase in
imports and with a different and potentially more serious import
threat—the Occupation's used-car problem. These two threats
combined to create a sense of peril among the domestic
manufacturers.14
The gravest and immediate threat to the Japanese passenger
car industry was the sale of cars brought to Japan for use by the
Occupation forces (see table 4). This threat was all the more
ominous because of the large number of automobiles involved and
the great difficulty in regulating their sale.
By 1950, many members of the Occupation were returning
home and anxious to dispose of their cars, as was GHQ itself.
Domestic producers, who were just beginning to manufacture
passenger cars, were afraid that no one would buy their cars if the
better quality and cheaper American cars were available.
Consumer demand for the used cars was indeed extremely high.
The used-car problem developed because of five exceptions to
the licensing provisions written into the 1949 U.S.-Japan
Administrative Agreement. Passenger cars for the U.S. Army,
passenger cars for civilians connected with the U.S. Army, moving
vans, automobiles given as presents to either foreigners or
Japanese, and vehicles for diplomatic use were exempted from
tariffs and the commodity tax.15 The consequence of these excep-
tions—made to facilitate the import of cars for use by foreigners—
was not foreseen in 1949.
The controversy began in March 1950 when GHQ's Economic
and Science Section requested permission to sell 150 used Ford
passenger cars to taxi companies in Yokosuka, Japan.16 The
request was approved and foreign currency granted to complete the
transaction in April. Later in April, GHQ informally asked MITI,
through the Foreign Ministry, if $500,000 could be allotted each
quarter so that it could sell off 2,000 cars a year. The Automobile
Manufacturers Association expressed its strong opposition to this
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Table 4
Imports of Foreign Used Passenger Cars



















































































































Source: Unpublished Ministry of International Trade and Industry
survey of imports of used foreign passenger cars made on April 15, 1952.
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request to both MITI and GHQ. MITI denied the request because
"the production of Japanese passenger cars has only started very
recently and is not on schedule. If we allow foreign cars to be sold,
the Japanese automobile manufacturing industry will be pinched off
in the bud."17 MITI formally gave four reasons for its decision18:
1. Domestic production of small passenger cars had not
yet begun full operation.
2. At least three years were needed to put production
on a normal schedule.
3. The used cars to be disposed of by American military
personnel should be handled by OAS dealers through
normal import procedures, or they should be
exported to a third country.
4. Japan's limited foreign currency reserves must be
used to import essential basic materials.
The Machinery Bureau of MITI at this time called in the three
domestic producers of passenger cars and explained the GHQ
request to them.19 MITI urged the companies to hasten the
establishment of a domestic production system and to work to
improve quality.
For a few months, it appeared that MITFs policy would not be
seriously challenged. Several requests were made to buy American
cars but none were granted. Finally in the fall of 1950, a request
was received from the police that MITI could not turn down. The
police complained that, because of the backwardness of their
Japanese cars, they could not catch escaping criminals who were
using American cars bought on the black market.20 As a result,
MITI pressed the manufacturers to produce passenger car models
that would have more appeal to the police. Toyota responded by
putting a more powerful engine in one of its cars. The new
Japanese cars, really only test models with hand-tooled bodies, did
not resolve the problem because they were still very expensive and
of very low quality.
MITI agreed to make an exception for the police after they
promised to support the domestic industry in the future. As a conse-
quence, pressure increased from both GHQ and domestic groups,
such as the taxi association and the newspapers, to permit more
sales of Occupation used cars. The taxi industry was supported by
the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) under whose jurisdiction it
fell.
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MITI entered into negotiations with GHQ and other govern-
ment ministries in 1951 to decide the amount of foreign exchange
that would be allocated to buy the used cars during Japan Fiscal
Year 1951. MITFs policy was overruled by the other ministries led
by MOT, and the amount decided upon was $3.9 million, which was
to pay for the transfer of 2,600 cars at $1,500 each.21
Next, representatives of MITFs International Trade Bureau,
Machinery Bureau, and Trade Promotion Bureau met with
members of the Ministry of Transportation to set up licensing
procedures for the sales.22 The result was an interministerial
ordinance, the Regulation Regarding the Conveyance of Foreign
Vehicles (Gaikoku Jidosha Uzuri Uke Kizoku) passed on June 9,
1951, formally delivered to GHQ on June 26, and effective until
July 1, 1952. This ordinance included three points23:
1. The license application must be submitted to MITFs
Machinery Bureau; later a license would be granted
jointly by MITI and MOT.
2. The transaction must be completed by using the
foreign currenc}r allocated for this purpose by the
government.
3. Eligible purchasers included the news media, the
police, hospitals, the Diet and the courts, taxi
companies exclusively catering to foreigners, and
others specially designated by MITI and MOT as
contributing to economic and cultural promotion.
Three-eighths of the cars were to go to government and public offi-
cials, and five-eighths were to go to the private sector. From the
amount allocated to the private sector, nine-tenths were assigned to
businesses and one-tenth to private individuals.24 On June 30,
thirty companies were authorized as dealers; later on, three
additional companies were added.
As the program commenced, MITI asked the three domestic
manufacturers in September 1951 to comment on the effect the
transfer was having on the domestic industry. The companies
responded with a joint report on October 8, 1951.25 They requested
that the foreign exchange allocation for the transfer of used cars be
minimized, if possible banned, and that an import tax be
levied. This report also covered additional issues relating to the
promotion of domestic passenger cars.
By the summer of 1952, the controversy over the future of
imports again heated up. Discussions were held in the Cabinet and
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in the Diet about the necessity for domestically produced
cars. During the summer, the National Passenger Car Association,
connected with the Automobile Manufacturing Association,
submitted several petitions to the Diet, MITI, and MOT concerning
imports and related questions, such as the creation of one
administrative authority for automobiles.26 At the hearing, "Discus-
sion on the Need for a Domestic Passenger Car Industry" (Kokusan
Joyosha no Hitsuyosei nisuite no Giron), held in the Transportation
Committee of the House of Councillors on July 26, 1952,
Mr. Chotaro Yanase of the Overseas Automotive Service presented
statements in support of imports:
The lifetime of Japanese cars is short, most last only one
or two years. There are 60,000 cars in Japan and the
number is increasing by about 10 percent (6,000 cars) a
month. Out of the 60,000 cars, 30,000 are old and will
have to be replaced by new cars soon. But only 6,000
cars are expected to be produced in Japan. This proves
imported cars are necessary.27
Ultimately, the Japanese government allowed the guidelines on
the import of Occupation used cars to lapse and permitted yen-
denominated sales. Initially, the purchasers were still required to
obtain permission from MITI, but this restriction was soon
lifted. Subsequently, the number of used cars entering the Japanese
market increased dramatically. Officially transferred cars are listed
at 1,650 in 1951, 5,476 in 1952, and 13,467 in 1953. After 1953,
the number decreased gradually. These statistics are not complete
as the government was unable to track all the purchases, but the
trend is accurate since the supply of these vehicles increased and
then decreased.
MITI and the domestic industry tried but did not have suffi-
cient leverage to prevail completely over GHQ and the domestic
consumer interests. But, the consequences of the transfer of used
cars and the smaller number of new-car imports was not as serious
as they had anticipated. The foreign cars were absorbed primarily
by taxi companies, satisfying consumer needs that the domestic
industry was not yet capable of fulfilling. In this sense Mr. Yanase
was correct. It was not until the introduction of the Toyota Crown
and the Prince Skyline in 1955 that Japan had domestic passenger
cars that could realistically compete for the taxi market.
One passenger car company, Ota Jidosha, was not able to
overcome the pressure created by the imports and the release of the
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used cars. Ota did not have the financial affiliations, technological
capability, and other resources of a Nissan or Toyota to help it
survive as a passenger car producer. It nearly went bankrupt in
1954 but obtained government loans through the Corporate Reor-
ganization Law of 1952. It merged with Nihon Jidosha in April
1957 and, after several more name changes and reorganizations,
was absorbed by Nissan in 1971 as Nissan Koki.
The importance of the increase in new- and used-car imports
through 1953 was that it reinforced the perception that unchecked
imports were a serious threat to the establishment of a Japanese
passenger car industry. The Diet held more hearings in the summer
of 1953 on the import problem. These hearings, which stressed the
weakness of the domestic industry and called for infant industry
protection, resulted in a reimposition of controls on passenger car
imports on February 1, 1954.28 The new controls stated that a
foreigner or a Japanese could import only one car every two years
on a non-foreign exchange basis and that these cars could not be
resold for at least two years. These controls included cars imported
for personal use or as gifts.
The hearings prompted Prime Minister Yoshida to issue
guidelines in 1953 stating that central government agencies must
buy domestic passenger cars.29 Because government officials
persisted in buying foreign cars, Prime Minister Hatoyama
announced in January 1955 a Cabinet agreement on strengthening
the guidelines. From April to December 1955, government officials
bought 151 new passenger cars, of which 62 were domestic
models. In the JFY 1956 budget, 63 million yen ($173,000) was
allocated to subsidize the purchase of 126 domestic cars by the
various ministries. The average price of a domestic car was
850,000 yen ($2,361) of which the subsidy would pay 500,000 yen
($1,389), and the difference would come from each ministry's
general budget. The government also moved to help eliminate the
import threat by changing the tariff and commodity tax rates.
Foreign Capital
The most severe threat did not come from imports or domestic
opposition but from foreign manufacturers who wanted to establish
production facilities in Japan or buy existing Japanese companies. If
foreign cars entered Japan through sales of completed cars, they
could be controlled through foreign exchange quotas. But, if foreign
cars were produced in Japan, many felt that all domestically owned
80 A Consensus Formed
motor vehicle manufacturing would be destroyed. The memory of
the strength of onshore manufacturing by General Motors and Ford
in the 1930s helped to foster this perception.
The threat posed by foreign capital was very real in 1952.
With the coming of independence on April 28, 1952, several foreign
automobile companies planned to build knock-down (KD) assembly
plants in Japan.30 With the exception of Chrysler, the major firms
exploring the Japanese market were all European. The American
firms were not very interested in Japan because they had little
excess capacity due to military demand, and they saw more poten-
tial in the European market.
Several small Japanese firms, who were interested in entering
the automobile market, thought that they could accelerate their
development by entering into agreements with foreign
producers. MITI viewed this development as unhealthy both from
the standpoint of excessive competition and because of the potential
for takeovers by strong foreign firms.
By April, six companies had conducted market research
studies of the Japanese market: Rootes, Renault, Standard, Opel,
Fiat, and Chrysler.31 The Rootes Group led the movement and had
already applied to the Foreign Capital Council for approval to set up
a knock-down factory and had established a subsidiary in Japan,
the Rootes Company.32 Standard, Fiat, and Renault also expressed
interest not only in expanding their sales network in Japan, but in
taking over existing companies through capital acquisition and in
establishing knock-down production.
In May, the Foreign Capital Council asked MITI to comment
on the Rootes application because government authorization was
required under the 1951 Foreign Investment Law for all foreign
capital investment.33 Before MITI could respond, Fuji Jidosha and
Chrysler submitted the first application for a technical tieup around
June I.34 Fuji Jidosha had approached Chrysler about establishing
a knock-down plant in Japan at a production level of 1,000 cars a
year. Chrysler, interested in Fuji Jidosha's diesel technology, agreed
to the arrangement. This application, along with the one from
Rootes, forced MITI to come up with a concrete policy.
MITI countered in June 1952 with the "Basic Policy for the
Introduction of Foreign Investment into Japan's Passenger Car
Industry," which supplemented the automotive provisions of the
Foreign Investment Law. It stated that the repatriation of earnings
from foreign investment in marketing facilities was not guaranteed,
and in production facilities only if it "contributed significantly to the
development of domestic industry."35
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MITI stated in June that it would allow foreign firms to enter
the market only through technical tieups with existing chassis
makers. By limiting the tieups to chassis makers, MITI tried to
ensure that only the stronger companies, who could better resist
foreign takeover and better use the imported technology, would
enter into agreements with foreign producers. Technical tieups
were acknowledged as necessary to raise the level of Japanese
passenger car technology to international levels.
MITI announced four additional provisions that it wished to see
included in the technology contracts.36 First, small European cars
were more suitable than large American cars. Second, MITI
supported the use of foreign currency allocated for the import of
cars for the import of parts instead. It could, however, allocate only
enough currency to build 1,200 cars per company. Third, the
Japanese company should try to obtain the right to sell the knock-
down cars in Southeast Asia. And fourth, if parts were initially
imported, they should eventually be made completely in Japan.37
These provisions had a direct impact on the way MITI responded to
the applications from Rootes and Chrysler.
The Rootes application was rejected because the company
wanted to set up its own knock-down plant and sales network.
They next tried to develop an agreement with Ikegai Motors by
which Rootes would set up a subsidiary, Rootes Motors Japan, to
import parts for 1,500 cars a year.38 Ikegai would then produce the
knock-down cars that Rootes would sell. All investments would be
made by Rootes, and all profits would be returned to England. MITI
also rejected this plan. Ultimately, Rootes entered into an agree-
ment with a major producer, Isuzu, to make its Hillman car in
Japan under the terms set by MITI.
MITI also was not sympathetic to the Chrysler application
because they felt that Chrysler's large cars were not suited for
Japan. In July 1952, MITI suggested to Fuji Jidosha that it might
allow the tieup at a production level of 500 a year.39 Fuji Jidosha
was forced to renegotiate with Chrysler until an agreement was
approved in the fall that permitted Fuji Jidosha to import knock-
down parts through Metropolitan (Chrysler's sales agency in Japan)
using currency Metropolitan had been allocated for completed car
imports. The agreement called for production of only fifty vehicles a
month and the import of $20,000 worth of welding and painting
equipment from Chrysler. MITI felt that this production level
would not have any adverse effects on domestic production. This
agreement was not carried out because Chrysler decided against
proceeding.
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The technology tieup movement gained a great deal of
momentum when Nissan began to negotiate possible knock-down
production with Austin. In July 1952, the Austin representative for
the Far East, Mr. J.V. Gray, arrived in Japan for discussions with
Nissan. Nissan and Toyota (after the breakdown in Toyota's
negotiations with Ford in 1950) had supported the domestic develop-
ment of passenger cars.40 The decision by Nissan, then the
strongest Japanese producer, to enter into a technical tieup forced
the government to make a final decision concerning these
agreements.
The final decision, "The Policy Relating to the Treatment of
Technical Tieups and Assembly Contracts in the Passenger Car
Industry," was announced on October 3, 1952. The first contract to
fulfill all of MITFs requirements was negotiated between Hino and
Renault. At the time of its announcement, the president of Hino
stated:
I believe that the only way to promote the Japanese
passenger car industry is to tieup with Renault, do KD
production and then domesticate [the car]. People say that
a domestic car is more expensive than imports but I
believe that this will upgrade production facilities and that
domestication will make costs cheaper.41
The companies themselves were responsible for finding foreign
partners and negotiating the contracts within the policy constraints
imposed by MITI. This did not mean that all negotiated contracts
were approved. Rootes had to rework its approach several times
before it arrived at an acceptable agreement with an acceptable
partner. Out of eleven tentative tieups, only four ultimately were
accomplished. The seven abandoned contracts were Fuji Jidosha
Kogyo/Chrysler, Prince Jidosha Kogyo/Morris Motors, Kyosan
Seisakusho/Simca, Tokyo Jidosha/Standard-Triumph, Daihatsu
Kogyo/Studebaker, Komatsu Seisakusho/Volkswagen-Benz, and
Mitsubishi Nihon Jukogyo/Kaiser.42 The four contracts that
received approval were Nissan Jidosha/Austin, Isuzu Jidosha/
Rootes, Hino Diesel Kogyo/Renault, and Shin-Mitsubishi Jukogyo/
Willys Overland.
The four companies that received approval were already
among the major companies producing four-wheeled vehicles during
the prewar and wartime eras. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries had
been disbanded during the Occupation, resulting in the formation of
three companies in January 1950 who all wanted to produce
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automobiles: West Japan Heavy Industries (Mitsubishi Zosen),
Central Japan Heavy Industries (Shin-Mitsubishi Jukogyo), and
Eastern Japan Heavy Industries (Mitsubishi Nihon Jukogyo).43 In
June 1964 these companies remerged. Thus, while the government
supported the development and protection of the passenger car
industry, it did not protect all producers or would-be producers.
Policy Actions To Support Passenger Car Development
The strategy devised to encourage the development of the
passenger car industry was a result of informal discussions between
government and business, discussions that became especially impor-
tant in late 1951 and early 1952 as independence approached. The
policy statement released by the three passenger car makers in
October 1951 in response to MITFs request for their views on the
transfer of used cars also influenced the strategy used to develop
the passenger car industry.
The makers stated that they had determined small-sized
passenger cars were the most suitable for the Japanese people.44 In
order to compete with the foreign makers, mass production methods
needed to be introduced, which would entail investments of
$830,000 over the next year. Appropriate government policies
perceived as necessary by the makers were also outlined in the
policy statement. These views were taken into consideration by the
government as it drew up specific policies for automobiles during
1952. These were:
1. equipment investment loans from the Japan
Development Bank;
2. the promotion of equipment imports;
3. the promotion of automotive parts imports;
4. a tax differential between large and small cars, in
favor of small cars; and
5. a higher commodity tax on foreign cars.
In addition to responding to requests from the government, the
manufacturers initiated discussions with government agencies.45
For example, in 1950, the Automobile Manufacturers Association
invited three MITI representatives from auto-related sections to
their annual meeting on May 19 to discuss automobile issues. On
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July 7, 1950, they similarly invited representatives from the
Ministry of Transportation.
The foreign threats caused the companies to turn to the
government for protection. MITI became convinced that a viable
passenger car industry was possible, which might in turn raise the
technological level of the machinery and steel industries and save
foreign exchange. A report released in April 1952 detailed MITI's
position. This report called for46:
1. Aid in renewing plant and equipment, of which
almost 50 percent required replacement or repair
through the Enterprise Rationalization Law and
loans from the Japan Development Bank.
2. Secure access to materials, parts, and electricity,
including importation of special parts if neces-
sary. Also, efforts to decrease the price and raise the
quality of domestic materials such as steel and tires.
3. Introduction of technology from advanced countries.
Foreign capital would be welcomed if it promoted
exports and decreased imports by utilizing Japan's
industrial potential.
4. Stabilization of demand by limiting imports of
completed cars for use by foreigners, for technical
research or other special needs. Also, efforts to
promote the use of small cars by decreasing the
commodity tax.
The views of MITI and the industry came together since both
sides concluded that the infant automobile industry had enough
potential to deserve protection. One Japanese scholar stated that
they were chasing rainbows but it seemed at least worth trying.47
By the time of independence, a policy that would give "minimum
survival security" to the passenger car industry had been
designed. The policy contained both protective and developmental
measures. Details were changed or added in reaction to special
interests, but the major tenets remained the same.
Protective Measures
There is little disagreement among scholars, even those who
believe the private sector was primarily responsible for the develop-
ment of the Japanese automobile industry, that protective measures
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in the 1950s helped the industry. Michael Cusumano states that "a
single policy—protection against imports—turned companies that
would surely have been business failures into highly profitable
operations."48
Four major types of protective measures were instituted:
tariffs, a commodity tax, restrictions on imports, and restrictions on
foreign capital. The measures were justified as necessary to protect
the infant industry.49
Japan's tariff rate on passenger car imports in April 1951
stood at 40 percent, a rate that remained until 1955 when a
differential was created for large and small cars.50 The rate for
small cars (less than 270 mm wheelbase) remained at 40 percent,
while the rate for large cars (more than 270 mm wheelbase) was
lowered to 35 percent. The tariff on trucks and automobile parts
remained at 30 percent, the level set in 1951. The tariffs were
progressively lowered for trucks in 1962 and for passenger cars in
1968 as the industry became competitive. Tariffs were lifted
entirely in 1978 for passenger cars and trucks.
The commodity tax is a consumption or luxury tax paid by
consumers upon the purchase of new trucks or passenger cars. In
1950, the commodity taxes on four-wheeled and three-wheeled cars
were set at 30 and 25 percent, respectively. MITI suggested
creating a differential for large and medium-sized cars in 1952, but
this suggestion was not immediately carried out.51 In April 1954,
after a lobbying effort by taxi drivers attempting to reduce the price
of their small cars, the commodity tax was revised to 50 percent on
large cars (304.8 mm wheelbase and greater than 3,000 cc engine),
30 percent on ordinary-sized cars (270-304.8 mm wheelbase and
2,000-3,000 cc engine), and 20 percent on small-sized cars (less
than 270 mm wheelbase and less than 2,000 cc engine). This
differential served to discourage imports since most imports were
large cars falling under the highest tax rate. This tax was gradually
reduced from 1962 and eliminated on April 1, 1989. It was replaced
by a consumption tax of 3 percent on passenger cars with an engine
size of 550 cc and under. A 6 percent tax will be levied on cars with
larger engines until March 1992 when this rate will be dropped to 3
percent.
The major method of restricting imports was through foreign
exchange allocation as well as transfer rules for used cars. The
government used powers granted it under the Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Control Act of 1949 to determine through the
use of quotas the purposes and purchases for which foreign
exchange could be used. The controls were lifted for trucks and
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buses in 1961. The controls on passenger cars were changed to
volume allocations in 1964 and eliminated for completed car imports
in 1965. The last remaining controls, on engine imports, were lifted
in 1971. Foreign exchange allocation for automobile parts was not
restricted until 1958 in order to avoid interfering with the tech-
nology tieups. Takafusa Nakamura observed that the foreign
exchange allocation system (see table 5) for restricting the total
value of imports turned out to offer at the same time a splendid
means of protecting the industry. He states:
It had been government policy to foster the automobile
industry since before the war, but by means of the foreign
exchange allocation system, the government took steps to
impose extreme restrictions on automobile imports over
the next ten years or more [after 1949], steps that were
the virtual equivalent of an import ban. Thus were
created the conditions under which the automobile
industry was assured of a secure domestic market for its
development.52
Table 5
Foreign Exchange Allocation for
New Passenger Car Imports, JFY 1954-1970




















Note: After 1962, foreign exchange allocations did not specify end-use.
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The government was able to control foreign capital imports
under the Foreign Investment Law of 1951 and the Basic Policy for
the Introduction for Foreign Investment into Japan's Passenger Car
Industry. Under the Foreign Investment Law, the government had
to authorize all investment by foreign capital, thus keeping foreign
investment out of areas where it could slow the development of
important domestic producers. Foreign capital was permitted to
enter only when it contributed significantly to the development of
domestic industry. In the case of the automobile industry, foreign
capital was not completely liberalized until April 1973.
The protection of the automobile industry should not be viewed
as an isolated or exceptional case. In this period, Japanese policy
makers were worried about many Japanese industries that they
thought might be overwhelmed by foreign competition. Therefore,
the Japanese government permitted virtually no imports of
manufactured consumer goods. Foreign capital also was generally
shut out. The widespread availability of protective measures,
however, does not negate their impact on the automobile industry's
development.
Developmental Measures
Developmental measures helped the industry overcome general
structural problems. These measures included: loans from govern-
ment institutions, special depreciation allowances, exemption from
import duties on certain machinery and equipment, authorization of
essential technology imports, and subsidies.
Loans from government institutions were almost entirely from
the Japan Development Bank (JDB), which was founded in April
1951. Funding given to the automobile industry in the first half of
the 1950s was marked for facility investment and went to the four
major companies—Toyota, Nissan, Isuzu, and Hino—and later to
the automobile parts industry. The JDB's twenty-five year history
states:
From 1951 to 1952, 35 million yen [$97,222] was given
to finance equipment expansion and modernization for
trucks and buses to fully prepare this area for produc-
tion. The truck financing corresponded with the Korean
War special demand and the development of electric
power facilities. Bus financing was related to transporta-
tion difficulties. From 1953 to 1955, the entry of foreign
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cars was prevented by promoting the function of domestic
passenger cars. This was to try to save foreign exchange
reserves. For this, 49 million yen [$136,000] was
provided in financing for foreign car domestication, the
strengthening of passenger car production facilities, and
rationalization. Further, in February 1956, JDB borrowed
$234,007,000 from the World Bank to lend to
Toyota. Via this tied loan, the bank cooperated in
Toyota's facility renewal through machinery
importation.53
Government-related loans in this period accounted for
approximately 19.3 percent of capital, which included loans from
JDB, the Long-Term Development Bank, and the Industrial Bank of
Japan. JDB loans in later periods were directed toward weak
production areas: automotive parts, industry rationalization, tech-
nology development, and pollution control.
The automobile industry's development was supported by
access to special depreciation and related benefits under the 1951
Special Taxation Measures Law and the 1952 Enterprises
Rationalization Promotion Law. These laws tried to encourage plant
and equipment investment in key industries by providing a reduced
tax burden via special depreciation on specified machinery. The
automobile industry was designated a key industry in 1952. There
was a special depreciation rate of 50 percent in the first year. In
1961 this was changed to 33.3 percent, and the official life of equip-
ment shortened from 16 to 13 years. The rate was further reduced
in three stages before being terminated at the end of 1975. Special
depreciation also was included for research and development equip-
ment and was divided into equal parts of 33.3 percent over a three
year period. This was modified in 1961 and then eliminated in
1967. For example, between 1952 and 1955 Nissan concluded
purchases of 271 machine tools totaling 3,629 million yen
($10,080,555) under the special depreciation system.54
Machinery needed to rationalize the industry was unavailable
from domestic suppliers. Therefore, equipment was imported
primarily from the United States. The government provided special
foreign currency allocations and exempted the imports from the 15
percent (GIF) tariff. The automobile industry was the foremost user
of this program, and its imports peaked in 1954. For example,
Toyota imported from the United States 28, 44, 78, 24, and 60
machine tools in 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, and 1956, respectively,
which constituted 43.3 percent of its machine tool imports through
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these years. After the early 1950s, the program was not as neces-
sary because the earlier imports were in place and increased
domestic production could fill new demand. The government
accelerated this process by providing subsidies to domestic machine
tool makers.
Direct subsidies to the automobile industry were not pervasive
and seem to have been concentrated in the area of technology
development. Hiroya Ueno and Hiromichi Muto estimate that
during the 1950s the automobile industry received only about 369
million yen ($1,025,000) in direct subsidies, which came from funds
derived from bicycle races and appropriated for machinery promo-
tion.55 This money was dispersed through organizations like the
Automobile Technology Association and the Japan Small
Automobile Industry Association. The Automobile Technology
Association, for example, set up a research committee, composed of
both private and government representatives, that analyzed the
performance and efficiency of imported foreign cars.
The final important area of government support was approval
of technology imports. The government realized that imported tech-
nology was essential to quickly overcome the gap between Japan
and more advanced industrial nations, but it added provisions to
ensure that the technology would be domesticated. The most impor-
tant technology imports arrived through the tieups approved for
Nissan, Isuzu, Hino, and Shin-Mitsubishi. In addition, there were
thirty tieups with foreign makers approved for the auto parts
industry between 1951 and 1963.56 The basis for these tieups was
the Policy Relating to the Treatment of Technical Tieups and
Assembly Contracts in the Passenger Car Industry released by
MITI on October 3, 1952.57 Its major provisions were:
1. Foreign capital for sales operations is not permitted
in Japan.
2. Foreign capital for production, if it contributes to the
development of the domestic industry, will be
approved.
3. The remittance of royalties and patent fees will be
guaranteed for foreign producers.
4. Within five years of the initiation of the technology
contract, at least 90 percent of parts must be
produced domestically (the parts were listed in
accordance with their importance).
5. Manufacturing rights for foreign cars must be trans-
ferred to domestic companies.
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6. The importation of raw materials not produced in
Japan will be permitted.
In addition, MITI limited the number and the type of Japanese
companies that could enter into technology agreements to two or
three chassis makers. Four makers ultimately received approval:
Nissan, Isuzu, Hino, and Shin-Mitsubishi. MITI clarified that
foreign cars produced without meeting the domestication require-
ment would be treated as imports.
The process, while successful, was not without its problems.
By 1955, MITI believed that the parts domestication process was
proceeding too slowly, especially in the case of Hino and Isuzu,
which were more inefficient and not as technologically experienced
as Nissan. MITI suspected that Renault and Rootes were purpose-
fully causing delays in approving Japanese-made parts in order to
increase brand loyalty, hoping to someday enter the Japanese
market independently.58 In March, therefore, MITI issued "New
Guidelines on the Domestication of Foreign Passenger Cars"
(Gaikoku Joyosha Kokusanka no Shinhoshin), which stated that the
foreign currency allotment given for KD production would be shor-
tened to cover only 200 vehicles a month if the domestication
progress was behind schedule.59 If domestication was proceeding
ahead of schedule, the foreign currency allotment would be
increased. The guidelines then set up a concrete schedule for the
completion of parts domestication. Hino, Isuzu, and Shin-Mitsubishi
agreed to meet the schedule. Eventually, MITI agreed to extensions
of the contracts for two years for Hino and Isuzu, and five years for
Shin-Mitsubishi, with three conditions: the foreign partner allow
export of the KD car, the Japanese company be allowed to buy the
manufacturing rights to avoid patent royalties, and the Japanese
company must be making a durable and exportable car at the end of
the extension period. Total production of these cars was 165,630.
Conclusion
In the early 1950s, government and business objectives coin-
cided to a greater degree than in later periods due to the severity of
external threats, the uncompetitiveness of the industry, and the
need for innovative policies after Japan's defeat in World War II.
The government-business relationship in the automobile
industry was cooperative during this period. Business needed
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government to take actions to protect it from imports and foreign
capital. It could not protect itself in the area of passenger cars
because of the immaturity of the industry; this same concern was
not evident in the area of truck production. Without protective
measures, Japan's passenger car industry would have been
dependent on foreign manufacturers longer, and the development of
domestic technology would have been slower. Foreign automobile
companies, especially European firms, were very interested in
Japan and posed a real threat.
The automobile industry convinced MITI that its development
would help Japan achieve broader economic policy objectives such as
saving foreign exchange and developing the machinery
industry. MITI then strongly supported the industry over the objec-
tions of other segments of the Japanese government. MITI, in a
trade-off for industry support from opponents, agreed to the sale of
Occupation used cars to temporarily fill the demand that domestic
carmakers as yet could not satisfy.
Support did not mean that the government took control of the
industry or created a national company. It simply set perimeters
limiting what companies could enter into technology tieups and
what types of cars could be produced (small not large), provided
minimum survival security through protection from imports and
foreign capital, and enacted generic support measures from which
the automobile industry benefited.60
John Campbell has stated that the automobile industry was
not "designated to play a key role in this long-term restructuring
strategy [the evolution of the industrial structure from lower to
higher value-added]."61 It is true that support, especially financial
support, was not as pervasive as in basic infrastructure industries
such as steel and electric power. But a consensus was reached to
provide minimal survival security, and that support was indeed
provided. It is impossible to ascertain how much the support
measures (as opposed to the protective measures) helped the
dynamic entrepreneurs working in the automobile industry obtain
their goals. Certainly, the entrepreneurs would have tried to develop
passenger cars even without government support, but they could
not have developed them as rapidly.
The governmental policies of the early 1950s were developed
in conjunction with the private sector—indeed often at their instiga-
tion—and were designed to promote the development of passenger
car production. The greatest impact of this period, an impact that
the government and the private sector helped create, is that the
automobile industry "established itself firmly through special
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procurement during the Korean Conflict, investment for equipment
and facilities, and the introduction of foreign technology."62 The
success of this joint effort can be measured by the successful
development of the industry, which in turn helped change the way
government and business interacted.
Finally, it has to be remembered that the developments of the
1950s occurred in an international environment that was conducive
to the type of policies and interactions that were used to launch the
passenger car industry. Other countries, especially the United
States, were willing to tolerate protectionist barriers because of
Japan's chronic balance of payment problems and relative insig-
nificance in world trade. Multilateral arrangements governing
trade, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), recognized the
legitimacy of protective actions to resolve balance of payments
problems and aid in reconstruction after World War II. Article XIV
of the IMF provided for the transitional period after the
war. Section 2 of this article states:
In the post-war transitional period members may,
notwithstanding the provisions of any other articles of
this Agreement, maintain and adapt to changing
circumstances (and, in the case of members whose
territories have been occupied by the enemy, introduce
where necessary) restrictions on payments and transfers
for current international transactions.63
The United States sought to strengthen Japan's weak and
vulnerable economy. For Japan to be a counterweight to
Communism in Asia and serve as a U.S. military base, the
Americans looked favorably on Japan's rebuilding
program. Therefore, the United States was tolerant of restrictive
practices except of those on products such as umbrella frames, wood
screws, and cotton textiles. Restrictions on these products created
trade problems that were resolved through voluntary export
restraints. As the Japanese economy strengthened, American and
international tolerance diminished, forcing changes in Japan's public
policies and straining the government-business partnership.
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By the mid-1950s, Japan's overwhelming concern with imports
and foreign capital in the auto sector changed to attempts to expand
domestic demand and build strong foundations for the passenger car
industry. The long-term threat from imports and foreign capital still
existed, but the enactment of protective policies changed the focus of
interactions to the domestic market. The consensus that developed
in the early 1950s to support the industry reinforced MITTs
mandate to develop the industry and helped create a more stable
economic environment.
The prominent policy issues, creating domestic demand and
enhancing competitiveness, were issues that required adjustments
at the national and company levels. The industry started to take a
more independent stance vis-a-vis the government on some of these
issues, issues that required their action rather than just that of the
government. Because the industry was also growing in competitive-
ness, it was less dependent on financial and other government
incentives. As a result, while agreement existed on what constituted
the major problems facing the industry, there were no clear-cut
solutions.
There were two major auto-specific policies in the late 1950s:
the People's Car Project and attempts to develop the automotive
parts industry. Conflict between the government and the industry
characterized the People's Car Project, while cooperative relations
prevailed in the auto parts program until the parts industry became
competitive in the 1960s.
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Creating Domestic Demand
The passenger car industry could not be competitive until
domestic demand increased sufficiently to make mass production
possible. Until this time, demand for passenger cars had come
almost entirely from the business sector—primarily taxis—and the
public sector. The potential demand from these groups was not
sufficient to support mass production. In 1957, hired cars and taxis
accounted for 53.9 percent of passenger car sales, with sales for
personal use at 3.6 percent. By 1966, hired cars and taxis had
fallen to 9.6 percent of sales, while sales for personal use increased
to 30.3 percent.
Government and business realized that private demand had to
increase to support mass production, but they could not agree on
how to reach this goal. The government increasingly favored the
development of a small passenger car that ordinary people could
afford and that was suited to Japan's crowded conditions. The
private sector favored decreasing the price on slightly larger small
cars already planned. This difference of opinion resulted in the first
major conflict after independence between MITI and the auto
industry. MITI unwittingly created this conflict, which centered on a
government project that sought to promote the development of a
small four-wheeled vehicle suitable for everyday use by ordinary
people—the Kokuminsha or "People's Car."
The People's Car Project
Mr. Akira Kawahara, a member of MITFs Automobile
Bureau, developed the People's Car Project in conjunction with three
Tokyo University engineering professors, including Dr. Hirao and
Dr. Watari. Mr. Kawahara's aspiration was to allow the Japanese
people, like people in other advanced nations, to enjoy owning
passenger cars1:
In an editorial in the Economist it said that British
automobile manufacturers should produce a people's car. I
thought we should not miss out on this new trend in car
production. Fortunately, the Japanese automobile
industry was still on the starting line, the number of cars
was very limited. We could see and follow the trends of
car production in the industrialized countries. In other
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words, we could take lessons from the industrialized
countries, and then we could study and consider the
production of automobiles in a new way. That was my
motivation for the study.2
MITI had been very interested in the development of the
Volkswagen in West Germany and published an analysis of it in
1956.3 MITI felt that producing a small, cheap popular car as a
consumer item suitable for Japanese conditions was the best
approach to expanding the market for passenger cars (as opposed to
production for business use only). This type of car would help create
a mass market and provide automobiles for those who wanted their
own "personal" car.
Toshimasa Tsuruta states that MITFs motivation was to
concentrate the production of an exportable passenger car in one
company.4 While exports might have been seen as a side benefit,
the main reason for the project was to expand domestic
demand. MITI was not seeking to create an automobile industry
centered on a single company. Instead, the tentative plan revolved
around only one company because MITI did not have either the
personnel or the funding to support more than one company. This
did not mean that other companies were not welcome to produce
cars on their own.
Disagreement surfaced abruptly on May 18, 1955 when Nihon
Keizai Shimbun published a very detailed article on the development
of MITFs plan for a people's car.5 This article was published while
the plan was still tentative and before the government was able to
informally approach industry to garner support. The plan quickly
became controversial because it stated that MITI would chose only
one company to mass produce the proposed car. The companies also
felt that the proposed price was too low. The proposal's main provi-
sions were6:
Requirements for a People's Car
1. Maximum Speed — 100 km/hr.
2. Seating Capacity — 4 persons or 2 persons plus 100
kg of cargo.
3. Fuel Consumption — between 60 km/liter and 30
km/liter.
4. Durability - 100,000 km.
5. Exhaust Volume - 350 to 500 cc.
6. Vehicle Weight - 400 kg.
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7. Production Price - less than 150,000 yen [$416] on
a production scale of 2,000/month.
Proposed Production Schedule
1. July 1, 1956. First Performance Test of Test
Models.
2. July 1, 1957. Second Performance Test and Decision
on a Single People's Car.
3. September 1957. Decision on a Single Manufacturer.
4. October 1958. Production Start.
According to the preliminary plan, MITI would provide finan-
cial support to the companies making test models so that they could
make improvements through additional research. If a company
were unable for some reason to produce the resulting car, the MITI
minister would have the right to transfer the manufacturing rights
to another company. After the second performance test from which
a single model and company would be chosen, MITI would provide
additional funding and act as a go-between to secure loans from city
banks. In addition, MITI would ask other relevant government
agencies to make any necessary changes in the traffic and tax laws
to promote the small People's Car.
During the summer, MITI and the automakers formally began
discussing the plan. On July 7, the head of MITI's automobile
section explained the People's Car Project to staff members of the
Automobile Manufacturers Association, and on July 17 he
conducted a similar discussion with the association's executive
committee.7
While these discussions were taking place, the association
began a feasibility study of the plan. On July 12, it sponsored a
meeting of top engineers from nine companies. These engineers
undertook the feasibility study and released their report on August
23.8 The report concluded that it was impossible to produce the
specified car at the specified price.
The industry's formal response was determined at a directors
meeting of the Automobile Manufacturers Association on September
1. The directors, basing their comments on the engineers' study,
stated9:
1. The specified levels of cost and efficiency make
the manufacture of the cars proposed by MITI
impossible.
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2. Even if the efficiency requirements could be met, the
cost of the car would be 50 percent higher than
specified.
3. The People's Car idea is worthy of further industry
research.
The controversy dissipated briefly but resumed in early
December when the president of Komatsu Seisakusho, Mr. Kawai,
announced that his company would make a test model.10 Mr.
Kawai wanted to enter the passenger car field earlier but failed to
receive government approval for a technical tieup with Volkswagen
because Komatsu was not a chassis manufacturer. He now
proposed to manufacture the car with assistance from Mr. Porsche,
the German developer of the Volkswagen and other cars. Mr.
Porsche stated that MITI's proposed plan was not impossible to
achieve. This new development perturbed the major automobile
manufacturers since other motorcycle and three-wheeled vehicle
producers also expressed interest in the People's Car Project in
September.
The five major manufacturers—Nissan, Toyota, Isuzu, Hino,
and Prince—agreed on December 25 to cooperate and fight the
plan.11 They also agreed among themselves that none would betray
the others by producing a test model. They reasoned that domestic
demand did not yet warrant a new type of car and that potential
export demand existed only in Southeast Asia. They also were
concerned that the new car might simply take sales away from
their current models.
These views were presented to MITI Minister Tanazan
Ishibashi.12 The manufacturers told him that they would work hard
to bring the cost down and raise the quality of their existing
passenger cars in order to meet private consumer demand, but that
the selection of a single manufacturer would violate the principles of
free competition. Minister Ishibashi replied: "We never thought of
assisting any private companies financially in regard to the People's
Car."13 This statement dealt a strong blow to the project.
The plan was not implemented for two reasons. First, the
major automobile companies opposed the project. They were not
willing to cooperate in producing the car or to let one company gain
a competitive advantage in the production of small cars. (However,
some companies, including Toyota Motor Sales, announced in 1956
that they would try to produce test models.14) Second, the
government, in the new postwar environment, did not have the
power to enact its programs unless it had support from the major
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producers in the industry. In this case, support was not
forthcoming.
Even though the project was not carried out, the program had
some positive effects. Hiroya Ueno and Hiromichi Muto state;
Though this program ended up as a desk plan, its objec-
tives have been well incorporated into MITI's subsequent
policies, such as preferential taxes for mini 4-wheel cars,
selective financing, and encouragement of production
concentration by reorganizing automobile manufacturers
into two groups.15
C.S. Chang also sees some positive effects:
The car was not produced because it was almost impos-
sible to develop. However, this outline stimulated motor
vehicle manufacturers to develop small passenger cars
henceforth.16
The plan especially stimulated the entry of two- and three-wheeled
vehicle producers into the four-wheeled passenger car market (and
out of production of three-wheeled vehicles), helping to create what
MITI termed "excessive competition" problems in the 1960s, which
it believed would keep the industry too weak to compete with
foreign producers.17 Instead, it sharpened competition and spurred
development. The publicity given the People's Car also helped
change the attitude of ordinary people toward passenger cars.18 No
longer were passenger cars perceived just as taxis.
Toshimasa Tsuruta cites the People's Car Project as evidence
that the Japanese government's relationship with the automobile
industry is adversarial and that MITI's industrial policy has been a
failure.19 He is correct in viewing the People's Car controversy as a
conflict. The major producers were not interested in following
MITI's technical specifications because they appeared unprofitable
and might have given one company an unfair advantage over the
others. Because it was impossible to predict which company would
receive that advantage, the major companies were motivated to
work together to defeat the plan. After additional companies
entered the market around 1960, this type of consensus was harder
to achieve. Because the small companies saw the project as an
opportunity to break into the market with a product suited to their
production capabilities, they did not have the same reaction as the
five existing manufacturers.
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Taizo Yakushiji states that this program "revived prewar
teaching of government control of the automobile industry in the use
of technical specifications."20 Certainly the standardized "Isuzu"
and the People's Car were based on government technical specifica-
tions, but there the similarity ends. MITFs plan was fundamentally
different from earlier military policies because it did not seek to
impose controls on the industry. Rather, the People's Car Project
represented MITTs attempt to use its leadership to influence
production trends. In the late 1930s, the government succeeded in
unilaterally imposing its need for trucks on the manufacturers, but
in the postwar period it could only attempt to influence. The final
decisions remained in the hands of the private companies.
Other Public Policies
Other public policies affected the level of consumer demand for
passenger cars in postwar Japan. These included policies related to
road construction and taxation.
The policy governing road construction increased demand
indirectly. Japan's roads at this time were inadequate. Dr. Ralph
J. Watkins, an American brought to Japan by the government in
1956, said, "The roads of Japan are incredibly bad. No other
industrial nation has so completely neglected its highway
system."21
This issue did not involve much interaction between govern-
ment and the automobile industry. The government and business
favored the creation and upgrading of roads. MITI, the strongest
advocate for the auto industry, was not in charge of road construc-
tion; it was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Construction,
which catered more to its clients—construction companies—and local
politicians than the automobile industry. The auto companies had
to compete with everyone else to obtain improved roads around
their factories to facilitate supplier deliveries.
The first postwar recognition of the importance of a road
network occurred in 1948 when SCAP outlined a five-year plan.22
This plan was to be carried out by the Ministry of Construction's
Road Bureau but was never implemented because of the Dodge
Line. Road construction that was done during the Occupation
progressed slowly because of conflicts over where the roads should
be built and the lack of materials.
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Interest in roads revived in 1952 when the Japanese govern-
ment made a survey of existing road conditions and established a
classification system for public roads.23 The government in 1953
passed the Temporary Measures Law Concerning the Source of
Funds for the Improvement of Roads (Doro Seibihi no Zaigento ni
Kan Suru Rinji Sochi Ho) in response to the survey. This law
established a five-year construction program that began in 1954
and was financed by a gasoline tax.24
Other laws were enacted in the 1950s that further expanded
the road network: the Law Concerning Special Measures for Road
Improvement (1955), the Japan Highway Public Corporation Law
(1955), the National Expressway Law (1957), the Law Concerning
Emergency Measures for Highway Construction (1958), and the
Metropolitan Expressway Public Corporation Law (1959). Five
additional types of special road taxes were also established to aid
road construction: the Local Road Transfer Tax (1955), the Light
Oil Transactions Tax (1956), the Liquified Petroleum Gas Tax
(1965), the Automobile Acquisition Tax (1968), and the Automobile
Weight Tax (1971).
The impact of the road construction program was favorable.
Takafusa Nakamura states that the upgrading of roads since the
latter half of the 1950s had a tremendous influence, increasing the
potential for automobile transportation.25 Masaki Koshi similarly
states that "the rapid diffusion of cars starting from the second half
of the 1950s is attributable to the government's policies of achieving
high economic growth and improving the nation's road network."26
Although MITI's policies helped expand demand for passenger
cars, other government policies were inconsistent with this
goal. John Campbell and Masaki Koshi state that the huge
increases in consumer demand for passenger cars in the 1960s
sometimes occurred in spite of, not because of, government policy.27
Masaki Koshi states:
It would not be an exaggeration to say that various
related government agencies have been implementing
their respective policies in accordance with their own
interests and circumstances. The impact of such policies
has frequently inhibited, rather than encouraged, car
ownership and use.28
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The policies that were unfavorable to passenger car demand
included difficult driver's license tests, restrictions on consumer
financing, parking and garage regulations, inspections, high tax
burdens, emission controls, and strict traffic safety regulations.
Those restrictive measures did not mean that the internal
opposition to passenger cars that existed earlier was still
prevalent. Rather, they exemplified a different type of government-
business interaction: regulation to minimize social costs. With the
exception of tax policies, the other policies were primarily enacted
during the 1960s after consumer demand had increased to a level
that created environmental and safety problems. Regulations tended
to be more controversial than developmental policies.
In regard to tax policies, the majority of automobile taxes were
used either to finance safety inspections (a social cost issue) or road
construction. The exception was the high commodity tax, which was
essentially a revenue tax on luxury goods, that had been applied to
passenger cars since before World War II. Although the tax
remained high, it was lowered considerably during the early 1950s
and included a differential that favored the small cars produced by
the Japanese companies. The fact that it was not eliminated does
reveal the bias that existed in Japan against consumer consump-
tion. To this extent, the automobile industry was not seen as central
to economic development in Japan as were industries such as steel
or fertilizer. The auto industry was provided only with minimum
survival security that left most of the initiative up to the private
sector.
The inconsistencies in government policy did exist, especially
after 1960. John Campbell states that the restrictive policies had
"the net effect of holding down demand, certainly well below the
level that would [have been] be reached if American-style [less
restrictive] policies had been implemented. "29
While it is difficult to determine the full dampening effect of
these policies, increased consumer demand due to road expansion,
general economic growth, and rising incomes outweighed the restric-
tive policies' negative effects. Even if demand had been higher, the
auto industry might not have been able to meet it since its manufac-
turing capacity did not take off exponentially until the
1960s. Registrations of new passenger cars then increased over
fifteenfold from 145,777 in 1960 to 2,379,128 in 1970.
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Automotive Parts Industry Promotion
A major reason why Japanese automobiles were not competi-
tive was the high price and low quality of domestically produced
parts.30 In an attempt to remedy this problem, the government's
major program to upgrade the automobile industry's competitive-
ness in the latter half of the 1950s involved the automotive parts
industry. The major automobile companies had achieved a degree of
stability, so attention shifted to the automotive parts industry, and
automotive parts became the major focus of government and private
sector interactions during this period.31
The Industry's Early Development
The parts industry began to expand in the late 1920s,
primarily to make aftermarket repair parts. A few firms, including
Toshiba and Teikoku Spring, supplied parts to the domestic
manufacturers and to the onshore assembly plants of Ford and
General Motors. These companies trace their present subcontracting
relationships with the major assemblers to this period. The market
grew further after the passage of the Automobile Manufacturing
Law in 1936, which required the domestication of parts produc-
tion. By the eve of World War II, Japan possessed a rudimentary
independent parts industry, but much of the parts production was
still done inside the car companies.
A Ministry of Commerce and Industry survey in 1935 found
that 202 factories had automotive parts as their major products
(excluding businesses such as general machine tool producers and
shipyards, which produced automotive parts but not as a primary
line). The survey found that production totaled 53 million yen ($1.9
million), of which 26.7 million yen ($933,566) was tire production.32
The government first became involved with the automotive
parts industry in conjunction with the "Isuzu" project. Studies on
standardizing automotive parts were carried out in 1931 and 1933
by the Research Committee on the Standardization of the Size of
Industrial Goods.33 No substantive action was taken until the
passage of the Regulation for the Registration of Qualified Auto
Parts and Materials (Yuryo Jidosha Buhin Oyobi Zairyo Nintei
Kisoku) in 1938 and the formation of the Committee on Automobile
Technology in 1939. The law's purpose was to establish an
authorization system for quality parts for use in the production of
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standardized military trucks. If parts were authorized for use, the
companies could obtain scarce raw materials and their parts would
be bought by the authorized auto manufacturers. The authorizing
authority was MCI's Machinery Experimental Bureau.
Auto parts companies could also be authorized under the
Automobile Manufacturing Law. Only one auto parts company,
Motor Wheel Industry (a predecessor of Topy Industries), was
authorized under the law. It was created by a forced merger of
three stamping companies34 and obtained a monopoly on the
production of wheels during World War II.
The Automobile Control Association regulated the distribution
of automotive parts during the war. After November 1942, the
Regional Automobile Maintenance and Distribution Corporation
(JIHAI), the operational arm of the control association, was
responsible for day-to-day supervision.
Prior to 1945, little information is available on how the parts
companies interacted with the government. As in the case of the
assemblers, they had no choice but to cooperate with the military,
and specific companies did benefit from procurement contracts and
participation in munitions production.35
Technology Tieups
At the end of World War II, the automotive parts industry was
backward and uncompetitive. Immediately after the war, existing
suppliers underwent extreme economic hardships forcing them to
restructure and cut employment. Some suppliers survived by
receiving a limited amount of aid from the major assemblers along
with income from the Korean War special procurement programs.
The automotive parts industry did not become a focus of
government attention again until around 1953, when the major
assemblers began KD production under technology tieups with
foreign firms. Because MCI, and later MITI, continued on a limited
scale after 1945 to certify parts' quality and engage in technical
research, the administrative apparatus needed in 1953 was already
in place.
One reason attention focused on the parts industry at this time
was because the contracts signed by the assemblers in the tieup
agreements required the domestication of parts production. MITI
refused to approve tieup contracts without this provision. Domestic
production of parts, including engines, was required to be 90 percent
within five years. For example, Hino's initial production plan for
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KD production of the Renault 3CV stated that in 1953 sixteen
parts, including tires, would be domesticated. The domestication
percentage would then rise to 25 percent in the second year, 50
percent in the third year, 75 percent in the fourth year and 100
percent in the fifth year.36 Thus, MITI's policy ensured that foreign
passenger car technology would be quickly internalized.
In order to qualify under the contract's domestic content provi-
sions, a part had to be approved by the foreign partner as meeting
specified quality levels.37 Once approved, MITI would also authorize
the part, and it could qualify as domestic content.
The automobile companies at this time did not have the funds to
subsidize parts production. In 1952, MITI, foreseeing this problem,
diverted some funds originally intended for the assemblers to the
parts industry as loans to finance the required parts.38 In addition,
MITI recommended that JDB extend loans to viable major parts
suppliers of the four major assemblers. Most smaller parts suppliers
did not have the staff to fill out the extensive government loan
applications, so the benefits of these programs went primarily to the
larger companies.
Despite the loan program and some subsidization from the
assemblers, the primary burden of fulfilling the domestication
schedule fell on the parts suppliers themselves. The companies had
to scrounge for the capital to upgrade their products (or in some
cases produce entirely new lines of products) to meet the high stan-
dards of the foreign partners. This was especially true for Hino and
Isuzu suppliers, who only had experience with truck parts.
Some of the larger parts producers also entered into technology
agreements with foreign firms in order to upgrade quality. These
agreements were subject to review by the government, which
decided whether or not to allocate the foreign exchange needed. The
first such postwar agreement was signed in 1951. (A few of the
largest parts producers, including Diesel Kiki and Nihon Air Brake,
had technology agreements with foreign companies in the
1930s.) There were eight agreements from 1951 to 1956.39 Ueno
and Muto describe the evolution of the agreements:
For instance, technology imports ranged from basic tech-
nology to design, increasing from eight in 1951-1956 that
centered around product technology (brake boosters and
electrical devices), to twelve in 1956-1960 that centered
around mass production technology (continuous casting,
etc.), fifty-one in 1961-1965 that centered on newly
developed technology (air spring, automatic clutch, etc.),
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and eighty-three in 1966-1968 that were mainly
accessories (sun visor, tire pressure indicator, etc.) and
technology-bypassing registered patents (wiper blades,
fan clutches, etc.).40
The advances brought about by these tieups benefited more
than just the individual companies involved. The assemblers helped
encourage the spread of technology, especially new industrial
engineering and quality control techniques, through the cooperative
associations of parts producers and specific assemblers that began
to form in the mid-to-late 1950s for prewar vehicle manufacturers
and in the 1960s for later entrants. Because the parts companies
often supplied more than one major auto assembler and assemblers
bought the same part from more than one supplier, the new tech-
nologies spread throughout the industry.
Operation Roll-Up
The technological development of the Japanese auto parts
industry in the 1950s also was enhanced by the U.S. military's
rebuild program, known as Operation Roll-Up. The program helped
increase parts quality, upgrade manufacturing techniques, and
provide a stable market. It also trained workers in automotive
skills.
In 1948, the U.S. military started a program to rebuild trucks
and jeeps left behind in Asia after World War II.41 These vehicles
were then reshipped all over Asia to support U.S. military and
United Nations forces. Compared to the cost of new vehicles, the
U.S. government saved an estimated $4,000 on every rebuilt 2.5
ton truck and $2,000 on every rebuilt jeep.
The U.S. Army Ordnance Depot at Oppama and the
U.S. Army Logistical Depot at Tokorozawa procured parts to repair
these vehicles and contracted for the complete repair of vehicles.42
Fuji Motors Corporation was the primary contractor for the
complete repair of vehicles. The major Japanese contractors for
parts included Nihon Seiko at its Oppama Plant near Yokohama
and Victor Autos Company at its Tokorozawa Plant in Saitama.43
The program required numerous parts that were procured
from small- and medium-sized Japanese parts companies. These
parts included products such as brake shoes and linings, piston
rings, electrical parts, shield beam headlamps, starters,
crankshafts, springs, hoses, and tires.
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Because the quality of the parts was poor, Japanese and
American engineers were assigned to work with the Japanese
suppliers.44 Special teams were frequently sent to the suppliers'
factories to teach them how to read SAE (Society of Automotive
Engineers) standards and military specifications and how to use
statistical process control. The U.S. military also specified as a
condition in the contracts the establishment of quality controls and
inspection systems.
By August 1958 when the program began to be phased out,
176,653 vehicles had been completely rebuilt and 7,000 more had
been repaired.45 In addition, almost 102,000 engines, axles, and
transmissions had been rebuilt. The rebuild program turned out 699
vehicles in 1948 and peaked at 37,722 in 1955. The number of
rebuilt vehicles and required parts is significant when compared to
828,249 domestically produced vehicles (passenger cars, trucks, and
buses) between 1948 and 1958 because it expanded demand for
parts and provided a stable source of income at a critical time in the
industry's development.
Machinery Promotion Act
The most extensive Japanese government program to increase
the competitiveness of the auto parts industry began in 1956. The
government felt that the assemblers' and parts companies' own
efforts were proceeding too slowly. Therefore, it designated automo-
tive parts in 1956 for promotion under the Machinery Industry
Promotion Act (Kikai Kogyo Shinko Rinji Sochi Ho).
The commerce and industry committees of both houses of the
Diet held hearings on this act in the spring of 1956. The hearings
dealt primarily with the overall level of specialization, rationaliza-
tion, and the lack of maturity within the machinery industry, with
the auto parts industry as one example.46 This act was passed on
June 5, 1956 and extended twice, each time for five years, first in
1961 and then in 1966.
The Machinery Industry Promotion Act helped industry to
overcome the technological gap it faced in relation to foreign
producers. Koichi Shimokawa states that the law allowed "eminent
specialized parts manufacturers" to grow up.47 In particular, he
points out that the law allowed companies to acquire technology
patents, to receive priority in foreign exchange allocation to buy
new equipment, and to obtain special fiscal privileges. In addition,
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there were special rules for the depreciation of new equipment and
the promotion of rationalization technology.
The machinery promotion act complemented the vehicle
assemblers' corporate price reduction plans. Nissan established the
Original Price Reduction Committee, while Isuzu had a similar
Rationalization Committee.48 Toyota conducted a comparative study
of the prices of 300 parts in Japan and the United States and found
that Japanese products were on average 45 percent more expen-
sive.49 The other major companies had similar committees and
conducted similar surveys in the late 1950s.
The assemblers were concerned not only with obtaining low-
cost products but with establishing integrated production
systems. The companies needed to rationalize parts production to
secure efficient mass production for successful competition—the
overriding concern during this period. The "just-in-time" or kanban
system of inventory management (in which parts arrive at the
assembly line from suppliers as needed rather than being stock-
piled) began during the 1950s in part as a way to better integrate
parts production with final assembly.50
Intensified domestic competition was created by a large
number of new entrants into the parts industry between 1955 and
1956. This competition provided motivation for parts companies to
take part in the price reduction and rationalization plans of the
vehicle assemblers and the government.
The act was administered by the Automotive Parts Committee,
an ad hoc group with members from MITI, the major automotive
parts associations, and the Automobile Manufacturers Associa-
tion.51 MITI and the committee agreed on the policy approach
pursued during the first ten years of the plan because all sides had
similar objectives.
The privileges extended under the act were the same benefits
earlier extended to the major automobile assemblers: technology
imports, tax benefits, and loans. The industry benefited from tech-
nology tieups and technology imports, but the impact of the loans
was more controversial.
Loans were extended through the Japan Development Bank,
and the Small and Medium Companies Finance Corporation. The
JDB loans went to primary parts makers (companies with direct
relationships with the assemblers), and the Small and Medium
Companies Finance Corporation loans went to secondary parts
makers (companies with indirect relationships with the assemblers
and direct relationships with primary parts makers). While the JDB
and the Small and Medium Companies Finance Corporation were
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responsible for granting the loans, the Automotive Parts Committee
approved their decisions.
The initial criteria for the loans stated that they had to involve
products that represented substantial costs to the final
assemblers.52 MITI listed ninety-five categories of parts, from
which forty-five categories would be promoted for modernization and
rationalization.53 Nine products were designated to begin the
program: wheels, carburetors, shock absorbers, horns, gauges,
metal cable, switches, chassis coil, and evaporators. Loan conditions
announced in 1964 were broader and reflected the growing concern
with the liberalization of the Japanese market.54 The new criteria
required that loans had to help prepare the passenger car industry
for liberalization, had to contribute to future exports, and had to be
given to companies with a substantial share of the domestic market.
The total amount of loans extended to the auto parts industry
by JDB under the Machinery Promotion Act was 30.642 million yen
divided among 139 companies (1956 to 1970).55 The Small and
Medium Companies Finance Corporation's loans under the act
totaled 4.147 million yen and were received by 161 companies
(1961 to 1970). The auto parts industry also received loans after
1970 under the Machinery Electronics Act (1971 to 1977) and the
Machinery Information Act (1978 to 1980), totaling 33.7 million
yen from JDB and 959 million yen from the Small and Medium
Companies Finance Corporation.
Koichi Shimokawa sees the loans as important and bases his
conclusions on the total loan figures and price reductions to show
increases in efficiency rather than defining success simply as the
industry's growth.56 John Campbell states that impact of the
government loans was ambiguous given that both firms receiving
and not receiving JDB loans grew at impressive rates.57 In addi-
tion, he notes that if JDB used "normal banking criteria" to decide
who should receive the loans, the stronger companies would have
benefited in any case. He concludes that "the impact of public policy
should be seen as helpful rather than determining."58
The evidence suggests that Campbell is more correct in his
evaluations. The loans could not by themselves determine which
companies would be successful but helped to reinforce and some-
what hasten trends that were already being pursued
privately. Because Japan was subject to time constraints imposed
by pending merchandise and capital liberalization, acceleration of
growth was essential to long-term competitiveness.
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Parts Company Mergers
In the mid-1960s, MITI's attention turned to promoting
mergers within the parts industry. This program sought to
encourage the consolidation of the parts companies in order to
strengthen the industry so that it could withstand the impact of
capital liberalization. The attempt lasted from 1966 to 1971. MITI
wanted to encourage mergers on a horizontal level to support its
plan to reorganize the automobile assemblers into three groups. It
tried to create a small number of horizontally integrated
companies—similar to the American structure—strong enough to
withstand the impact of capital liberalization.
MITI's attempts to encourage mergers were strongly opposed,
primarily because they disturbed the industry's emerging
subcontracting practices, in which major parts companies were
quasi-integrated with a major assembler and smaller parts
companies were similarly integrated with the major parts
companies. In addition, the mergers would have disrupted efforts to
encourage new entries needed in certain product lines and would
have discouraged the rivalry within supplier groups that permitted
prices to be held in check.59
Few mergers resulted from MITI's efforts.60 Some companies
did enter into joint manufacturing agreements, which resulted in the
grouping of third and second tier suppliers around a primary
supplier that handled formal agreements with the assembler. These
subcontracting relationships emerged because Japan did not have a
strong existing parts or machinery industry, from which a
passenger car industry could develop. The major assemblers, who
were still weak themselves, had to develop a production system that
shared capital and labor costs and transferred the brunt of labor
problems to the suppliers. The resulting production system
depended on a vertical division of labor that was reinforced by
cultural proclivities toward groupism and the vertical structuring of
social relationships.61
The industry also was not motivated to accept MITI's merger
policies during the 1960s because the very success of the first ten
years had created vigorous, more independent parts producers. The
growing competitiveness of the industry first became apparent in
1964 when the parts producers rebelled against increased pressure
to further reduce prices while facing rising raw material costs.62 In
the fall, the parts suppliers announced that they had reduced prices
to the lowest limit possible without going into debt. The confronta-
tion was accentuated by a recession that lasted through 1965.
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On November 25, 1964, the relationship between the
assemblers and the parts makers was discussed at a conference
chaired by Katsuji Kawamata of Nissan and attended by represen-
tatives of the major assembler and parts companies and MITI and
the trade associations, as well as by representatives from other
related industries.63 Prior to the conference, the top executives of
the parts industry compiled a twelve-point demand, the most impor-
tant point being that if raw material prices rose, the prices paid for
parts must also rise. Evidently, the assemblers took the position
that they were "buying the parts not the materials/' thus putting
the burden of price increases on the parts makers. The parts
makers, by taking a unified stand, were able to "obtain the full
understanding of the assemblers." Their demands were formally
accepted on December 17.
Conclusion
The mid-to-late 1950s was a period of consolidation and expan-
sion for the Japanese auto industry. Because the immediate threat
from the international arena had been eliminated, the companies
gained competitive strength and were ready to build mass produc-
tion facilities. Toyota completed construction of its Motomachi plant
in 1959. Toyota's lead was followed by the other companies in the
early 1960s. The new mass production plants included: Nissan's
Oppama plant, Isuzu's Fujisawa plant, Hino's Hamura plant, and
Prince's Murayama plant.
Domestic demand expanded primarily because of rising
incomes and Japan's rapid growth. Policy initiatives to develop
domestic demand also had an impact in reinforcing a trend that
already had begun with Korean War special procurements. The
Peoples' Car Project, although it was never implemented,
encouraged the entrance of new producers and quickened the
existing companies' small car projects.
The most important government-business interaction during
this period involved the automotive parts industry, the weakest link
in the drive toward competitiveness. Interactions and policies in this
area mirrored those with the vehicle manufacturers. The industry's
uncompetitiveness and the existence of shared objectives initially
facilitated cooperation. The industry worked with the government
and received government subsidies. Later, cooperation dissipated as
the industry became more competitive, and MITI tried to change
the industry's structure through mergers.
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By the early 1960s, increased demand resulted in a promising
passenger car market that attracted new entrants like Honda and
Mazda, who previously produced motorcycles or three-wheeled
vehicles. The new entrants sharpened competition and helped set
the stage for the next round of government-business interac-
tions. Concern over internationalization intruded and again became
the central theme of relations between the government and the
assemblers.
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Liberalization of trade and capital flows was the major factor
affecting the relationship between the Japanese government and the
automobile industry in the 1960s. The pressures and fears
surrounding liberalization strongly influenced the way in which the
government viewed its role vis-a-vis the business community. The
government had to balance Japan's need to enter fully into inter-
national trade through complete access to foreign markets with the
need to ensure that Japanese industry would be competitive enough
to export and not be overrun by foreign competitors.
Liberalization was necessary because Japan had to have
access to the international market in order to survive and
expand. By 1960, Japan's access began to be jeopardized by export
and import practices that did not comply with rules and procedures
established under multilateral trade arrangements: the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). Japan did not yet have the ability to
affect the contents of such arrangements; therefore, it had little
choice but to adapt, although it did so more slowly than other
nations wanted. As Japan accepted the conditions of various trade
arrangements and its industry adapted to liberalized trade, interac-
tions between government and business changed.
Arrangements For Liberalization
During World War II and immediately thereafter, the United
States established a system to manage and regulate international
economic relations. This system developed from the experiences of
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the two world wars, the Great Depression, and the excesses of
economic nationalism, experiences that had threatened economic
stability and thereby threatened world peace. These experiences
gave birth to a new guiding principle: the international economic
environment affected the stability of the international political
environment. A stable international economic system would enhance
the chances for peace. Cordell Hull, the U.S. secretary of state from
1933 to 1944 and one of the founders of the new system, stated:
Unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs,
trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with
war. . . . If we could get a freer flow of trade—freer in the
sense of fewer discriminations and obstructions—so that
one country would not be deadly jealous of another and
the living standards of all countries might rise, thereby
eliminating the economic dissatisfaction that breeds war,
we might have a reasonable chance of lasting peace.1
Supporters of the new system believed that the desired stability
could only be achieved through the establishment of a liberal inter-
national economic order. They established multilateral arrange-
ments to carry out this objective.
As Japan became bound by the rules and regulations of the
new postwar multilateral arrangements, the government-business
relationship revolved around controversies over whether the
domestic economy could withstand national competition and, if it
could not, what steps should be taken to ensure it would become
internationally competitive as quickly as possible. Japan first faced
this issue when it tried to join GATT.
GATT is a complicated set of agreements applying reciprocal
rights and obligations to each country with a differing degree of
rigor.2 It became effective on January 1, 1948 and since has been
expanded by numerous international agreements. It was originally
intended to complement the functions of the ill-fated International
Trade Organization (ITO). When the charter of the ITO was not
ratified, GATT by default became one of the major international
instruments for regulating international trade, with the following
objective:
The contracting parties recognize that their relations in
the field of trade and economic endeavor should be
conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily
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growing volume of real income and effective demand,
developing the full use of the resources of the world and
expanding the production and exchange of goods, and
promoting the progressive development of economies of all
the contracting parties.
The contracting parties desire to contribute to these
objectives through this Agreement by entering into
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements
directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce.3
Japan quickly moved to join GATT at the end of the Occupa-
tion and submitted a membership application on July 18, 1952.4
Japan was not immediately granted membership because of stiff
objections from several nations led by the United Kingdom and
Australia. Because of these objections, Japan was granted only
associate membership (observer status) in October 1953, with full
membership delayed until February 21, 1955. Japan, like the
European nations, initially had transitional status in GATT, which
meant it did not have to accept the obligations of full GATT
membership under Article XII because the IMF had given it tran-
sitional status under IMF Article XIV. This status was important
because IMF Article XIV allowed the use of quantitative restraints
to control imports for balance of payments purposes in order to
complete reconstruction and settle international debts arising from
World War II, while full status under IMF Article VIII did not.
G.C. Allen states that the objecting countries feared Japanese
trade "would take its prewar form," which they believed was based
on "social dumping,"5 described as "the use of prison or sweated
labor to produce goods which could therefore be sold at very low
prices."6 The United Kingdom, whose prewar cotton goods industry
had declined as India and other colonial possessions began domestic
production, believed that as Japanese exports of cotton goods
expanded, British industry would be hurt further. At GATT's
preparatory discussions on dumping, several countries wanted to
make four types of dumping—price, social, exchange, and service-
dutiable. The American position that the definition should be limited
to price dumping that causes injury in the importing market was
finally accepted.7 The limited definition of dumping helped make the
objecting countries reluctant to permit Japan's full membership
because social dumping would not be actionable under GATT.
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Whether or not the dumping accusations were true, Japan's
prewar trade had particularly hurt producers of textiles, and such
nations objected to Japan's admittance into GATT. James E.
Landes attributes the British objection, in addition to the economic
motives, to a basic distrust of Japan arising out of wartime
experiences as well as to frustration over American domination of
the Occupation, especially its decision to rearm Japan.8 Warren
Hunsberger further states that the United Kingdom discriminated
against Japan in favor of similar imports from low-wage areas of
the Commonwealth, while Australia discriminated because of "a
residue of political resentment."9 Like Allen and Landes, he states
that the strongest motivation for opposing Japan's membership in
GATT was a fear that a "sudden spurt of cheap [not necessarily
dumped] manufactures [would] seriously disrupt markets and
damage domestic producers who [had] not been given the time to
adjust themselves to the new competition."10
The value of Japan's GATT membership was reduced when
several nations refused to grant most-favored-nation (MFN) status
to Japan for several years for the same reasons. The refusals were
based on a clause in Article XXXV that stated if a contracting party
does not wish to grant GATT treatment to a newcomer for political,
economic, or welfare reasons, it need not until bilateral tariff
negotiations are undertaken.11 Japan's major trading partners,
including the United Kingdom and Australia, had disinvoked Article
XXXV by 1963. This episode's significance is that in the 1960s
many Japanese felt that Japan would be refused equal treatment in
world trade until the obligations of full status in the IMF, GATT,
and the OECD were accepted.
GATT was especially pertinent in interactions between govern-
ment and business in the 1960s because Japanese tariffs were
lowered as a result of GATT negotiation rounds. The overall reduc-
tion in tariff rates affected the motor vehicle industry because the
tariff rates on automotive products were high. The first step to
lower tariffs to comply with GATT occurred in January 1968 when
the tariff was lowered on large passenger cars from 40 percent to
36 percent and on small passenger cars from 35 percent to 28
percent.12 In April 1971, all tariffs on passenger cars, as well as on
trucks and automotive parts, fell to 10 percent, eliminating the
differential between large and small cars and bringing the tariffs in
line with those of other major auto producing nations. These tariffs
were eliminated in 1978.
The IMF was the major institution forcing Japan to undertake
liberalization in the 1960s. The IMF was created in 1944 under the
Internationalization 127
Bretton Woods Agreements to organize the conduct of international
monetary affairs through the elimination of exchange controls and
the restoration of reasonably stable exchange rates combined with
national independence in monetary and fiscal policy. It began to
play an important role in the mid-1950s when the United States no
longer needed to finance European and Japanese reconstruction.
Japan joined the IMF on August 13, 1952. It initially held
transitional status, as did the European nations, under Article
XIV. After the last European nation, Italy, shifted from transitional
status to full status under Article VIII in 1959, Japan came under
increasing pressure from the IMF to accept full status. In addition,
Japan's balance of payments position had improved, eliminating the
reason for transitional status. At the IMF's 1959 annual meeting,
Japan was urged to hasten its liberalization process. Japan entered
into negotiations with the IMF and agreed to switch to Article VIII
status in April 1964.
When Japan accepted Article VIII status, it relinquished the
right to impose foreign exchange restrictions for making payments
and transfers for current international transactions, to engage in
discriminatory currency arrangements, to establish multiple
exchange rates without consultation with the IMF, and to apply
restrictions on the convertibility of yen held by nonresidents.13 In
addition, it automatically switched to full status in GATT under
Article XII.
Japan also joined the OECD on April 28, 1964, which was
founded on September 20, 1961 as a transformation of the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)
established in the context of the Marshall Fund at the end of World
War II. After 1949, the OEEC became increasingly involved in an
effort to form a free-trade area in Western Europe. The OECD's
formation reflected French dissatisfaction with efforts to include
Britain in the free-trade area as well as American dissatisfaction
with the growing trade imbalance and its role as "donor nation. "14
In addition, the United States wanted to encourage Europe to adopt
global liberal trade policies that would not discriminate against itself
and Canada. The United States planned to include Japan to further
expand the scope of the organization. Thus while the OEEC was to
stabilize Europe, the OECD was to be a new international forum for
highly developed, market-economy industrialized nations.
The significance of Japan's admittance to the OECD is
twofold. First, OECD membership required Japan to fully conform
to OECD codes. In return, membership gave Japan greater access
to the European market through the receipt of MFN status.
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Second, Japan had particular trouble accepting one OECD provi-
sion, the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements, that required
the freeing of foreign capital transactions. Japan was permitted by
the "Memorandum of Understanding Between the OECD and the
Government of Japan" to temporarily maintain seventeen reserva-
tions to the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements in order to
prevent capital flight and to control capital penetration. Japan also
was allowed to maintain ten reservations on technical assistance to
the Code of Liberalization of Nontrade Transactions that controlled
technology imports. Other countries were permitted reservations,
but none had as many as Japan. In the late 1960s, Japan was
strongly criticized for delaying the abolition of these reservations
and was forced to abandon most of them in the early 1970s.
Japan embarked on a capital liberalization program to comply
with the OECD codes. Prior to Japan's admittance into the OECD,
all foreign direct investment required government authorization,
and foreign companies were not guaranteed the right to transfer
income overseas.15 In 1963, investment was liberalized to the point
that if a transaction received authorization, income could be freely
transferred. In 1964, Japan permitted the free transfer of funds for
short- or medium-term credits for exports or imports, for current
income and liquidation proceeds of direct investment, and for
portfolio investments listed on the stock market.
Heated debate occurred within Japan over the pace and
implications of capital liberalization. In 1965, the first capital
liberalization program was announced to take effect in 1967 and be
completed by 1972. This plan divided industries into two
groups. Industries in Group 1 could be 50 percent foreign owned,
while those in Group 2 could be 100 percent foreign owned. Some
industries that were considered too weak to withstand liberalization
were excluded from both groups.
Manufacturers of motor vehicles (all kinds of vehicles, motor
vehicle chassis and accessories, and motor vehicle parts and
accessories) initially were excluded and then placed in Group 1 in
April 1971 and in Group 2 in May 1973. The liberalization of
capital had especially strong implications for the motor vehicle
industry because American auto companies historically entered
overseas markets via capital rather than by exports.16 The initial
exclusion of motor vehicles, along with delays in liberalizing imports
of engines, parts, and used cars, became part of a major trade
controversy between the other OECD nations and Japan. This
controversy, as it affected automobiles, mainly involved the United
States.
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Japan, with the concurrence of the IMF, adopted the "Plan for
Trade and Exchange Liberalization" in June 1960 to prepare for its
full membership in GATT, the IMF, and the OECD. This plan
established four liberalization stages for merchandise imports that
ranked products according to the degree of effect they would have
on the economy.17 Examples of items in each liberalization stage
were: stage one, raw materials such as mineral ores; stage two,
synthetic fibers and glass; stage three, machine tools and
automobiles; and stage four, agricultural products such as rice. In
mid-1961, the Japanese government decided on a liberalization
target of 90 percent by September 30, 1962. This goal was reached
by August 31, 1963 when liberalization reached 92 percent.18
The OECD designed a liberalization ratio based on the
licensing procedure under which imports were allowed into Japan.19
Merchandise was classified by four-digit numbers covered by the
Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) system. If a good was
imported under the Foreign Exchange Allocation (FA) system,
which required consideration on a case-by-case basis to obtain
import authority and the right to purchase needed foreign exchange,
it was not considered to be liberalized. However, if an import
arrived under either the Automatic Fund Allocation (AFA) system,
which permitted automatic approval and allocation of foreign
exchange but still required applications to be submitted to MITI, or
under the Automatic Approval (AA) system, which automatically
granted import licenses, it was considered liberalized. Warren
Hunsberger explains how the liberalization ratio was set:
The Japanese use 1959 as the basis of calculation so the
importance of liberalizing any particular item is measured
by its share in imports of that year. Items that were
important then, like raw cotton or crude petroleum, carry
heavy weight in measuring liberalization. Items whose
import was small in 1959 carry little weight.20
In addition, some items were placed on a negative list and so
were still subject to quantitative controls even after the Japanese
accepted Article VIII status. Takafusa Nakamura states that the
reasoning behind this list was that liberalization would not be
authorized until genuine competitiveness had been achieved.21
In the case of the motor vehicle industry, three- and four-
wheeled truck imports were liberalized in October 1960 as they had
little foreign competition. Completed passenger car imports were
liberalized five years later, in October 1965. Restrictions on
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engines, engine parts, chassis with engines, and used cars were not
lifted until February 1970.
Japan's membership in these multilateral organizations
affected government-business relations in two ways. First, the
government lost many tools it had used to regulate and aid business
during the 1950s. Japan could no longer use (except for agricultural
products) strong foreign exchange controls, quantitative quotas,
high tariffs, and some export subsidies. The close government-
business relationship that existed in the early 1950s had been
possible in part because a supportive international environment had
allowed and even encouraged Japan to use these tools to reestablish
and protect its industries. After these tools were taken away, the
government had fewer methods to facilitate business compliance.
Second, the controversy over how Japan should prepare for
liberalization and what power the government, particularly MITI,
would have to structure the economy affected the government-
business relationship. It facilitated cooperation because government
and business sought to delay the implementation of liberalization
measures as long as possible to enable industry to become competi-
tive. At the same time, it created tension in the relationship when
the government sought to implement reorganization programs in
many industries, including automobiles. The tension that resulted
from MITFs attempt to pass the Special Measures Law for the
Promotion of Designated Industries and its later efforts to promote
mergers exemplified this relationship.
Reorganization Plans
The primary government program to prepare Japanese
industry for liberalization was industrial reorganization based on
the Japanese concept of "excessive competition" or kato kyoso.
Excessive competition, defined as existing when too many firms
engage in competition, was believed to result in overproduction,
price cutting (especially on exports), loan defaults, and the
bankruptcy of major companies. As Michael Cusumano states, "Too
much competition would not have mattered so much if MITI had felt
confident that it could isolate Japan's automobile market from the
rest of the world indefinitely/'22 Because of the pressures from
GATT, the IMF, and the OECD, MITI knew that it could not.
Martin Brofenbrenner, while dismissing the validity of exces-
sive competition when used "as a tainted cover for monopoly or
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cartelization," describes the economic reasoning behind its applica-
tion to various types of cases.23 He relates the most frequent usage
"to decreasing-cost and excess-capacity firms and industries, where
there are large economies of scale." Brofenbrenner provides an
excellent description of how this reasoning was applied to the
automobile industry.24 He states that if only one company produced
automobiles, it would be able to produce and sell enough units to
reach an economy of scale that would be competitive inter-
nationally. It could export without any, or only a minimal, need for
government protection. However, if too many companies produced
automobiles, they could not produce at a level that would be
competitive internationally in the absence of protective tariffs and
quotas. The latter situation would prevent exports except when
dumped. The reasoning follows then that if the Japanese automobile
industry had only two or three large producers, they could each
produce enough to be competitive enough to withstand liberaliza-
tion. If only one producer existed, unit prices would drop even lower,
exports would increase, and Japan's overall trade balance would
improve. He further states that if such a program is carried out
and if trade liberalization is accomplished, the argument "includes
the promise to compensate the consumer for reduced competition
among Japanese firms by increased competition on the international
level." This line of reasoning was behind MITFs attempts to reor-
ganize the automobile industry in the 1960s through mergers and
tieups.
Brofenbrenner was not happy with government-imposed solu-
tions to excessive competition based on organizing Japanese
exports, disciplinary price-fixing, or various types of competition-
reducing practices. He preferred strict enforcement of antimonopoly
regulations that would allow the market to eliminate excessive
competition. He felt that Japanese governmental controls them-
selves were the chief culprits in causing excessive competition by
creating expectations that profits would be protected. In some
industries, profits were protected through various cartels. In the
auto industry, the expectation that profits would increase came
from the protection of the market and the rapid growth of the
economy. As a result, companies increased output and
capacity. Thus, during the 1960s, the Japanese government sought
to impose solutions on the automobile industry through its various
industrial reorganization programs, which the industry rebelled
against.
Often, excessive competition is depicted as a unique Japanese
phenomena related to the market-share maximizing behavior of
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Japanese companies. Yasusuke Murakami and Kozo Yamamura in
their analysis of market-share maximizing behavior during the
1950s and 1960s claim that excessive competition is really profit-
maximizing behavior that only seemed to be market-share maxi-
mizing because it occurred when firms faced decreasing long-run
average costs.25 In turn, decreasing long-run average costs occurred
because of rapid growth in domestic demand and world trade,
various favorable environmental conditions (e.g., large supply of
trained labor and a high savings rate), and government policies
designed to prevent "unstable equilibrium" (e.g., administrative
guidance on investment and various cartels). While in partial agree-
ment with Brofenbrenner that government policies helped create
"excessive competition" that resulted from market-share maxi-
mizing behavior, Murakami and Yamamura—with hindsight
unavailable to Brofenbrenner in 1966—disagree that the attempted
policy solutions were misguided. Rather, they believe such solutions
helped permit "the orderly growth of innovative large firms,"
although they also entailed political costs arising from the creation
overseas of the "Japan, Inc." image, an image that became
synonymous with the Japanese auto industry. They hasten to add
that while these policy approaches were necessary and effective in
the 1960s, they are no longer valid.
Other scholars stress additional motives for the reorganization
program. William Duncan, in a discussion limited to automobiles,
states:
The government both during the 1930s and the 1960s
sought to reorganize the industry in order to insure that
its future growth would be domestically controlled. In
other words, though a prosperous and competitive
industry was of top priority, the reorganization policy
came to center on a political objective, i.e., management
control. By 1962 the issue among MITI planners was not
how to maximize automobile production but rather how to
maximize domestically controlled automobile production.26
Duncan is stressing Japanese opposition to foreign ownership,
which, in the case of automobiles, can be traced back to Ford's and
General Motors?s dominance before World War II. Duncan asserts
that the Japanese concept of "reorganization" is different from the
Western idea of "infant industry protection" because it is associated
with maintaining domestic control of industries rather than being a
temporary measure to aid import substitution.
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Chalmers Johnson raises yet another valid motivation for the
reorganization program, especially in terms of the Special Measures
Law for the Promotion of Designated Industries. He believes that
the reorganization effort was a power play by MITI, or at least
some MITI officials, to maintain their control over the economy and
their raison d'etre.27 He states that MITI felt that it would be left
"without any continuing function" if liberalization exposed that it
was the weakness of Japanese industry that was disrupting the
economy and allowing the large increase in foreign ownership.
These explanations taken together make clear the motivations
behind the policy and demonstrate the complexities of policy
making. Japan was faced with a time limit in which to develop an
internationally competitive automobile industry. The Japanese
government did want an automobile industry composed of domestic
manufacturers. Because the economy was rapidly growing and the
auto industry was becoming competitive, the automobile manufac-
turers increasingly were able to assert their independence. Because
MITFs loss of control over foreign exchange decreased its power, it
did seek new avenues for control. But these concerns were only part
of the broader policy context that sought the best way to protect the
country's industries by meeting the challenges of liberalization
through the elimination of excessive competition.
The Selection
The passenger car industry was an obvious candidate for reor-
ganization. MITI believed the industry had economic poten-
tial. Production was increasing steadily and, importantly, the
industry was beginning to export. Because it had just reached the
stage of mass production, policy makers could not imagine that it
was ready to compete internationally, especially with such giants as
General Motors and Ford.
MITI felt the industry could be strengthened through reor-
ganization to eliminate excessive competition. Conventional wisdom
stated that the successful production of passenger cars was tied
closely to mass production. The government felt that existing exces-
sive competition inhibited mass production, and mass production
was needed to achieve competitiveness.
The loss of market share by Nissan and Toyota to new
entrants—the creation of excessive competition—lent urgency to
reorganization plans. More producers entered the market as
economic growth increased domestic demand for passenger cars
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during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In 1950, Toyota and Nissan
accounted for 83.3 percent of passenger car production, and they
had only one major competitor, Ota Jidosha.28 By 1955, the Big
Two's market share had fallen to 69 percent as Isuzu and Hino
started KD production, and Prince began passenger car production.
By 1960, three additional competitors—Mazda, Mitsubishi, and Fuji
Heavy Industries—had entered the market, although Ota had
ceased producing vehicles. Toyota and Nissan's market share fell
even further, to 58.8 percent. The final three Japanese passenger
car producers—Daihatsu, Honda, and Suzuki—(Suzuki produced
forty-three passenger cars in 1955 and 1956 but halted production
until 1961)—entered the market by 1964, raising the number of
producers to eleven.
The number of producers remained relatively stable at five
throughout the 1950s and then suddenly increased at the beginning
of the 1960s. This trend was considered an alarming side effect of
protectionism and economic growth by many who felt it would
potentially have a negative impact on competitiveness. In
retrospect, Toyota and Nissan were able to retain a combined
market share of approximately 60 percent from the mid-1960s on,
and the increased competition forced domestic producers to be more
innovative. But around 1960, it appeared that their market share
was steadily declining and that their competitiveness might also.29
The renewed threat from European manufacturers, especially
Renault and Rootes, in 1960 and 1961 also precipitated plans for
reorganization. Although the potential impact from Europe was
never permitted to materialize, it lent credibility to those arguing
that the smaller passenger car producers were vulnerable to foreign
takeover if not protected or merged. Foreign small cars were still of
higher quality and lower price than domestic models.
This threat developed just prior to the expiration of the KD
contracts between Hino/Renault and Isuzu/Rootes in 1962. Renault
and Rootes, anticipating the liberalization of the Japanese market,
attempted to get a head start over other foreign companies by main-
taining their relationships with Hino and Isuzu. Renault wanted to
continue cooperation in the area of sales and also possibly invest in
Hino.30 It was rumored that Renault might keep its patent fees
from Hino inside Japan to gradually buy Hino. Rootes tried to
negotiate an extension for KD production of the Hillman. By
proposing to allow production without requiring any remuneration,
Renault hoped to avoid any need for government approval of the
extension.31 This scheme would effectively circumvent foreign
exchange controls. Rootes would lose income under such a proposal
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but would retain free advertising for its nameplate and would be
able to use Isuzu's sales network after liberalization. Isuzu, by
continuing to have access to Rootes technology, would have a safety
net in competing with Nissan and Toyota.
The new arrangements failed to materialize. Rootes and Isuzu
did organize on paper a joint sales agency named Yamato Motors
(later Shinsei Motors). In 1967, Chrysler would gain control of
Rootes and try to use Shinsei Motors as an operations base in
Japan.32 Renault was stymied by MITI when Hino became
affiliated with the Toyota Group in 1966. In the same period,
attempts by Mitsubishi and Kawasaki to import passenger car tech-
nology from Fiat and Benz, respectively, failed to win government
support.33
Increased domestic competition and concern about foreign
capital investment reflected the environment in which the decision
to reorganize the automobile industry took place. The combination of
these problems and the financial, labor, and cultural difficulties
inherent in horizontal mergers set the stage for changing
government-business interactions during the reorganization period.
The Three Group Concept
MITFs first attempt to reorganize the automobile industry was
the "three group concept." This concept was developed in 1960 and
was the focus of policy discussions until late 1963.
The three group concept was designed to limit the number of
manufacturers of passenger cars—excessive competition—in order
to stimulate the mass production thought to be crucial to competi-
tiveness. The plan sought to establish three groups of passenger car
producers; a given manufacturer could only produce cars within one
group. The three proposed groups were: two conventional passenger
car manufacturers (Nissan and Toyota), two or three specialty car
producers (high quality, minidiesels, sports), and two or three
minicar producers.34 A manufacturer of minicars could not make
conventional passenger cars or vice versa. Individual companies
were not named, but this plan, if passed, probably would
have left only Nissan and Toyota as conventional passenger
car manufacturers.
This concept was announced at a meeting of the Industrial
Structure Investigation Council's (Sangyo Kozo Chosa Kai) Subcom-
mittee on Capital in June 1961. The Council was created on April 1,
1961 to prepare for Japan's overall liberalization. The concept was
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entitled the "Guideline of Policy Hereafter for the Motor Vehicle
Industry" and was delineated further by Mr. Manabu Sasaki of
MITFs Machinery Section at the Conference on Liberalization Policy
for the Machinery Industry on August 4.35
The August announcement outlined a plan to strengthen the
passenger car industry and included more than just the three group
concept36:
1. Production Measures
a. Obtain a waiver from the liberalization of
engines and engine parts.
b. Revise the foreign capital law.
c. Establish a special production system (three
group concept).
2. Technology Measures
a. Support specialized promotion through financial
aid.
b. Construct a high-speed test course.
c. Establish departments of automotive engineering
in universities.
3. Materials Measures
a. Cost down the cost of steel, specialty steel, glass,
etc.
b. Standardize parts production.
c. Stabilize iron scrap prices.
d. Promote low-cost nickel imports.
4. Rationalization
a. Set up special rationalization funds in JDB and
the Small and Medium Companies Finance
Corporation.
b. Extend depreciation life on equipment.
c. Expand depreciation system.
d. Revise the tax system.
e. Revise the sales system, especially to promote
the formation of consumer finance companies.
By early 1962, MITI was preparing legislation that would
empower it to implement the three group concept. The law was
tentatively titled the Passenger Car Industry Promotion Law
(Joyosha Kogyo Shinko Ho). While this law was discussed in
various incarnations until late 1963, it was never submitted to the
Diet for consideration.37 Its failure was partially due to its
subsequent inclusion in the Special Measures Law for the Promotion
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of Designated Industries, which the Japanese business community
strongly opposed. Discussions of the Passenger Car Industry Promo-
tion Law included these points:
1. Mass production would be promoted within the
context of the three group concept.
2. MITI's permission would be required for new
production.
3. MITI would allow companies to work together to
concentrate production and, if necessary, would
provide financial aid.
4. The auto parts industry would not be included since
it was covered by the Machinery Industry Promotion
Law.
The next major step in the development of the three group
concept occurred on April 12, 1962 when a Passenger Car Subcom-
mittee was set up within the Heavy Industry Section of the
Industrial Structure Investigation Council.38 The subcommittee was
headed by Katsuji Kawamata, president of Nissan Motor Company,
and included representatives from each passenger car company,
middle and upper level staff from financial institutions, and
scholars. Ultimately, this subcommittee only dealt with technical
issues. Its reports centered on the status of the Japanese passenger
car industry relative to foreign producers. The first interim report
was published on October II .3 9
MITI felt that it needed a second subcommittee to serve as a
forum to develop a policy consensus rather than simply discuss the
status quo and technical issues. The Passenger Car Subcommittee
had been unable to hold such debates because of the low rank of
most of its members. After overcoming industry's initial opposition
to the new committee and obtaining agreement from the Automobile
Manufacturers Association, a Special Subcommittee on Passenger
Car Policy of the Industrial Structure Investigation Council was
established on September 12.40 The special subcommittee was to
use the findings of the Passenger Car Subcommittee to develop
policy alternatives for the automobile industry. It was chaired by
Koki Imazato, the president of Nippon Seiko K.K., and included the
presidents of the major auto companies.41
In October Mr. Sasaki stated why the special subcommittee
was necessary:
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The passenger car problem cannot remain in the mist of
vagueness. The passenger car is able to become the
center of future motorization. The motor vehicle industry
has under it a large number of related industries and it
prides itself on being a core industry for economic
development. Such an important industry cannot be
allowed to decline because of liberalization. And also, in
order to develop it in the future and place it under
national control in a broad sense [control by domestic
producers not the government], it cannot be left under the
control of foreign currency. Because it is a core industry,
it cannot exist where the nation's control cannot reach it.
On the other hand, IMF's liberalization advice
inevitably will come. If so, this is really the time to decide
a concrete strategy for the passenger car by directly
researching its problems. With this in mind, a policy
subcommittee that examines only liberalization policy for
the passenger car was established.42
He admonished the membership in an effort to force the subcom-
mittee to make policy decisions:
I would like you to debate thoroughly standing on a high
level and decide what the Japanese passenger car
industry should be. After that, the development process
for individual companies should be considered along with
this great direction. This is no longer an intellectual
problem like control or free economy or cooperative
adjustment. In this time of liberalization, this is an actual
problem, simply live or die, develop or maintain the
status quo. It is a mistake if you think such amae kangae
[dependent thinking] as "anyway the government will do
it properly." I really strongly wish that this problem will
be resolved by the manufacturers as it is their own
problem.43
The special subcommittee released its final report on December
18, 1962 outlining the fundamental direction for passenger car
policy. The report conceptually endorsed MITFs earlier policy
proposals:
The motor vehicle industry contains a vast number of
related industries and workers so its development will
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greatly influence the expansion of the people's economy as
a whole. And in the future, they should try to develop to
be an expert industry inasmuch as it is an important
industry. However, it cannot yet be fully equipped with
international competitive power in the production system,
it's not yet established a sales system, and roads and
surrounding conditions are remarkably behind compared
with the United States, Europe and advanced
countries. In these, international competitive power is not
yet fully acquired.
Therefore, on the premise that liberalization will be
achieved by the end of fiscal 1964, we should at this time
promptly establish a production system for the passenger
car industry and at the same time try to upgrade its
physical plant, prompt adjustment of the sales system
and surrounding conditions and wherewith strengthen its
international competitive power and try to establish its
basis as an export industry.44
The report presented possible policy initiatives45:
1. Establish a mass production system in order to
achieve widespread cost-down by the time of
liberalization. In order to do this:
a. Check the increase in kinds of cars.
b. Decrease the current number of kinds of cars.
c. Promote tieups and mergers.
2. Vigorously invest capital in those enterprises that
are expected to be mass producers and strong
exporters.
3. Increase imports of foreign cars by the time of
liberalization.
4. Quickly decrease the price of domestic cars and
promote their quality by the time of liberalization.
5. Strongly promote the rationalization of the parts
industry by promoting
a. unification and simplification of parts standards,
b. concentration and planning of parts ordering,
and
c. amendment of the excessive quality of parts.
6. In combination with the move to adjust the produc-
tion system in order to prevent the negative effect
chaotic building will have on such adjustment,
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statutes are to be enacted for the purpose of
checking the advance of new manufacturers and at
the same time ensuring the effectiveness of earlier
points.
7. Promote the adjustment of the sales financial system
in combination with the adjustment of the production
system and an ordered sales system.
8. Epoch-making policy is to be practiced given the
influence of roads and the surrounding environment
on passenger car demand and cost. At the same
time, promote the adjustment of various legal
requirements as well as changes in the tax system.
Industry Reaction
The presidents of the companies, under pressure to write a
report and conceding in principle that the industry faced excessive
competition, had written a report supporting MITFs position. When
it came time to implement specific recommendations early in 1963,
they balked.
Nissan and Toyota took a neutral stance. This stance revealed
that, although they understood they would be the primary
beneficiaries of legislation to limit the number of automobile
producers, they still had misgivings about the proposed degree of
government involvement in the industry.46 Instead, they decided to
direct their energies toward delaying commodity and capital
liberalization. Hino, having just completed a mass production
factory, expressed support for keeping new companies out of the
market.47
The Small Car Industry Association stated their views on the
policy in January 1963:
Our committee consists of three companies who are
members of the policy committee [MITI's special subcom-
mittee] and four other companies who are actually
producing or are going to produce passenger cars. They
were obliged to examine their opinions about the
report. Therefore, a Board of Directors' meeting was held
on January 25 and also a meeting of members producing
passenger cars for an exchange of opinions.
Some of them expressed opinions in direct opposition
to this report from the international viewpoint, and also
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some of them expressed opinions in support, saying it is a
necessary policy to maintain the motor vehicle industry
as a national industry. Opinions were expressed from
various angles and our committee's views below are based
on this.
1. We will fundamentally cooperate with this
report. That means that for the time being we won't
produce the kinds of cars (over 1,000 cc) that are
problematical from the standpoint of international
competitive power.
2. But, some margin should be left [for us]—high
technology development should be left (gas turbines,
rotary engines, etc.). Tentatively, our committee's funds
and mental cooperation will be given. And, we will care-
fully weigh how various areas would respond.48
Honda Motor Corporation voiced strong opposition to the report
and MITFs three group concept. Since Honda was not yet producing
passenger cars, they would be frozen out of the market if MITFs
policy were implemented. Honda was able to object to the policy
because of its position as the largest producer of motorcycles and as
one of Japan's largest exporters.
Shoichiro Honda, the founder of Honda Motor Corporation, had
planned to enter the passenger car field since the late 1950s.49
Mr. Honda felt that this could be done with ease given the
company's experience producing engines. In late 1962, Mr. Honda
received an unofficial inquiry from MITI asking if his company were
planning to produce a specialty passenger car. This request was
motivated by the exhibition of a prototype sports car (S-360) and a
lightweight truck (T-360) by Honda Motors at the 1962 Tokyo
Motor Show in October. The proposed legislation was one reason
Honda had hastened to display vehicles at the show. MITI's ques-
tion caused Honda to accelerate production plans since it appeared
that if it did not enter the market soon, it never could. In the long
run, MITI's opposition caused a delay in Honda's plans because its
first passenger car was put on the market in October 1963 (a truck
had been marketed the previous August) before being fully
tested. The car had to be withdrawn and redesigned due to technical
problems.
On January 18, 1963, Mr. Honda told newspaper reporters
that "free competition should be practiced without restraining the
types of cars."50 Mr. Honda described this confrontation in an inter-
view in October 1983:
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After we succeeded in the motorcycle race at the Isle of
Man [December 1961], we gradually became confident
and enthusiastic about starting the manufacture of
passenger cars. We had a letter from customers saying
that they wanted to use a Honda-made passenger
car. And many younger Honda men pushed me to start
passenger car manufacturing. Therefore, we made a
prototype and then we dared to enter a very severe car
race. In these circumstances, we had encountered a
serious problem posed by MITI. They tried to establish a
new regime authorized by new legislation, the so-called
Special Measures Law. In their regime, they insisted that
manufacturers who were not manufacturing at that
moment should not be able to start manufacturing
passenger cars. We, our plan, suffered significantly from
this guidance. Then I resisted (revolted against) MITI
vigorously. "We have a right to manufacture what we
want to!" "We are free!" I do not know whether because
of my revolt or because of their own common sense the
new legislation, or rather their attempt at new legislation,
was cancelled. But our plan was delayed at least one
year.51
In early 1963, it appeared that a partial consensus (the most
prominent exception being Honda) had been reached between
government and business over the future direction of policy. The
consensus was only on the general policy direction, not on how each
specific company would be affected. Ultimately, the policy failed
because no company was willing to be the one eliminated. William
Duncan quotes one company president who was a member of the
special subcommittee: "In the council I am a member, but when I
return to my company I am president. The adjustment between
conception and reality is difficult."52 The differences between
conception and reality fully emerged with the introduction of the
Special Measures Law for the Promotion of Designated Industries.
Special Measures Law for the Promotion of Designated Industries
MITFs major legislative initiative in 1963 was the Special
Measures Law for the Promotion of Designated Industries (Tokutei
Sangyo Shinko Ringi Sochi Ho). This bill was MITFs attempt to
Internationalization 143
obtain legal authority to promote reorganization in industries it felt
were especially vulnerable during the liberalization process. It was
also an expression of the concept of "public-private cooperation" or
kanmin kyocho. This concept was based on a relaxation of antitrust
laws to permit various types of cooperative behavior. Industries
"designated" as "vulnerable" included specialty steel, petrochemi-
cals, ferro-alloys, machinery, tires, and automobiles. The earlier
debate on the three group concept was subsumed in the broader
discussion that resulted from this bill. Legislation affecting only the
automobile industry continued to be discussed during 1963 but
would have been redundant with the passage of the Special
Measures Law.
The bill specified development measures that could be used to
help the vulnerable industries. These measures included stan-
dardization, specialization of production, establishment of joint
capital enterprises, organization of industrial complexes, rationaliza-
tion of plant and equipment investment, mergers, and the conver-
sion of businesses to other fields of activity in line with the reor-
ganization of industrial structure. Takafusa Nakamura states: "The
bill would have obligated businessmen to comply with these stan-
dards while the government devised the requisite monetary and tax
measures and made exceptions to the Anti-Monopoly Law as neces-
sary, with banks also supplying funds."53
The Special Measures Law is often called the "Bill Without A
Sponsor."54 This nickname explains why it failed to win the support
of business. The bill was written within MITFs Enterprises Bureau
without industry consultations except for reports such as that by
the Special Committee on Passenger Cars. There was disagreement
over the bill even within MITI.
On February 1, 1963, the Enterprises Bureau announced the
final draft of the bill, which was titled the Draft Law of Special
Measures for Strengthening the International Competitive Ability of
Designated Industries.55 During the next two months, amendments
designed to weaken its impact were added to overcome opposition
from the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), the financial
community, and business leaders. The JFTC feared that the bill
would impair the Anti-Monopoly Act (antitrust regulations). The
financial community felt that it would interfere with the operation of
their financial keiretsu (company groupings around a principal
bank). Keidanren, the major business federation, opposed giving
MITI, in particular, and the government, in general, more power to
intervene in the economy.
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On March 22, a Cabinet conference changed the title to the
Special Measures Law for the Promotion of Designated Industries,
which was then presented to the 43rd session of the Diet on March
25.56 In the Diet, the Japan Socialist Party and others opposed
it. At the same time, the financial community and the JFTC
continued strongly to oppose the bill. Ultimately the opposition of
these groups made the bill too controversial. The Diet session ended
on July 6 without any action taken.
The bill ceased to be a threat as of July 23, 1963 when its
main supporters in MITFs Enterprises Bureau were transferred to
new jobs and opponents of the bill moved into their positions. The
bill was reintroduced at the 44th session (October 17 to October 23,
1963) and the 46th session (January 30 to June 26, 1964) of the
Diet. It failed to be considered both times.
The automobile industry's stance on this bill and on the reor-
ganization program stayed combative during this period. The major
producers continued to take a neutral position and stated through
the Automobile Manufacturers Association that it was unnecessary
to arrive at any "unanimous opinion."57 The Small Car Industry
Association established the System Research Committee in May
1963 to study the implications of the bill.58 The members of this
committee had divided opinions: some felt that the bill would hinder
technological progress and infringe on the freedom of the companies,
and others felt it was a necessary evil to prevent the advance of
foreign capital. The association finally decided that MITI had not
presented a "positive approach."
After the bill failed to gain support for the third time, MITI
dropped it. MITI had failed to gain any legal authority to implement
its industrial reorganization concept "for reasons not particular to
the auto industry" but related to business and financial opposition in
general.59
Koichi Shimokawa argues that MITFs ultimate failure to win
business support for its automotive reorganization program was due
partially to underestimating the competitiveness and dynamism of
its own industry.60 Given the deep-seated fear of internationaliza-
tion, it is easy to understand why MITI felt the automobile
industry—in terms of the mass production of passenger cars—was
uncompetitive. Companies, wanting to maintain their independence
and perhaps in a better position to know their own strength,
rebelled against MITFs reorganization programs. As with the
People's Car Project, the industry fought to maintain its independ-
ence when MITI attempted to control rather than work as a
partner.
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The failure of the bill did not mean that the concept of reor-
ganization was entirely abandoned. Instead, MITI attempted in the
latter half of the 1960s to use administrative guidance and financial
aid to induce voluntary compliance. The major positive result of the
reorganization movement, according to Katsuji Kawamata, was the
industry's increased awareness that it had to take steps to prepare
for impending liberalization.61
Preparation for Capital Liberalization
After Japan liberalized passenger car imports in June 1965,
the major issue facing the automobile industry was the liberalization
of capital imports. This issue was one of the most controversial in
the context of interactions between government and the automobile
industry.
In consultations with the Automobile Manufacturers Associa-
tion on March 15, 1965, MITI Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi
enumerated three items that needed attention before liberalization
was enacted.62 The technical and financial strength of companies
had to be enhanced through business mergers. Companies had to
refrain from excessive sales competition and had to prepare quickly
to export. The assemblers also needed to pursue close cooperation
with, and the strengthening of, the parts industry. At the same
meeting, the Automobile Manufacturers Association stressed that,
while they were not concerned about the impending liberalization of
completed passenger car imports, the liberalization of parts and
capital was not yet possible.
The issues raised at this meeting formed the focus for policy
debates in the second half of the 1960s. In particular, the debates
focused on the potential takeover of weak firms by foreign capital as
capital liberalization approached and as the major American
automobile companies showed an active interest in Japan. The high
degree of controversy surrounding this issue resulted in a wide
range of policy makers, including the Liberal Democratic Party,
which established the Automobile Industry Policy Conference in
1966, and major business federations, becoming involved in the
automobile issue.63
In 1964, Ford and General Motors began negotiations with
Japanese companies; Ford was in contact with Nippon Oil Seal and
General Motors with Nittsu, a distribution company.64 The
continuing rumors and press reports, some true and some not,
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about U.S. interest in Japan's auto industry added to the
tension. MITI was alarmed by the reports. It was true that the
American companies were interested in Japan because U.S. imports
of Japanese automobiles had increased from 1,806 in 1960, to
34,441 in 1965, and to 422,464 in 1970. When asked if Japanese
imports bothered him, Henry Ford II stated:
They sure as hell do. They're turning out mighty good
cars and I don't like the way they're cutting into the
American market. I haven't got anything against open
competition. If they can build a better car and sell it for
less money, let 'em do it. But what burns me up is that I
can't go into Japan. We can't build, we can't sell, we can't
service, we can't do a damn thing over there. Ford Motor
Company still owns land in Japan, and we still have a
building there that was put up before the war. I under-
stand it leaks like a sieve but it's still there, built with our
money, and we can't use it. I'd be in there tomorrow if
the Japanese would let me. I'd be manufacturing cars and
I'd give the Japanese a run for their money. But they
won't let me in and that's why the whole thing is unfair. I
think this country ought to have the guts to stand up to
unfair competition.65
Concern about foreign capital also grew because increased
fragmentation of the passenger car market appeared to make the
industry conducive to takeovers. Because Toyota and Nissan had
achieved a measure of competitiveness by 1965, their existence was
not directly threatened by capital liberalization. This was not true
for the smaller and newer auto companies.
In 1965, there were eleven Japanese producers of passenger
cars and thirteen producers of trucks. The passenger car companies'
market shares were: Toyota (33.9%), Nissan (24.4%), Mazda
(11.7%), Prince (6.8%), Mitsubishi (6.6%), Fuji Heavy Industries
(5.4%), Isuzu (4.4%), Hino (3.8%), Daihatsu (1.6%), Honda (1.3%),
and Suzuki (0.3%). When production of trucks and buses is included,
the smaller companies' market share position improved: Toyota
(25.2%), Nissan (18.4%), Mazda (14.6%), Mitsubishi (8.8%),
Daihatsu (7.9%), Isuzu (5.2%), Prince (4.9%), Fuji Heavy Industries
(4.9%), Honda (3%), Hino (2.7%), Suzuki (2.2%), Aichi Trucks
(1.8%), and Nissan Diesel (0.3%). The last two companies were
closely tied to Nissan.
Internationalization 147
Finally, a recession began in late 1964. Unlike the early 1960s
when all the automobile companies were growing and profitable, the
recession quickly strained the resources of the financially weaker
companies.66 The problems faced by the smaller companies
increased the possibility that they could be taken over by foreign
capital.
MITFs major policies from 1965 to 1969 reflected these
problems. The policies sought to induce voluntary mergers and to
postpone capital liberalization for as long as possible. The auto
industry rebelled against the former policy but worked closely with
the government to ensure the success of the latter.
The Merger Movement
MITI's major domestic policy involving the automobile industry
in this period was the promotion of mergers. As with the earlier
reorganization policies, the automobile industry was not the only
industry in which MITI tried to induce mergers. This policy grew
out of the three group concept and the Special Measures Law. It
differed from earlier reorganization programs because MITI did not
have, or attempt to obtain, a legal mandate to enforce its views.
Financial aid was the major tool the government possessed to
encourage mergers. The financial aid available included tax deduc-
tible allowances for merging companies and, most importantly,
loans from the Japan Development Bank (JDB). Beginning in
Japan Fiscal Year 1963, JDB established a special fund for
promoting mergers between large companies in strategic (potential
export) industries, including the automobile industry.67 The first
merger to receive these funds was the Nissan-Prince merger in May
1966 (JDB was already supplying funds to aid mergers of
small- and medium-sized companies, including the automobile parts
companies).68 Toyota's merger with Hino in 1966 and with
Daihatsu in 1967 were also mergers funded under this
program. Altogether, JDB loans for mergers amounted to 11.9
billion yen ($33 million).
The automobile industry did not draw heavily on the loan
program because the size of the loans was too small to make a
substantial difference in the companies' total financial picture. One
source suggests that the size of these loans could not outweigh the
longer-term obligations that might have been incurred from being
"indebted" to MITI.69 This situation was very different than that
which existed in the early 1950s when capital was scarce and the
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amount of capital needed was smaller. MITI claimed that even a
small amount of government financing was meaningful because it
created easier access to private financing.70 This claim was more
true in the 1950s than in the 1960s when capital was more readily
available and the auto industry had proven its potential.
MITFs other major tool to encourage mergers was administra-
tive guidance. Administrative guidance is "the use of influence,
advice, and persuasion to cause firms or individuals to behave in
particular ways that the government believes are desirable."71 The
effectiveness of this tool is related closely to how individual
companies perceive their interests and competitiveness. The effec-
tiveness in this case is revealed by the two major merger negotia-
tions that occurred in the late 1960s. The first, between Nissan and
Prince, succeeded while the second, among Mitsubishi, Isuzu, and
Fuji Heavy Industries, failed.
The merger of Nissan and Prince is often cited as the first and
only successful example of MITFs merger program.72 While MITI
was instrumental in arranging it, the merger actually was
precipitated by Prince's poor financial condition in late 1964. Prince
had failed in its attempt to challenge Toyota and Nissan in the
1,500 cc and 2,000 cc passenger car market. In addition, although
it had a good reputation in technology, its sales network was weak.
The president of Prince's principal bank, Shozo Hotta of
Sumitomo Bank, was worried about Prince's financial status and
sought to arrange a merger in 1964. Mr. Hotta approached Mazda
with the merger plan since Sumitomo was also Mazda's principal
bank. This proposal did not succeed because Mazda, based in
Hiroshima and controlled by the Matsuda family, was too hampered
by regionalism.
MITI became involved in Prince's merger plans through the
intervention of MITI Minister Yoshio Sakurauchi and Vice Minister
Shigeru Sahashi. They met with the chairman of Prince, Shogiro
Ishibashi, to discuss a possible merger with either Toyota or
Nissan. Initially, Mr. Ishibashi was troubled about such a merger
because he owned Bridgestone Tire Company, which he wanted to
keep as an independent supplier not connected with either Toyota or
Nissan. Minister Sakurauchi's father, Ukiyo Sakurauchi, who was
an old friend of Mr. Ishibashi, was called upon to mediate. At this
point, Minister Sakurauchi flew to Nagoya in January 1965 to
discuss a possible merger with Toyota's Taizo Ishida. Toyota
decided that it preferred to "go it alone" and informed MITI in
March.
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Minister Sakurauchi thereupon approached Katsuji Kawamata
of Nissan, who quickly agreed to the merger because it would
expand Nissan's product line to match that of Toyota. Mr.
Kawamata stated: "This merger has been decided on the basis of
strengthening international competitive power."73 The two
companies and their respective banks settled the details of the
merger. The agreement was sealed in May and stated74:
1. Nissan will take over Prince and continue to exist as
an entity; Prince will be dissolved.
2. The merger's stock ratio will be 2.5 to 1.
3. The company's capital after the merger will stand at
39.8 billion yen ($111 million).
4. The date for the formal merger will be August 1,
1966.
5. Nissan and Prince will both ask for approval of the
merger at regular stockholders' meetings to be held
on May 28.
6. A general stockholders' meeting will be held in
September after the merger.
Although the impetus for the merger was financial, it "did give
a boost to MITI's prestige and set the precedent for further reor-
ganization."75 MITI's major contribution to the merger was to seek
out and arrange for a merger partner. In addition, MITI gave
Nissan the first JDB reorganization loan of 8 billion yen ($22
million).
Toyota and Hino entered into a business merger on October
15, 1966.76 As with Prince, it was precipitated by Hino's financial
position. Hino failed to prosper in the passenger car market despite
its technological tieup with Renault and stopped production of
passenger cars in 1969. Because Hino's continuing strength in truck
production complemented Toyota's strength in passenger cars, a
merger was mutually advantageous. It was arranged through
Mitsui Bank. This was not a true merger like that of Nissan and
Prince since the companies maintained separate identities while
cooperating in new production, technology promotion, and the
purchase of raw materials. MITI's role in this arrangement was
limited. Mr. Yoshifumi Kumagaya of the Heavy Industries Bureau
acted as one of the go-betweens, which resulted in the merger
receiving a JDB reorganization loan of about one billion yen ($2.8
million).77 In 1967, Toyota also entered into a business agreement
with Daihatsu, whose minicar production complemented Toyota's
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production of larger passenger cars. JDB again provided a loan of
about one billion yen.
The second major merger attempt involved three companies:
Mitsubishi, Isuzu, and Fuji Heavy Industries. It initially appeared
that some combination of these companies would form a third major
automotive company to challenge Toyota and Nissan. However,
these proposals failed to materialize, demonstrating the limitations
of MITI's administrative guidance and the various economic pres-
sures working against the merger program.
In December 1966, Isuzu and Fuji Heavy Industries formed
agreements in technology research, the purchase raw materials,
new production, and sales.78 The companies retained separate iden-
tities but established six joint committees to discuss proposed areas
of cooperation. Toward the end of 1967, Isuzu decided that a
production level high enough to be internationally competitive would
be impossible to achieve by cooperating just with Fuji. Thus, when
Mitsubishi began making overtures, Isuzu was interested.
Mitsubishi's involvement in the motor vehicle industry began
in the 1930s but did not extend to the passenger car market until
after 1964. In 1964, the three companies that had been formed out
of the breakup of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries by U.S. Occupation
authorities in 1950 were remerged. One of these companies, Shin-
Mitsubishi, had a motor vehicle division. The merger gave this divi-
sion a stronger financial base to support its efforts to become the
third largest Japanese motor vehicle producer. In order to
accomplish this goal, Mitsubishi invested 75 billion yen ($208
million) in the motor vehicle division from 1966 through 1969.79
Mitsubishi, however, needed a partner with experience in passenger
car manufacturing in order to expand rapidly before capital
liberalization. (Mitsubishi had failed to win government approval for
a technology tieup with Fiat in 1962.) Mitsubishi decided to
approach Isuzu and Fuji Heavy Industries in December 1967. It
received MITI's support for the proposed tieup.
The negotiations quickly ran into trouble. In May 1968, Fuji
Heavy Industries ended its agreement with Isuzu in order to enter a
tieup with Nissan in October. There were several reasons behind
Fuji's action. Fuji and Nissan shared the same principal bank, the
Industrial Bank of Japan, which wanted to strengthen the Nissan
group and pushed the agreement. Fuji feared it would lose its inde-
pendence in a tieup with Mitsubishi, given the huge resources of the
Mitsubishi group. And, some antagonism remained between Fuji
and Mitsubishi from World War II when Mitsubishi and Fuji's
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predecessor, Nakajima Aircraft, had competed in aircraft
manufacture.
Mitsubishi and Isuzu proceeded with negotiations without
Fuji. They agreed to a merger in June 1968, but this agreement
also ran into problems. Mitsubishi and Isuzu, rather than
complementing each other, made competing products; both were
strong in truck production and weak in passenger car production.
Most importantly, Isuzu agreed to the tieup on the premise that
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries would make its motor vehicle division
an independent company. When the motor vehicle division
experienced financial difficulties after the imposition of a new
purchase tax on automobiles in 1968, the creation of the separate
company was delayed. At the same time, consumer complaints that
Mitsubishi passenger cars drove like trucks contributed to stagnant
sales. Isuzu, like Fuji, started to worry that it would be absorbed by
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and decided not to move forward with
the tieup.
Other tieups that were discussed during the late 1960s but
never implemented included Isuzu/Nissan and Suzuki/Toyota.80 In
addition, the Automobile Manufacturers Association and the Small
Car Industry Association, at MITI's suggestion, merged in April
1967 to form the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association
(JAMA).81 The new association represented the convergence in
product lines—and the interests—of the former two- and three-
wheeled vehicle producers of the Small Car Industry Association
and the four-wheeled vehicle producers of the Automobile Manufac-
turers Association.
The failure of most of the tieups was due to economic pres-
sures and the strong separate identities of the companies
involved. The government supported the concept of mergers but
provided few incentives and did not have enough persuasive power
to overcome the disincentives present. In addition, MITI floated a
two-group concept in the late 1960s that contributed especially to
the failure of the proposed Mitsubishi-Isuzu tieup. The two-group
idea was MITFs last plan to reorganize the industry before capital
liberalization and was closely tied to the progress of U.S.-Japan
negotiations on automotive trade and investment from the fall of
1967 to October 1969.
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The U.S.-Japan Negotiations
After the capital liberalization program excluding automobiles
was announced in July 1967, the United States began to pressure
Japan to open the automobile sector to direct investments.82
Although the issue of automotive liberalization had been raised
earlier by the United States and other countries, the July announce-
ment intensified the debate. While the automobile industry was only
one of several industries about which the United States expressed
concern, it rapidly became the most politicized and symbolic because
of strong lobbying by the U.S. auto industry, especially Ford and
Chrysler.
Informal negotiations on automobile trade took place on
December 12 and 13, 1967 in Tokyo.83 The U.S. delegation was led
by Philip Trezise, U.S. Ambassador to the OECD. The Japanese
delegation was led by Katsuji Kawamata, the president of Nissan
and chairman of JAMA. Although he was made a temporary MITI
advisor for the meeting, Mr. Kawamata was not a government offi-
cial. Thus, the Japanese responses to American demands were
necessarily—perhaps purposely—vague. The meeting accomplished
little except to clarify the positions of the two countries. The United
States made three demands: reduce tariffs and taxes (commodity,
road, and various prefectural) that discriminate against large cars;
liberalize imports of engines and parts; and permit foreign capital
investment. The Japanese delegation took the position that taxation
was a domestic, not international, issue and that tariffs had been
addressed in the Kennedy Round of GATT. Tariffs on passenger
cars were to be reduced from 40 percent to 36 percent on small cars
and 35 percent to 28 percent on large cars in July 1968, with
further reductions in 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972. In regard to the
liberalization demands, the delegation did not set specific dates but
indicated the issues would be considered with a forward-looking
attitude.
The issue was raised again at the Japan-U.S. Joint Economic
Subcommittee meeting in Hawaii on January 23-26, 1968, but no
progress was made. Soon after, MITI Vice Minister Shigenobu
Yamamoto stated: "We will decide MITFs attitude after a conclu-
sion has been reached by the automobile industry around March
concerning capital liberalization and engine liberalization."84 JAMA
released its views in a March memorandum to MITI:
We have no objection to liberalizing engines, etc. which
are included within foreign trade liberalization. We
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understand that capital liberalization and trade liberaliza-
tion are not the same thing. But, the time to start capital
liberalization must be thought about carefully. Because it
would be embarrassing for us in the future if foreign
capital gained ground in Japan, monopolizing patents, we
hope that the United States and Japan will discuss this
and come to an agreement. In regard to tariffs, we agreed
to the Kennedy Round. In regard to the commodity tax,
etc., we expect the government will consider them.85
MITI's own position was clarified by MITI Minister Etsusaburo
Shiina's May 21 press statement:
The liberalization of major automobile parts such as
engines cannot be dealt with separate from capital
liberalization. There is fear that if we were to liberalize
engines in advance this would create confusion at a time
when the reorganization of the domestic industry is
progressing. I think that both engine liberalization and
capital liberalization should be carried out together.86
The most noteworthy point about these statements is the omis-
sion of a timetable for liberalization. The positions of MITI and
JAMA were closely aligned in favor of delaying liberalization
because of the weakness of the domestic industry compared to Ford
and General Motors. Executives from Nissan and Toyota were espe-
cially vehement on this point. The statements also tied together the
liberalization of capital and engines. Duncan states the reason for
this stance was that Japan saw engine imports as the first step
toward comprehensive foreign onshore assembly operations. This
position was maintained through the early summer of 1968 in
Japanese government proposals to the U.S. government during
June and in JAMA?s position paper, the Hakone Declaration,
released in July.87 The United States separated the two issues for
negotiation purposes. In the long run, the separation allowed Japan
to concede on the less important issue, engine liberalization, rather
than on the much more critical issue of capital liberalization.
By March 1968, MITI and the automobile industry agreed on
a liberalization policy. Nissan and Toyota directed their energies
toward working with the government on liberalization while main-
taining a neutral position on reorganization. In fact, one study
states that "during the ensuing eight months [December 1967 to
August 1968] of discussions between the two countries, MITI and
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the domestic producers demonstrated their most complete unity
during the postwar period."88 Toyota and Nissan continued to work
with MITI until 1969 when the decision was made to liberalize
engine imports. The smaller producers increasingly disassociated
themselves from this policy.
During the spring, certain domestic groups voiced support for
capital liberalization in the automobile industry. These groups
feared the United States would penalize all Japanese exports to the
United States if the automobile issue were not resolved. This period
was generally a time of strong bilateral trade tension. Keidanren,
the major business federation, became the strongest advocate of
early liberalization of the automobile industry.89 In February 1969,
Keidanren reached an agreement with the automobile industry and
MITI in which it conceded that while it was impossible to set a
specific date for capital liberalization, it felt the automobile industry
would be able to survive liberalization in Japan Fiscal Year 1971.
Mounting pressure from the United States and domestic
groups forced two developments in August. On August 20, the
Japanese government agreed to liberalize engine and parts imports
by the beginning of 1970 with considerable increases in quotas
occurring earlier. This concession, combined with the fact that
Japan and the United States were on the verge of national elec-
tions, created a temporary lull in bilateral tensions. The timing of
capital liberalization still remained undecided, and this issue
ultimately revived bilateral tensions.
On August 21, 1969, MITI Vice Minister Setsuo Takashima of
the Heavy Industries Bureau once again raised the reorganization
issue, referring to a two-group idea in a press conference.90 MITI
had considered a plan during 1968 that sought to reorganize the
passenger car industry into two groups around Toyota and
Nissan. A possible third group would concentrate on bus and truck
production. The August decision on engine liberalization combined
with the failure of the Mitsubishi/Isuzu/Fuji tieup—and the
problems developing in the Mitsubishi/Isuzu merger—accelerated
MITFs interest in a two-group idea. It is unclear how committed
MITI was to this plan but Takashima's public reference to it greatly
disturbed the smaller passenger car producers, who immediately
attacked it with varying degrees of intensity. Commenting in 1983,
Shoichiro Honda stated:
MITI insisted that Japanese automobile manufacturers
could not compete with the United States. Therefore,
MITI said you manufacturers should merge to make two
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or three larger manufacturing units. . . . I went to MITI
and shouted at them "Even though you insist that we
cannot compete with large U.S. auto companies, history
teaches us that it is the newcomer who makes good
progress. You [MITI] don't have the right to order us like
that. If you want to do that you should be an owner of
Honda stock. You can say that as a Honda stockholder at
the Honda stockholder meeting. We follow, we are
prepared to listen to stockholder's comments, but we
never will be ordered by the government."91
The two-group idea, even though it was abandoned quickly by
MITI after the strong industry protests, helped split the automobile
industry's unanimity by creating an additional incentive for the
smaller manufacturers to seek limited tieups with American
automobile companies to maintain their independence. Between
August 1968 and May 1969, the smaller makers had gradually
backed away from supporting an indefinite delay in capital
liberalization. This movement culminated in Mitsubishi's announce-
ment in May 1969 that they would tie up with Chrysler.
The Chrysler/Mitsubishi announcement was a shock. It was
viewed by MITI—as well as Toyota and Nissan—as a betrayal.
Isuzu and Mazda followed Mitsubishi's lead and concluded tieups
with General Motors and Ford. Honda and Suzuki chose to remain
independent and draw on their strength in motorcycles to support
their passenger car programs.
Mitsubishi's announcement, combined with the need to resolve
other tense issues between the United States and Japan such as the
Okinawa reversion and the textile negotiations, finally forced the
government to establish a timetable for the automobile industry's
capital liberalization. On October 14, 1969, the Japanese Cabinet
decided to permit direct investments of up to 50 percent in the
automobile industry as of October 1971. Capital investment in the
automobile industry was liberalized completely in 1973.
Conclusion
The liberalization policies of the 1960s reflected both change
and continuity in the government-business relationship. The rela-
tionship was adversarial on some issues but had strong elements of
cooperation on others.
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Domestic opposition was no longer a factor in the 1960s. As
the automobile industry gained strength, it did not have to struggle
continually for survival and recognition. The rapid increases in
exports and the emergence of new producers best exemplified its
newfound competitiveness. The industry unquestionably was impor-
tant to the economy in terms of the government's economic develop-
ment policies and the contribution made by the individual
companies' corporate growth and profits. Hence, MITI was
concerned about the competitiveness of the industry in relation to
foreign producers and the smaller companies' determination to begin
production of passenger cars.
The absence of domestic opposition affected the industry's lack
of incentive to cooperate with government policy. Koichi Shimokawa
and Toshimasa Tsuruta correctly stress the limitations of govern-
ment policy when the industry and its market were strong.92 These
limitations were especially evident when the government in the
1960s lost its strongest controls over the industry because of the
limitations imposed by the multilateral arrangements. In addition,
the tools the government still possessed consisted of incentives that
increasingly were less attractive. Small-scale JDB loans were not
very enticing when capital needs were large and capital easily
obtainable.
This view is useful in understanding the failure of MITI's
industrial policies and of the various reorganization attempts. It is
also the primary reason that relations between the automobile
industry and the government during the 1960s are characterized by
a majority of scholars as one of the foremost examples of
antagonistic government-business relations. This reasoning is
behind John Campbell's emphasis on the failure of the reorganiza-
tion program and Koichi Shimokawa's emphasis on the refusal of
smaller companies such as Honda to accept government policies.93
While this characterization of interactions as adversarial is true, it
remains incomplete even in the context of the reorganization
programs. These programs produced many types of reactions
among the producers, depending on their size and on the specific
reorganization program. More importantly, this characterization
considers only one part of liberalization policy; the other part was
closely related to threats posed by imports and foreign capital.
The policies to liberalize imports and foreign capital investment
were still potential threats to the industry's development. Foreign
capital investment was the most substantive threat in the latter
half of the 1960s since passenger car imports had ceased to be a
problem by the time of their liberalization in 1965. European
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small-car imports had been delayed until Japanese products were
competitive. The American companies produced the wrong type of
product and were primarily interested in capital investment.
Fear of foreign capital was a factor in the reorganization
programs and, obviously, in the delay of capital liberalization. The
automobile industry initially had strong incentives to cooperate with
the government on this issue. The automobile companies did tend to
support the conceptual reasoning of the possible impact of excessive
competition behind the reorganization programs. However, the
strength of the domestic market and the refusal of the smaller
companies to bow out of the market overwhelmed the government's
ability to extend agreement on the concept to agreement on a
specific policy to solve the problem and on which company would be
eliminated.
Cooperation prevailed on capital liberalization policies until the
public announcement of the two-group idea and Mitsubishi's decision
to tie up with Chrysler. It is important to note that this cooperation
was able to last as long as it did given the strong pressure to
liberalize from powerful domestic organizations, such as Keidanren,
and from foreign countries, especially the United States.
It is possible to be critical of MITI for delaying capital
liberalization longer than the competitive strength of the automobile
industry indicated. In hindsight, the industry was more competitive
than imagined. In addition, the delay reveals the government and
automobile industry's congruence of interest, and that their interac-
tions were based on a partnership designed to provide minimal
survival security.
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CHAPTER 7
COMPETITIVENESS ACHIEVED
A new era began for Japan's automobile industry in the first
half of the 1970s. The changes of the 1960s combined to create
another stage in the relationship between the government and the
industry. The industry was now globally competitive. It had
survived the competitiveness test by exporting; the home market
was secure.
The international environment continued to be important, but
not as a source of vulnerability. Rather, Japan's competitiveness
was a challenge to other countries. Interactions therefore
concentrated on regulatory issues and trade problems that led to a
relationship that was more adversarial and distant.
The Final Transition
Foreign Capital Tieups
The new stage began on May 12, 1971 when Chrysler and
Mitsubishi signed their tieup agreement, which symbolized the auto
industry's maturity and independence. The agreement revealed that
the international challenges to the industry's survival had
evaporated.
While the government-business relationship during the capital
liberalization negotiations had great unanimity because of the
perceived danger in the renewed interest of the American
automobile companies in Japan, the unanimity disappeared in the
1970s when the smaller producers realized that foreign capital
tieups, rather than threatening their independence, presented an
opportunity to preserve it.
The tieups gave the smaller makers access to the growing
American market for imports. Nissan and Toyota already had
established sales networks in the United States and had begun to
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replace European companies as the dominant imports. Most of the
smaller Japanese makers, however, did not have the financial
resources to establish extensive sales networks in the United States.
The sequence of events leading up to the Mitsubishi/Chrysler
tieup demonstrates the transition in the government-business rela-
tionship.1 This tieup proved to be more important than the later
General Motors/Isuzu and Ford/Mazda tieups because it directly
challenged MITFs wishes and established precedents for the others.
Chrysler took the first step toward the tieup on June 8, 1968
when Vice President A.N. Cole, together with other Chrysler execu-
tives, arrived in Tokyo.2 The visit's purpose was to find a Japanese
automobile company that could supply Chrysler with a small
passenger car. Ford and General Motors were investigating the
Japanese market at this time, but Chrysler was the most aggres-
sive because of the three it was the only company that did not have
a small car ready for production. General Motors and Ford had the
Vega and Pinto, respectively. During his visit, Mr. Cole conducted
interviews with a wide range of people involved in the automobile
industry: Mr. Shozo Hotta of Sumitomo Bank, Mr. Katsuji
Kawamata of Nissan, Mr. Eikichi Ohashi of Isuzu, Mr. Kohei
Matsuda of Mazda, and Mr. Yaichiro Makita of Mitsubishi. He was
especially interested in the three smaller companies that were not
tied to either Toyota or Nissan: Mazda, Isuzu, and Mitsubishi.
Mazda and Isuzu turned down the overtures because they
feared that even if Chrysler began as a minority shareholder it
would eventually attempt to take full control, as happened in
Chrysler's acquisition of Rootes in England and Simca in France.
Mitsubishi decided to conduct preliminary negotiations with
Chrysler. Mitsubishi initially did not seriously consider Chrysler's
offer because it was attempting to become the third major Japanese
automobile manufacturer through tieups with other domestic firms.3
It was not until after the proposed tieups with Isuzu and Fuji failed
and MITI announced its two-group idea that Mitsubishi's interest in
Chrysler's proposal heightened. Unlike Mazda and Honda,
Mitsubishi was not afraid of being absorbed by Chrysler because, as
part of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, it had access to tremendous
resources. And unlike Ford and General Motors, Chrysler was
willing to accept minority ownership.
The negotiations accelerated after January 1969 and then
climaxed in May when Mitsubishi Vice President Yaichiro Makita
arrived secretly in Detroit for discussions with Chrysler's top execu-
tives, including Mr. V.E. Boyd and Mr. Lynn Townsend as well as
Mr. A.N. Cole.4 Mitsubishi suggested an investment ratio of 70
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percent/30 percent in its favor. Chrysler wanted 40 percent. The
difference between the two figures was split, giving Mitsubishi 65
percent and Chrysler 35 percent.
Mr. Makita returned to Japan on May 18 and announced the
agreement. In addition to the investment ratio, Mr. Makita
announced the following points5:
1. Mitsubishi and Chrysler would conduct joint research
and development.
2. Mitsubishi would separate from Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries and Chrysler would invest in the new
company, Mitsubishi Motor Corporation.
3. Initial cooperation would be in sales. Chrysler cars
would be sold through Mitsubishi and the Mitsubishi
Gallant (Dodge Colt) would be sold by Chrysler.
4. Local assembly of Chrysler cars in Japan might be
considered in the future.
5. A trading company would be established to import
Chrysler engines for use by Mitsubishi.
MITI was stunned by the announcement, although there had
been rumors earlier in the year that negotiations were being
conducted. Mr. Makita's American trip had been undertaken and
the announcement made without prior consultation with MITI. The
announcement, combined with the ongoing foreign capital negotia-
tions, forced the government to finally announce a date for capital
liberalization—October 1971. It had no choice but to approve the
final tieup agreement.
MITI made a final attempt to establish limits for foreign
investment in the automobile industry. This move was extremely
crucial because the Mitsubishi agreement set precedents not only for
the automobile industry but, because it was one of the first such
agreements, for foreign capital investment in general.6 MITI
suggested that it would only approve foreign investment when the
share was less than 35 percent to ensure domestic control. Under
the Japanese commercial code at that time, anyone with more than
25 percent of outstanding stock had the right to vote in the selection
of directors, but anyone with more than one-third had the right of
veto. Thus, if Chrysler obtained at least 35 percent in the tieup with
Mitsubishi, it would have greater influence in decisions about the
management of the company. Thirty-five percent was finally
accepted by MITI after negotiations with Mitsubishi since it still
constituted a minority share.
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MITI suggested stockholder safety measures, which attempted
to consolidate and stabilize the domestic share owners by
encouraging banks and other major institutions to become
permanent shareholders by buying out potentially weaker
shareholders. Some controversy arose over what institutions
constituted proper permanent shareholders—institutions that could
be counted on not to sell their stock even if it declined in value. For
example, at first MITI wanted to eliminate life insurance and
casualty insurance companies as permanent stockholders, but later
allowed their inclusion. Although the automobile companies did not
have to abide by MITI's proposals, they also favored limiting the
percentage of foreign ownership in order to maintain their
independence, which was the motivating factor behind the tieups.
Between May 1969 and October 1971, Mitsubishi and
Chrysler completed the details of their formal agreement. Chrysler
would pay $100 million over three years to Mitsubishi, acquiring a
15 percent share in the first year, 25 percent in the second year,
and 35 percent in the third year. Chrysler, however, announced in
June 1972 that it was indefinitely postponing any investment over
the 15 percent acquired in 1971 due to its own overall financial
difficulties.7
Isuzu followed Mitsubishi's lead and decided to negotiate a
tieup with General Motors.8 General Motors asked a Japanese
trading company, C. Itoh (with whom GM had earlier dealt), in
September 1968 to help locate an affiliate in Japan to produce
trucks and buses. At the same time, General Motors approached
Mitsubishi through Mitsubishi Shojii and later in January 1969
initiated a survey of Mazda. Neither Mitsubishi nor Mazda was
interested. In March 1970, C. Itoh suggested that it might be
possible to arrange a deal with Isuzu and negotiations began in
August. C. Itoh was evidently instrumental in persuading General
Motors to abandon its initial attempt to obtain 100 percent owner-
ship. Isuzu, unhappy in its 1968 preliminary tieup with Nissan and
especially upset about rumors that Nissan wanted it to merge with
Nissan Diesel, agreed to negotiate the tieup with General
Motors. This agreement, signed in July 1971, gave General Motors
a 34.2 percent share of Isuzu. The companies agreed to collaborate
in safety and air pollution technology, and Isuzu would produce
trucks for General Motors. Because the share was less than 35
percent, the government accepted the tieup.
Negotiations began between Mazda and Ford.9 These talks
proceeded slowly, partly because Mazda was involved in a patent
controversy over its rotary engine with the Dutch automotive
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company, NSU. Mazda also wanted to try to establish a sales
network in the United States on its own. Later, management
problems revealed by the 1973 oil crisis caused further delays in the
negotiations with Ford. Ford did negotiate various sales agreements
with Mazda in the 1970s and then acquired 24.7 percent of Mazda
in 1979 for $55 million in cash and $80 million in property located
in Yokohama, which Ford had acquired prior to the war.10
The tieups are depicted as results of the failure of MITFs reor-
ganization program. Ira Magaziner and Thomas Hout state that by
the end of the 1960s it was clear that MITFs reorganization
program had failed and that the effect of this failure was the
accelerated flow of foreign capital into the industry.11 The failure of
the reorganization program did create an opportunity for foreign
capital in the Japanese automobile market. But, importantly, the
smaller producers were able to retain their independence by using
the tieups to become more competitive while limiting foreign capital
to a minority position.
The smaller firms' ability to retain majority ownership was a
surprise to many Japanese. Katsuji Kawamata stated: "It was
unexpected that American capital affected the Japanese automobile
industry less than we had anticipated."12 He was especially
surprised that the Americans did not build assembly plants in
Japan.
Because the Japanese companies were competitive enough to
retain control and the government supported the minority owner-
ship policy, it was possible to impose limits on foreign owner-
ship. And, because the foreign ownership share was kept low, the
Japanese companies were able to retain management control. More
importantly, limited foreign ownership was also a result of U.S.
corporate policies that, at least in the early 1970s, saw the tieups
primarily as a source of captive imports rather than as a method to
move aggressively into the Japanese market.
The Mazda Bailout
Even though the smaller firms did not present a serious chal-
lenge to Nissan's and Toyota's dominance, their survival was no
longer in question after the early 1970s. Therefore, their relations
with the government could be distant. Mazda was the sole
exception.
Mazda had built its passenger car program around the Wankel
(rotary) engine, which was not as fuel-efficient as conventional
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engines. After the 1973 oil crisis, Mazda found itself with a high
inventory of undesirable products, poor managerial practices, and
inefficient production. By late 1974, Mazda faced bankruptcy.
Unlike the Chrysler bailout in the United States, the govern-
ment did not assume the primary responsibility for helping
Mazda.13 Instead, Sumitomo Bank with the help of Sumitomo Trust
Bank took the initiative and the operational responsibility for the
bailout. Because it was one of Japan's strongest banks at the center
of one of the major financial keiretsu, Sumitomo Bank was able to
gain the confidence and cooperation of smaller creditors. In
December 1974, it sent a group of its own staff led by Tsutomu
Murai, head of Sumitomo's Tokyo office, to Mazda to revamp
managerial practices and to obtain assistance and cooperation from
labor, suppliers, dealers, and other related parties. Mr. Murai and
his colleagues encountered some opposition and problems but
managed to make progress despite the fact that Keiji Matsuda
continued as president until 1978 (Matsuda's managerial style had
drained the company's resources, hurt supplier relations, and stifled
the development of strong managers). Upon Mr. Matsuda's resigna-
tion, Yoshiki Yamasaki, who had been chosen by Mr. Murai to
streamline production, became president.
Even though Sumitomo Bank was in charge, the government
expressed its concern and became involved by lowering the risk
involved in the venture. As with Toyota's near bankruptcy in 1949,
the government had to be supportive because of Mazda's regional
economic importance. Pascale and Rohlen estimate that Mazda
accounted for approximately one-quarter of all manufacturing
employment in the Hiroshima area.14 In addition, the Hiroshima
economy was already having difficulties because of the decline of its
major industry, shipbuilding. Unlike conditions in 1949, the private
financial sector in the 1970s was strong enough to help Mazda
without direct financial assistance from the government.
The government thus assumed an indirect and supportive role,
with the most active government agency being the Ministry of
Finance (MOF). Besides informal consultations and discussions,
MOF implicitly guaranteed the solvency of Sumitomo Bank. Pascale
and Rohlen state:
This [implicit guarantee] does not imply that the Ministry
of Finance would have compensated Sumitomo directly for
any losses. Rather, presumably it would have cared for
the bank and restored it to health by granting it special
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business favors (e.g., shifting larger portions of the
government's cash account to Sumitomo).15
The implicit guarantee enabled Sumitomo to "take an energetic
response" to Mazda's problems.
MITI advised competitors and large suppliers not to take
advantage of Mazda's problems and publicly expressed its support
for the company. Evidently, it tried to limit negative media coverage
to help restore consumer confidence. Pascale and Rohlen see MITI's
support as somewhat incongruous since MITI "viewed the industry
as overcrowded and due for an adjustment." Thus, it should have
viewed the loss of one competitor as favorable.16 However, by 1975
the justification for MITI's earlier rationalization programs had
disappeared. The Japanese automobile industry was internationally
competitive, and Mazda, before the oil crisis, had proven to be a
successful exporter. In addition, while high officials in MOF had
opposed the development of a domestic passenger car industry in
1949, they still helped Toyota because of its importance to the
economic strength of the Nagoya area. In 1976, the same reasoning
applied to MITI's and MOF's support for Mazda. Finally, MITI
wanted to assist Sumitomo, which had just been weakened by the
bankruptcy of another client and could have been seriously hurt by
Mazda's failure.
The Mitsubishi/Chrysler tieup and the Mazda bailout
demonstrate that the relationship between the government and the
automobile industry became increasingly indirect during the 1970s
because there was no need for protectionist and developmental
policies. The relationship, and with it government policy, had
evolved and changed as the industry reached healthy maturity and
the international threat disappeared. The demise of the earlier rela-
tionship did not mean that interactions completely ended. Rather,
they changed direction to deal with newly emerging issues, which
included regulation to achieve social goals and the negotiation of
export restraints.
Emission Control
Regulation to achieve social goals became a major focus of
attention during the 1970s. While regulation existed earlier, it was
not until the 1970s that it began to dominate the government-
business relationship in the automobile industry. This trend
represented an economy-wide modification of national goals as well
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as the maturity of the automobile industry. A Japanese government
report in 1976 stated:
In view of the fact that the automobile has already
become indispensable to the Japanese and that motoriza-
tion has been approaching its saturation point in Japan, it
is necessary to implement traffic and environmental
policies answering the needs of the Japanese people. In
addition, the Japanese automobile industry must recog-
nize its role in society and appropriately cope with the
requirements of society such as those associated with the
environment and the conservation of natural resources.17
The rising concern about the social and environmental costs of high
growth gained in importance. Japan was not able to focus on these
concerns until economic success and competitiveness lessened the
preoccupation with achieving economic growth regardless of its
social costs.
The relationship between the government and the automobile
industry was part of this trend. Several regulatory issues had high
visibility, including safety and fuel economy problems. The environ-
mental problem of automobile emissions was the most volatile
regulatory issue during the 1970s and therefore serves as the best
example of the new regulatory relationship.18
The regulation of automobile emissions was only one aspect of
a strong environmental movement in Japan. The environmental
movement began in the 1960s as the public became increasingly
aware of health problems caused by industrial pollution. Incidents
such as the mercury poisoning Minamata disease, cadmium-induced
itai itai disease, and the lethal Yokkaichi asthma resulting from
industrial smog created a powerful citizens movement opposed to
pollution. Local government officials, many of whom represented
minority political parties, responded to and supported the citizens
movement, as did the mass media. The automobile emissions issue
arose when this movement was at its height and the health effects
of photochemical smog were widely publicized. The public outcry
over all types of pollution increased the legitimacy of government
attempts to regulate the automobile industry and added to the
industry's fear that negative publicity would adversely affect sales.
Automobile emissions did not become a major policy issue until
1970 although concern had emerged in the late 1960s. Before
1970, air pollution policy centered on controlling stationary sources
such as factory smokestacks. In 1970, public interest focused on
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widely reported incidents of lead poisoning and photochemical smog
that many scholars traced to automobile emissions. The automobile
companies' initial response was that automobile emissions were not
the only cause of photochemical smog and that it was preferable to
control such emissions through various secondary policies such as
the establishment of bus lanes and parking regulations.19 After
similar incidents in 1971, the need to solve the problem became
urgent. Public outcry over other types of pollution was high, forcing
the automobile emissions issue into the public arena. Both houses of
the Diet formed Special Standing Committees on Industrial Pollu-
tion that served as platforms for heated discussions on pollution,
including automobile emissions. The formation of these committees
was unusual and demonstrated the political sensitivity of the pollu-
tion issue.
The Ministry of Transportation (MOT), which had jurisdiction
over automobile emissions as well as other regulatory issues such
as safety, took the first step to control emissions.20 (MOT had
managed to retain some power over the automobile industry out of
the jurisdictional dispute with MCI in 1945-1946. Its control was
limited to areas such as parking and licensing regulations.) By July
1970, MOT had drawn up emissions proposals to be implemented
by 1975. The automobile manufacturers had been consulted while
the proposals were being written, and by 1970 the companies had
already begun research to meet them.
Japan's automobile emissions standards are often linked to the
passage of the U.S. Clean Air Act in 1971, implying that Japan
only enacted emissions regulations to ensure that exports would
meet American standards. However, MOT's standards were
proposed prior to any action in the United States and were in
response to incidents of photochemical smog in Japan in 1970 and
1971. American regulations became an added incentive to strive for
stronger emissions standards but were not actually responsible for
the Japanese government's enactment of the regulations.
In September 1971 MQT's jurisdiction over the automobile
emissions policy was transferred to the newly created Environ-
mental Agency, although MOT retained authority for implementing
regulations.21 The Environmental Agency, under intense political
pressure, immediately requested the Automobile Subcommittee of
its Central Committee—an advisory group or shingikai—to draw up
long-term automobile emissions control standards. The subcom-
mittee's membership consisted of three professors, two industry
association members (automobile and oil), five government represen-
tatives from MOT, MITI, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare,
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and a traffic specialist from the Policy Science Institute. Because
the Environmental Agency drew its initial staff from competing
ministries, it was feared that infighting would diminish its
authority. The Environmental Agency was able, however, to act
strongly on the emissions issue backed by public outcry over pollu-
tion in general and the forceful personalities involved.
The subcommittee released its interim report in August 1972
to the Central Committee, which in turn formally submitted it to the
Environmental Agency on October 3. The subcommittee members
had only two precedents on which to base emission allowance stan-
dards: the U.S. Clean Air Act and the earlier MOT recommenda-
tions. The subcommittee decided to accept the stricter 1971 U.S.
standards in its interim report, albeit with some differences in
testing methods.22 Julian Gresser explains that the subcommittee
chose the U.S. standards because they believed that the U.S.
government would never establish a standard for an industry of this
importance without firm evidence that the industry's compliance
was possible and because Japanese exporters would have to comply
with U.S. emission standards.23
The stricter standards helped satisfy the political demands of
environmental activists. The draft regulations went into effect on
October 5, 1972 with the final regulations scheduled to take effect a
year later. The Environmental Agency asked MOT and MITI to
urge the industry to comply.
Criticism surfaced at a series of Environmental Agency hear-
ings on the 1975 emissions standards held from May 21 to June 6,
1973.24 All the automobile companies stated that these standards
were attainable, although Toyota and Nissan demurred somewhat
saying that they would be difficult to achieve in all their
models. But the Environmental Agency held to its stated position of
implementing the 1975 standards. The smaller companies,
particularly Mazda and Honda, were so enthusiastic that they
stated they would attain these standards ahead of schedule. None of
the car companies were enthusiastic about the 1976 standards and
criticized the stricter 0.25 gram/kilometer standard for nitric
oxide. The standards for carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons would
remain the same as in 1975.
In 1974, a heated controversy began on the nitric oxide provi-
sion of the 1976 standards. The year opened with a January 9
press conference by Eiji Toyoda for the purpose of detailing four
reasons for loosening the 1976 standards.25 First, the technology
for emissions reduction was not reliable or durable. Second, emis-
sions reduction increased cost. Third, there was not enough time
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allowed to apply the standards to all types of cars. And fourth, the
new technology would cause a 10 percent increase in gasoline
consumption. He further stated that even meeting the 1975 stan-
dards would be harmful for the nation and that he would ask the
Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association to present a new
proposal to the Environmental Agency. The manufacturers' position
drew a great deal of criticism and accusations from environmental
activists and opposition party politicians.
In the summer of 1974 the Diet's Special Standing Committee
on Industrial Pollution held hearings on the 1976 standards.26 At
the same time, the Environmental Agency began closed hearings
with the manufacturers. At the Diet hearings, all nine automobile
manufacturers again spoke in favor of postponement. Shoichiro
Toyoda said, "There is no prospect for fulfilling the technological
development required for the 1976 standards."27 When asked what
temporary limit for nitric oxide would be acceptable, most of the
companies, including Toyota and Nissan, said that they could not
answer the question. Honda and Mazda suggested a figure of 0.6 to
0.7 grams per kilometer. Ikuo Kobayashi, head of the Automobile
Subcommittee, stated that if the smaller makers could meet a
temporary level the larger makers (Toyota and Nissan) could
also. He implied that the larger makers refused to suggest a tempo-
rary standard because they wanted a complete postponement. In
September, MITI supported the automobile manufacturers, stating
that the standards would create unemployment and cause GNP
growth to slow down.28 MITI was never able to seriously challenge
the authority or position of the Environmental Agency on the emis-
sions question, however, partially because the issue had become
politicized through the hearings in the Diet.
The Environmental Agency decided to ask the Central
Committee in August to reconsider the 1976 standards. The Central
Committee set up an "Expert Advisory Committee on Automotive
Production," which began to study the standards. The Environ-
mental Agency and the industry immediately came under attack
from environmental activists, including the ad hoc Diet Environ-
mental Committee and the mayors of seven major cities (Tokyo,
Kawasaki, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe). The
mayors not only held their own hearings in September but began
their own study of the standards' feasibility.
The mayors' report, entitled "The Seven Cities' Investigative
Report on the Automobile Emissions Regulations Issue," was
released in October.29 The report gave a brief history of local
government actions on automobile emissions and related problems
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such as noise pollution. It concluded that the 1976 standards were
technologically feasible and urged local governments to take
action. Although the report was criticized for technological inac-
curacy by the Environmental Agency and others, it, along with the
formation of the ad hoc Diet committee, clearly demonstrated how
the issue had become politicized and helped put pressure on the
manufacturers. The report resulted in an agreement "in spirit" by
the expert committee on the compliance question.30
The expert committee managed to retain control of the issue
by keeping some company data confidential while releasing to the
public a great deal of information. Concentrating on technological
rather than policy considerations increased the committee's
credibility.
The committee's final report in December concluded that the
1976 standards should be postponed until 1978 because they were
technologically infeasible in view of the small amount of
preparatory time given to the industry.31 Thus, the government
returned to a position closer to the original MOT suggestions. The
report supported tax incentives for pollution research and the enact-
ment of stricter traffic regulations. The final report was accepted by
the Environmental Agency in February 1975 after a small delay
caused by opposition from environmental activists.
During 1975, additional research was conducted on the tech-
nology needed to meet the new 1978 standards. Disagreement
remained on the issue of technological feasibility, but by early 1976,
the debate resolved itself. Several smaller manufacturers, sensing
an opportunity to finally cut into Toyota's and Nissan's market
shares, announced that they would meet the 1978 standards.32
These companies included Mitsubishi, Fuji Heavy Industries,
Honda, and Mazda. Within several months, this announcement
forced Toyota and Nissan to agree to meet the 1978 standards.
The emissions issue illustrates two aspects of the government-
business relationship. First, the regulatory relationship differed
from that created by developmental policies in that it was more
antagonistic and politicized. More importantly, the government had
to take a stronger role to force compliance as government and
industry interests diverged. The administrative tradition of
resolving conflicts, while ultimately prevailing, faced a challenge
from opposition Diet members and local governments. Chalmers
Johnson states that nations have either a predominate regulatory or
developmental policy orientation producing
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two different kinds of government-business relationships.
The United States is a good example of a state in which
the regulatory orientation predominates, whereas Japan
is a good example of a state in which the developmental
orientation predominates.33
This distinction is useful if, as in the case of the automobile
industry, it is clear that as domestic and international environments
change, a nation's predominate orientation can also change. In addi-
tion, its orientation can be different depending on the industry
involved.
Second, although the government-business relationship in the
1970s revolved around regulatory issues, it differed from the
regulatory relationship that existed in the United States. Julian
Gresser states that Japanese "viewed the emission standards more
as administrative targets than rigid, inflexible, legal require-
ments."34 Because the standards were implemented administra-
tively rather than legislatively, the Environmental Agency was able
to be more flexible in coordinating the disparate interests of the
industry and the environmental activists than if it had simply been
an implementing agency. The Environmental Agency, although
sensitive to the position of the automobile industry, was able to
avoid direct challenges to its authority and to maintain a strong
position because of the large number of competitors in the domestic
environment. Thus, because the smaller makers saw emissions
standards as an opportunity to expand their market share, the two
dominant makers were forced to comply.
The Export Takeoff
Export policy had been part of the government-business rela-
tionship in the Japanese automobile industry since 1948 when
MCI's Five-Year Plan targeted the Asian market for future
exports. By 1949, the motor vehicle industry had formed an Export
Promotion Association, headed by Kiichiro Toyoda, that received
some funds from MCI to do market research.35 The Korean War
stimulated exports of trucks in 1950 and 1951. And, MITFs 1952
report on passenger cars alluded to the automobile industry's poten-
tial to directly contribute to machinery exports. However, the
automobile industry's export capability was limited in the early
1950s to trucks and three-wheeled vehicles. It was difficult to
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foresee that four-wheeled passenger cars could become a major
export, let alone become Japan's largest export earner by 1976, just
thirty years after the end of World War II.
The industry's export potential was clearer by 1955. Toyota
and Nissan decided to explore the American market in 1955 and
launched American sales companies in 1957. MITI added a motor
vehicle section to its Heavy Machinery Export Council in 1955.36
The justification for developmental policies was no longer primarily
to save foreign exchange and fill domestic demand but to encourage
the industry's export potential. Therefore, export policy during the
late 1950s and 1960s concentrated on export promotion.
However, in the 1970s, export policy changed drastically
from focusing on export promotion to export restraint. Government
and business found it necessary to cooperate in order to cope with
the international repercussions of export success—an issue that
continued to dominate the relationship in the 1980s.
Until the 1970s, the relationship between the Japanese
government and the automobile industry revolved around the
development of a competitive industry. This focus existed
throughout the post-World War II period in protectionist, reor-
ganization, developmental, and export promotion policies. But by
the 1970s, the Japanese automobile industry was competitive; the
goal that dominated the relationship in the 1950s and 1960s had
been achieved, and attention shifted from industry growth and
protection (the Japanese automobile industry was now "protected"
by its competitiveness) to how government and business would cope
with the international tensions resulting from competitive-
ness. Ironically, at a point in time when there was little need for
government and business to interact except on various social goals,
a new area of interaction developed in response to demands from
trading partners for export restraints.
Export Promotion
Exports initially consisted primarily of trucks, but four-
wheeled passenger cars quickly became an export commodity,
increasing from only one in 1954 (19 passenger cars had been
exported during the Occupation but none from 1951-1953) to 4,884
in 1959. By 1965, passenger cars had surpassed trucks in total
export numbers. Total exports of four-wheeled vehicles did not
surpass the 100,000 level until 1964, while passenger car exports
alone surpassed the same level in the next year. Similarly, when
Competitiveness Achieved 179
total exports of four-wheeled vehicles surpassed the one million
mark in 1970, passenger car exports followed suit one year later.
C.S. Chang states that a basic tenet of Japanese government-
business relations in export promotion is a division of labor between
the Japanese government and the motor vehicle industry with the
government controlling import policy and the industry playing the
most important role in exports.37
This tenet does not imply that the government was not active
or interested in exports. Rather, the government consciously
promoted exports by supporting the domestic growth of industries
with export potential. In the 1950s and 1960s, the government
provided export incentives that were generally available to all
industries. The government did not provide direct support through
specific market research, nor did it help design grand strategies for
export offensives. This was done at the corporate level.38 The
Japanese auto producers developed their marketing strategy in the
United States based on Volkswagen's early success and their own
failures in the late 1950s.
The government's export policy in the 1950s and 1960s
concentrated on general export promotion accomplished through tax
advantages and subsidized interest rates as well as trade promotion
and information provided through the Japan External Trade
Organization (JETRO) to the auto parts industry. None of these
measures were automobile industry specific with the exception of a
few JETRO programs. However, the automobile industry was not
sufficiently developed to take advantage of export incentives that
were available before 1964.
The establishment of the Japan Export Bank in December
1950 (the name was changed to the Export/Import Bank in 1952)
was the first export incentive. The bank's purpose was to encourage
or assist ordinary financial institutions in facilitating international
commerce by underwriting exports, imports, and overseas
investments.39
Although the motor vehicle industry's (including motorcycles
and parts) percentage of total Export/Import Bank loans to the
manufacturing sector peaked at 28.8 percent (5.18 million yen) in
1953 because of Korean War procurement, it relied most heavily on
the bank during the late 1960s, peaking in 1968 at 13.2 million
yen. The number of loans then fell before increasing again in the
1980s.
One major export promotion program was the special
accelerated depreciation allowance for exporting firms.40 Prior to
1964, this program involved tax write-offs and later switched to a
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five-year tax deferral scheme when Japan entered GATT. This
allowance gave companies the greater cash flow they needed to
expand into international markets. Up until 1971 there were two
depreciation schemes available to businesses. There was a "basic"
accelerated depreciation scheme and a "supplemental" accelerated
scheme. The basic accelerated depreciation scheme was computed
from the company's export ratio multiplied by a stipulated export
percentage figure that changed every few years. The supplemental
depreciation scheme was available to companies who qualified as
"export contributing companies" because of their strong export
performance.41 The supplemental depreciation provisions were
ended in 1971; the basic depreciation scheme was abolished in April
1972.
The Export Income Deduction Provision was effective from
1953 to 1964, when it was abolished as contrary to the export
subsidy provisions of GATT.42 This program provided for a tax
deduction based on export performance. The more a company
exported, the greater the tax advantage. Ira Magaziner and
Thomas Hout estimate that fewer than 150,000 passenger cars
were exported under this deduction. The programs did not have a
significant effect because it was abolished before the industry's
export drive began.
The Reserve Fund for Overseas Market Development was
enacted in 1964 to replace the Export Income Deduction Provi-
sion.43 The fund allowed companies to maintain a reserve for
market development through a five-year tax deferral scheme avail-
able for "export contributing companies." The law was revised in
November 1972 to exclude all companies capitalized at over $3.3
million (1 billion yen), which effectively excluded the automobile
industry with the exception of the smaller parts manufacturers.
JETRO was organized to provide market information and tech-
nical assistance primarily to small- and medium-sized exporting
companies. The automobile manufacturers were not targeted by
these programs as they had sufficient resources to undertake the
same type of activities on a corporate level. JETRO did establish
automotive parts promotion centers in Chicago and Bangkok in
1966.44
A dearth of statistical data makes it impossible to determine
exactly how much the automobile industry benefited from these
programs during the 1950s and the 1960s. By the 1970s, the
export incentive programs were abolished for all except very small
firms. From available evidence, it appears that the industry did
take some advantage of the programs, especially the Reserve Fund
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for Overseas Market Development. Thus, the companies had extra
funds for maneuvering during the critical period of overseas market
development, but not during the period of accelerated export expan-
sion in the 1970s.
Export Tension
After becoming a full member of IMF and GATT, Japan was
not permitted to use many export subsidies. By the 1970s, export
incentives were no longer necessary. Instead, Japan needed policies
that would address repercussions resulting from the impact its
growing market had on other countries' industries.
Textiles were the first major Japanese product after World
War II to strain multilateral trade relations and so served as a
precursor of later trade tension. The textile issue was important in
the controversy over Japan's admittance to GATT. Textiles also
were the first product to strain the U.S.-Japan trade relationship.45
By 1955, Japanese textile exports were increasing and taking
domestic sales away from American producers. The Japanese
government responded in December 1955 with voluntary restraints,
which were expanded in a five-year bilateral agreement negotiated
in January 1957. U.S. imports of Japanese textiles decreased in the
late 1950s. U.S. imports again increased in the 1960s, not just from
Japan but from other textile exporters such as Hong
Kong. Additional restraint agreements were negotiated. Textiles
remained a problem and various restraint agreements continued to
be imposed throughout the 1960s, eventually resulting in 1969-
1971 in a major dispute and the Arrangement Regarding Inter-
national Trade in Textiles (the Multifiber Arrangement) in
1974. This dispute brought for the first time economic and product-
specific tensions to a level that threatened to overwhelm the
bilateral relationship. Japan now appeared not as a weak,
vulnerable economy but as a powerful exporter.
Bilateral tension that began with textiles and expanded to
encompass many other products continued to escalate in the 1970s,
exacerbated by the 1973 oil crisis and the 1974-1975 recession. It
did not flare up again until 1977, when American concern about
Japan's current account surplus and the U.S. current account deficit
spilled over into an increasing number of product-specific
conflicts. The U.S.-Japan trade conflict intensified during the Carter
Administration not only because of the policies pursued but, more
importantly, because the time was right.
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During 1977, two highly visible product-specific conflicts
developed between the United States and Japan—color televisions
(settled by an orderly marketing agreement in May) and steel
(settled by the announcement of the trigger price mechanism in
December). The dispute over the trade imbalance, however, received
the most attention. Official U.S. attention focused on how America
trading partners could reduce their surpluses with the United
States—surpluses caused by "unfair or overzealous trading."46
Because of these highly visible product-specific conflicts, Japan was
depicted as the major culprit in disturbing the international
economy.
The United States called upon Japan to restrain exports, to
open the Japanese market to U.S. exports, and to accelerate the
growth of its economy. Increasingly, the policies generated by the
trade imbalance were used by Congress and industry to obtain
restraints on specific products. During 1978 and 1979, the U.S.-
Japan relationship extended from U.S. charges of Japanese unfair
trading practices on products ranging from seafood to semiconduc-
tors to Japanese promises to liberalize their economy and correct
the trade imbalance. By 1980 when the automobile crisis surfaced,
a pattern had developed in the solutions of product-specific issues:
Japanese investment in the United States, voluntary restraint
agreements, and import relief.
Development of the Automobile Issue
The automobile export restraint issue developed in the broad
context of multilateral and U.S.-Japan bilateral trade relations. The
auto issue was primarily bilateral because the United States was
Japan's major trading partner and major market for its car
exports. Initial bilateral export tension and attempts to curb motor
vehicle exports began in the 1970s.47 Japan exported less to Europe
because of various import restrictions and the similarity in product
size. Other areas of the world did not have competing domestic
automobile industries.
The Japanese government's first attempt to restrict motor
vehicle exports to the United States occurred in October 1972 as
part of a broad export control program adopted in the "third yen
policy."48 This policy was an attempt to lower Japan's trade
surplus to help prevent the collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement.
Japan's bilateral relations with the United States greatly
deteriorated after 1969 due to the growing trade imbalances, the
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textile dispute, and problems associated with the reversion of
Okinawa. These tensions, combined with the problems in the inter-
national monetary system and the undervaluation of the yen,
strained the bilateral relationship (as well as Japan's relationships
with other advanced industrial nations).
Economic tension came to a head with President Richard
Nixon's announcement of his "New Economic Policy" on August 15,
1971.49 The main provisions of the policy suspended the conver-
tibility of the dollar, imposed a 10 percent import surcharge, froze
domestic wages and prices, and enacted a tax cut to stimulate the
American economy. While this policy was primarily a response to
multilateral monetary problems, it spilled over into the U.S.-Japan
relationship. The multilateral repercussions of the program,
however, were the farthest reaching and led to the Smithsonian
Agreement. This agreement, signed on December 19, 1971,
devalued the dollar and revalued upward the currencies of other
advanced nations, including Japan.
The Smithsonian Agreement immediately began to
collapse. The direct result of the collapse on the U.S.-Japan relation-
ship was a progressive deterioration in the American trade balance
with Japan. The United States, reversing its previous approach in
resolving trade imbalances, pressed Japan to correct the situation.50
Prior to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system when the
United States had a surplus in its trade balance, it urged deficit
countries to assume the burden of adjustment by decreasing
domestic consumption and expanding exports. However, by 1972
when the United States was in deficit, it had begun—and has
continued so to the present—to demand that the surplus countries,
that is, Japan, assume the burden of adjustment. Part of the
Japanese response to the new American demand was the third yen
policy.
In December 1972, MITI announced details of the export
control plan, which sought to restrict exports of twenty groups of
commodities retroactively from September 1972 until August
1973.51 The commodities chosen had export values in the January
to July 1972 period that had increased by more than 20 percent
over the same period in 1971. Commodities already regulated, that
is, textiles, were exempted. The exports were to be restricted either
through "voluntary" export cartels or by invoking the compulsory
Export Trade Control Order (Yushutsu Boeki Kanri Rei). The
automotive products covered by the plan included:
1. regular passenger vehicles, excluding buses;
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2. special passenger cars and trucks;
3. automotive bodies and chassis; and
4. motorcycles and motor bikes and parts.
The automobile industry was shocked by the government's plan
since they had expected only another yen revaluation, not to be
"singled out" for export controls.52 They had not been
consulted. Although the plan was never implemented, it created
antagonism between the industry and the government, which
continually resurfaced during export disputes in the following
years. Importantly, these controls were a response to the general
bilateral trade problem and not to the conflict over automobile
exports.
The first oil crisis in October 1973 again brought the export
restraint issue to the forefront. The growing American demand for
small cars increased imports of Japanese passenger cars by 17.1
percent and trucks by 32.1 percent in 1974 over 1973
levels. Japanese products overtook those of West Germany
(primarily Volkswagen) as the top imports. Indeed, imports from
several countries continued to increase in the first half of 1975. In
reaction, Representative John Dent of Pennsylvania and the United
Automobile Workers (UAW) independently lodged formal complaints
with the U.S. Treasury Department and the International Trade
Commission alleging that eight countries—Belgium, Canada,
France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and West
Germany—were dumping (selling their products in the U.S. market
at less than fair value, i.e., at a price lower than in their home
markets).53
The American automobile manufacturers did not lodge
complaints, preferring to take a neutral stance. Mr. William D.
Eberle, president of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association
and former special trade representative, testified before the Inter-
national Trade Commission in August 1975 that the import
increase resulted from a switch in consumer preferences due to
gasoline price increases associated with the oil embargo, and new
safety and pollution regulations, rather than less than fair value
sales.54
On August 7, 1975, the U.S. Treasury Department
preliminarily decided that there was "substantial doubt" that any
less than fair value imports were the cause of injury to the U.S.
industry.55 Upon receipt of this decision, the U.S. International
Trade Commission decided on September 8, 1975 that it could not
determine that there was "reasonable indication that the imports
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were causing injury to the U.S. industry." The U.S. Treasury
Department arrived at a final determination on May 4, 1976,
supported by Representative Dent and the UAW, that conditionally
discontinued the investigations of dumping by all eight countries "so
long as certain specialized assurances are received from . . .
exporters concerning future prices to be charged on their products in
the U.S." The major Japanese exporters—Toyota, Nissan, and
Honda—were cleared of all charges, but Fuji, Mitsubishi, and
Mazda were found to have made some sales at less than fair
value. The latter three companies received conditional discon-
tinuances after they made price assurance commitments that were
monitored by the U.S. Treasury Department.
The Japanese automobile manufacturers reacted to the inves-
tigation by asserting that there were no grounds for the
charges. Shotaro Kamiya of Toyota stated that he was "totally
convinced" Japanese cars were not being sold at less than fair
value.56 The companies then quietly waited for the investigation to
end, anticipating correctly that the final decision would be in their
favor. MITI, on the other hand, reacted with more alarm, fearful
that even a favorable decision might precipitate import
barriers. Their anxiety increased because of various proposals in
1975 to enact local content requirements on automobiles by
members of Congress and the AFL-CIO. One such proposal passed,
inserting local content requirements into the Energy Conservation
and Conversion Act of 1975, which was intended to prevent U.S.
manufacturers from meeting energy conservation requirements
through captive imports. At a GATT conference in October, MITI
demanded that the United States immediately end the investiga-
tion.57 Later, because of the potential import barriers, MITI infor-
mally came out in favor of voluntary curbs on export ship-
ments. The industry did not agree and antagonism increased. The
issue cooled as U.S. domestic car sales rebounded in the 1976 and
1977 model years, overshadowing the continued, though more
modest, increase in import sales.
By late 1977 and in 1978, rumors surfaced again that Japan
might curb automobile exports to the United States.58 In March
1978, MITI asked the automobile industry to voluntarily restrain
sales to the United States and in April began to require auto
manufacturers to file their export shipment programs with the
government.59 The government expressed its fears that if U.S.
automobile imports exceeded 20 percent of the market there would
be repercussions, and it warned the automobile industry to export
cautiously.
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As in 1972, the government's request was part of a larger
program designed by MITI to reduce Japan's trade surplus with the
United States. U.S.-Japan trade tension had begun to escalate in
early 1977 centering on imports of Japanese color televisions and
the United States's establishment of a 200-mile fishing zone. As the
year progressed, the dispute increasingly focused on U.S. demands
that Japan reduce its current account surplus.
The automobile manufacturers again opposed MITI's position,
calling export restraints unnecessary.60 Importantly, the manufac-
turers were in a better position during 1978 and 1979 to challenge
the validity of MITI's opinions because the major companies had
opened their own offices in Washington, D.C. Honda opened an
office in May 1978, followed by Toyota in August 1978 and Nissan
in August 1979. The Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association
had opened a Washington office in 1976.
The adversarial government-business relationship that
developed out of increased export tension reflected the divergence of
the perceived interests of government and industry, and the
competitive strength of the industry. While Japan had negotiated
and implemented voluntary restraint agreements since the 1930s to
forestall the enactment of tougher restrictions by foreign countries,
it was not until the 1970s that the concept of export restraint
rather than export promotion began to dominate the relationship
between the government and the auto industry.
The now mature automobile industry believed that the export
market was important for corporate vitality since the domestic
market was becoming saturated. This belief was especially strong
among the smaller manufacturers who found it hard to compete in
Japan with Nissan and Toyota's already well-established sales
networks. On the other side, the government under pressure from
overseas was interested in reducing international trade tension.
Automobile trade, politicized in the United States because of the
automobile's high visibility as a consumer product and the mystique
surrounding the industry, became a major issue in the redefined
Japanese government-business relationship.
The Voluntary Export Restraint Agreement
The final crisis leading to the imposition of the voluntary
restraint agreement began in January 1980. In the aftermath of
the second oil crisis, American consumer demand again shifted to
small imported cars. Foreign imports in the United States recorded
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a new high in 1980 of 2.4 million vehicles, 28.2 percent of the U.S.
market. Of this number, Japanese makers sold 1.9 million vehicles
for 20.8 percent of the U.S. market. At the same time, American
manufacturers were experiencing their worst year since 1961, and
Chrysler was on the verge of bankruptcy. Automobiles became the
hottest issue in U.S.-Japan trade as well as in Japanese trade with
Europe.
The year opened with a speech on January 13 by UAW Presi-
dent Douglas Fraser stating that Japanese automakers must build
assembly plants in the United States or face import restrictions.61
He followed this speech with a trip to Japan in February during
which he reiterated his warnings. The American executive branch
was conspicuously quiet but supported Japanese investment in the
United States.
MITI took the lead in fashioning the Japanese government's
response, since it felt that government intervention either directly
or through administrative guidance was necessary to avert trade
friction. In early 1980, MITI asked Japan's automakers to under-
take "orderly" export practices with the United States and to invest
in the United States.62 The manufacturers agreed in principle to
restrain exports but opposed foreign direct investment. Each maker,
fearful that the others would try to increase their market share and
aware of American disagreement on the import issue, pushed export
levels in the first half of 1980 to record levels.
During early March, high-level negotiations began between
members of the Carter Administration and MITI Vice Chairman
Naohira Amaya, which revolved not around export restraints but
around Japanese investment in the United States and imports of
American automotive parts by Japan. MITI made concessions on
parts imports but failed to persuade the Japanese automobile
makers to invest in the United States. The sole exception was
Honda, which was already planning to build an assembly plant in
Marysville, Ohio. The investment issue dominated discussions into
the summer, but it soon became obvious that Toyota and Nissan
were not going to open plants in the United States. Even if Toyota
and Nissan disagreed, it appeared that such plants would probably
produce only trucks and would have no immediate effect on either
American unemployment or the trade imbalance.
Bilateral tension resumed in June. The UAW and its congres-
sional supporters, frustrated with the lack of action from either
Japan or the Carter Administration, filed a 276-page petition with
the International Trade Commission under Section 201 of the Trade
Act of 1974 (the escape clause) seeking temporary relief from
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import competition through higher tariffs and quotas.63 The Carter
Administration responded with a $1 billion relief program that
included some regulatory relief on emissions, loan guarantees for
car dealers, and eligibility designations for certain workers and
communities to receive trade adjustment assistance.
In Japan, tensions between MITI and the automobile industry
intensified. MITI ordered the automobile industry to practice
disciplined behavior and insinuated that they might impose export
controls under the Export-Import Transactions Law.64 In addition,
they publicly censored the automobile industry for their lack of
cooperation. Again, the automobile manufacturers responded nega-
tively, continuing to stress that imports were not responsible for the
American automobile industry's problems.
The U.S. import situation continued to escalate during the
summer and early fall. The most significant event of the summer
occurred on August 4 when Ford filed a petition with the Inter-
national Trade Commission supporting the position of the
UAW. The Ford petition went further than the UAW petition,
calling Japanese imports a "continuing source of problems" rather
than only one source of current problems. The pending American
presidential election further politicized the issue.
At the beginning of September 1980, MITI Minister Rokusuke
Tanaka with the support of Prime Minister Suzuki summoned the
top executives of Toyota, Nissan, and Honda to a meeting. He
strongly urged that they practice voluntary restraints during the
final months of 1980 in order to preempt an orderly marketing
agreement.65 By this time, the automakers believed that the situa-
tion was deteriorating and agreed to cooperate. Minister Tanaka
announced publicly on September 5 that automobile exports would
decrease in the last quarter of 1980. Keeping in mind possible
antitrust charges, the Japanese automakers announced that they
were not voluntarily restricting exports but that exports would
decline "simply because of market conditions in the U.S."66
The International Trade Commission announced its final deci-
sion on November 10, when it ruled by a three-to-two vote that
imports were not a substantial cause of actual or potential serious
injury to the American motor vehicle industry. This decision made it
legally impossible for the Carter Administration to implement an
orderly marketing agreement. Nevertheless, the UAW, members of
Congress, and the automobile manufacturers continued to pressure
the Carter Administration and later the new Reagan Administration
to seek stronger import restraints.
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The Japanese manufacturers made a final bid in January
1981 to convince the incoming Reagan Administration not to impose
restrictions. Nissan President Takashi Ishihara, who was also presi-
dent of JAMA and thus a spokesman for the entire industry, stated:
Curbing car imports from Japan cannot be helpful to
solving unemployment of American auto workers. The
new U.S. cabinet should work out a broader industrial
policy of promoting industries other than automaking to
relieve the unemployed.67
He also pointed out that import restraints would not help vitalize
the American industry in the short, medium, or long term.
The Reagan Administration established an interagency task
force on automobiles at the end of January to resolve the problem,
but the task force found itself divided on the issue of import restric-
tions. Ironically, MITI helped to resolve the split in favor of export
restraints by indicating in January, and again in February, that it
would support a negotiated voluntary restraint agreement. The
Japanese government was also divided over restricting automobile
exports. The Foreign Ministry opposed the restrictions, but MITI's
position prevailed.
March and April were devoted to completing an agreement
before Prime Minister Suzuki visited Washington, D.C. in May.
These negotiations occurred on a government-to-government level
and within Japan as MITI had to persuade the manufacturers to
accept its plan.
By March, the Japanese automobile manufacturers realized
that some type of restraint was inevitable. Toyota's Vice President
Shigenobu Yamamoto urged the government not to make any hasty
decisions since opinion on this issue was divided in the United
States. The real issue however between the government and the
automakers was the size and duration of the impending limit.68 On
April 25, MITI Vice Minister Amaya met with the heads of the
automobile companies. During the meeting, the companies would
only agree to hold exports to the 1980 level of 1.82 million
vehicles.69 MITI considered this too high and again mentioned the
possibility of statutory limitations on exports.
Japan and the United States reached a final agreement on
May 1 after negotiations in Tokyo between Amaya and U.S. Trade
Representative William Brock. MITI offered and Brock accepted a
two-year restraint with exports limited to 1.68 million vehicles in
the first year and 1.68 million vehicles plus 16.5 percent of any
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growth in the U.S. market in the second year. In addition, a third
year of restraints would be considered if conditions so warranted.
After the announcement, Japan's automakers expressed their
strong dissatisfaction with the volume and duration established in
the proposal. Takashi Ishihara stated:
The three-year restraint plan will seriously hurt the
motor industry, related material and component
industries and the nation's whole economy.70
The only choice was to consent, and they voluntarily agreed to
MITI's three-year restraint plan on the grounds that otherwise the
government would enact statutory limits. The automakers based
their decision on these grounds in order to avoid possible antitrust
actions in the United States. MITI and the automakers then jointly,
but with much conflict, determined the quotas of the individual
companies, which were announced by MITI on June 24 and
reflected the market share held by each company in 1980.71
The export restraint issue increased the level of tension in the
relationship between the automobile industry and the govern-
ment. An uneasy truce was not declared until 1981 when industry
became convinced that the situation in the United States had
progressed to the point that local content legislation was
likely. Later, the majority of Japanese automobile companies
decided to build assembly plants in the United States only after it
became clear that the restraints and the swell of protectionist senti-
ment would continue.
Impact of the Restraints
The imposition of the restraints is depicted as a symbol of a
new government-business relationship in Japan. Chalmers Johnson
states that MITI began to reassert its control over industry after
the 1973 oil crisis when it "successfully redefined its mission" and
became more "internationalist."72 MITI, believing that a valid part
of this "new" mission was to negotiate export restraints and
encourage overseas investment to ease trade tension, had urged the
automobile industry to agree to voluntary export restraints.
Two studies on the Japanese automobile industry appropriate
Johnson's depiction of a more "internationalist" MITI. Although
both studies focus on government-to-government interactions, they
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extend the "internationalist" argument to government-business rela-
tions. Gilbert Winham and Ikuo Kabashima state:
However, over the years, the MITI has become much
more internationalist, in the sense that it is now more
willing to accommodate the interests of Japan's major
trading partners instead of trying to defend the narrow
and immediate interests of the industries under its
jurisdiction.73
A University of Michigan study edited by Robert E. Cole contains a
similar description.74 These studies indicate that a more inter-
nationalist MITI is better able to handle trade conflicts on a
bilateral level than it was in the case of the textile dispute. At the
same time, because MITI is less inclined to defend the automobile
industry's interests, these studies suggest that interactions are
more antagonistic.
The interactions that occurred between government and
industry during the U.S.-Japan auto dispute also resulted from the
industry's competitiveness and the fact that the problem involved
an external threat. Thus, the relationship, unlike the close interac-
tions of the 1950s when industry and government goals were
synonymous and international threats to the industry's existence
strong, contained powerful tensions hidden behind the cooperation
and the heightened government control seen during the implementa-
tion of export restraints. These tensions reappeared each time the
restraints were extended.
Conclusion
During the 1970s, the relationship between the government
and the automobile industry was more adversarial and distant, yet
there were moments of mutual agreement.
The final shakeout of domestic producers characterized the
decade's start. The shakeout occurred as the industry became
competitive and overcame three final challenges to its exis-
tence. The challenge of foreign capital was resolved when three of
the remaining small producers negotiated tieup and sales agree-
ments with American firms. The second and third challenges, the
reevaluation of the yen and the 1973 oil crisis, were weathered
fairly easily by all the companies except Mazda. Eventually, Mazda
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also was able to overcome adversity and to survive as a viable
manufacturer.
Regulatory issues, especially the inflammatory automobile
emissions issue, gained prominence as Japan achieved a high level
of industrial development. With the internal and external threats to
the industry's survival eliminated, it was possible to redress the
undesirable social and environmental implications of earlier
economic policies. Costs imposed on the industry would no longer
significantly affect its international viability. These regulations were
opposed by the industry, which had to bear increased costs. Some of
the overt antagonism was deflected by cultural predispositions
toward consensus. The use of the regulations by the smaller makers
as a method to increase market share and the use of administrative
rather than legislative methods to design and implement regulation
were also important in encouraging compliance and cooperation.
The industry's international competitiveness led to skyrock-
eting exports. Increased world demand for small passenger cars
following the oil crisis created new and different problems that had
to be resolved within the context of the government-business
relationship.
The relationship was more adversarial and distant than in
earlier decades because the goals of the government and the
industry diverged. The industry was competitive and felt it was able
to oppose those government policies it thought undesirable. The
ability of Mitsubishi and Isuzu to disassociate themselves from
MITFs reorganization plans and negotiate tieups with American
automobile companies was evidence of their new independence,
although each held majority control of its venture primarily because
of MITFs policies covering foreign capital investment. Later, the
companies' competitiveness was evident in the role private listening
posts played in monitoring developments in Washington and in the
vocal disagreements between the industry and the government on
the export restraint issue. The industry no longer relied on the
government's perception of the severity of international problems.
Because the automobile industry was competitive, its existence
was no longer threatened by either imports or foreign capital. The
government's role as a buffer was no longer required. Again, this
decreased the incentive of the industry to work with the government
on issues where there was a conflict of interest. It was only after
the new threat of protectionist legislation overseas became serious
enough to threaten the profits of the industry that the two sides
were again forced by external circumstances to cooperate.
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The two sides did work together at times when there were
similar goals to achieve. The Ministry of Finance provided support
for Sumitomo Bank and its client, Mazda. MITI supported delaying
the implementation of the 1976 emission standards. And, the
government and the industry accepted voluntary export restraints
to retain access to the U.S. market.
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The relationship between the Japanese government and the
automobile industry consists of complex interactions. The relation-
ship is like controlled chaos; it has shape and form, but inside is a
labyrinth of obligations, responsibilities, and pressures. It has many
players seeking their way through its corridors, sometimes walking
together and sometimes alone, but always aware of the presence of
others.
Interactions varied considerably depending on the situation,
but at the same time there were elements of continuity. The inter-
actions also reveal that no monolithic government or private sector
controlled the relationship; rather, many actors shaped the relation-
ship including Japanese government agencies, Japanese and foreign
companies, foreign governments, multilateral organizations, and
individuals. Most importantly, each of these actors precipitated
interactions within the relationship that resulted in public
policies. The overall effect of the interactions was to help create a
dynamic situation that led to the development of a competitive
automobile industry in Japan.
Understanding that government-business relationships are
complex interactions and contain elements of continuity and change
is not sufficient to comprehend the ramifications of these relation-
ships in global competition. But this understanding does lead to
three further questions. What are the major factors that shape the
relationship by creating change and providing continuity? How did
the government-business relationship contribute to the automobile
industry's competitiveness? And, does this case provide any insights
into the development of policies that would cope with the




Many factors exist that affect government-business interac-
tions. While it is impossible to delineate precisely the impact of each
factor or to even uncover all of them, four factors most strongly
influenced government-business relations in the Japanese
automobile industry and can account for the form the interactions
took. These factors are distinct but often overlapped in their effects.
Cultural and Historical Lessons
Culture and history provided continuity in the relationship.
Culture helped reinforce the constant of negotiation in the
government-business partnership. History provided policy makers in
government and business with lessons they remembered and
created common preceptions of the competitive environment that
were reflected in policy.
Japanese culture, through its emphasis on harmony, promoted
consensus building. Consensus building in turn reinforced a policy-
making pattern based on negotiation, negotiation being the recogni-
tion of the interdependence between government and business that
resulted in formal and informal bargaining and accommoda-
tion. Thus, while there was much disagreement, conflict did not
result in polarized positions and rarely in open confrontation. Each
side accepted the other's right to a role in policy formation even if it
was not enamored of the other's position. Ultimately, compromises
were worked out that helped grant a certain legitimacy to public
policies. Several scholars, including Richard Samuels and Ellis
Krauss, also see a pattern of negotiated policies in Japan.1 The
effect of this pattern was directly apparent in relations between the
Japanese government and the automobile industry in the develop-
ment of emissions policies and the role of advisory commissions
(shingikai), and indirectly evident in the acceptance of the right of
all parties to have a role in policy formation.
In contrast, cultural tendencies toward vertical relationships
heightened adversarial relations when MITI attempted to create
horizontal mergers in the 1960s. The industry rebelled even though
the businessmen who were members of the relevant advisory
committee agreed in principle with the government's concern over
excessive competition. They rebelled partially because horizontal
mergers went against the cultural tendency toward vertical value
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order and because no company wanted to be the one shut out of the
market.2
Policy implementation through administrative rather than
legislative means reveals another indirect effect of culture. Culture
reinforced the tendency to avoid the direct confrontations more
common with legislative methods of policy implementation, espe-
cially with regulatory policies. Thus, while culture did not create
administrative guidance, it reinforced the industry's responsiveness
to the Japanese government's frequent use of it.
History, through the lessons it taught, also provided continuity
in the relationship. Japanese government and business policy
makers remembered their lessons about the possible negative
impact of foreign capital and unrestrained imports on an uncompeti-
tive infant domestic industry. These lessons grew out of experiences
common to all of Japanese industry during the Meiji era, and those
specific to the automobile industry in the 1930s.
Because government and business learned the same lessons,
they sought, and cooperated in creating, policies that lessened the
vulnerability of the industry through protective measures or tech-
nological innovation. These experiences led to a widespread aware-
ness of the international environment's role in creating and in
undermining competitiveness. Michael Cusumano points out that
the international environment also affected Japanese industry and
government through the use of foreign technology and industrial
practices in their development plans.3 Everyone knew General
Motors, Ford, and other foreign companies were not only
competitors but also models to emulate.
History also taught that Japanese exports might be
discriminated against and denied access to foreign markets. Discus-
sions over Japan's membership in multilateral organizations rein-
forced this lesson in the 1950s. It helped shape protectionist and
developmental policies during the internationalization period and
created a sense among policy makers during the export crisis, espe-
cially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and eventually in MITI,
that Japan would have to compromise to preserve its overall market
access.4
While culture and history provided continuity in the relation-
ship, other factors, especially administrative rules and competitive-
ness, often overrode them to create change.
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Administrative Rules
The administrative rules under which the government operated
affected the relationship—rules being the perimeters agreed to by
consensus or imposed by force within which the government made
and carried out policy.5 The rules arose from the domestic environ-
ment (e.g., military or civilian government) and from the inter-
national environment (e.g., the Occupation authorities and multi-
lateral trade agreements). The rules changed throughout the history
of the Japanese automobile industry. Changes in the rules affected
the amount of leeway industry had to influence public policy and the
amount of control government had to enforce its ideas.
Effects of changes in the rules on interactions are most
apparent when comparing the wartime and postwar periods. From
approximately the time of the Manchurian Incident in 1931 to
1945, the relationship was characterized by the subordination of
industry to military needs. Subordination did not mean that interac-
tion and negotiation did not occur; Toyota's and Nissan's discussions
with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry about the Automobile
Manufacturing Law and the formation of the Survey Committee for
the Establishment of the Automobile Industry are evidence to the
contrary. However, subordination did place strong constraints on
business by specifying what type of cars could be produced, what
companies would produce them, and who would get raw
materials. Nissan and Toyota used this period to gain entrance into
the Japanese automobile market, but they had to develop production
plans within the boundaries set by what the government felt was
important. Most importantly, the government did not permit them
to make passenger cars and forced them to work through the
control associations to obtain materials and to sell.
Beginning in the Occupation, industry was able to exert
greater and more direct influence over public policy. The wartime
control associations became voluntary trade associations. Regula-
tions prohibiting passenger car research and production were
repealed. Companies no longer had to be authorized in order to
produce, which allowed new companies to enter the industry. The
government worked more closely with the industry, and sought its
advice, when developing policy options. Industry also suggested
policies and played a large role in developing initiatives to propose
to SCAP. MITI's 1952 policy paper on the automobile industry also
incorporated industry's views. In fact, in the 1940s one of the first
tasks of the Automobile Manufacturers Association (the predecessor
of the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association) was to lobby
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SCAP and the Japanese government to support the industry—a role
it continued to play during liberalization, the negotiation of the
export restraints, and up to the present. When industry's views
were overlooked, as occurred during the People's Car Project, busi-
ness was likely to oppose government policies.
Japan's parliamentary structure also affected interactions. It
helped reinforce the tendency, along with culture, to use administra-
tive rather than legislative methods of policy implementation. It
also was responsible for the existence of an elite bureaucracy,
rather than the legislature, that took the governmental lead in
policy formation. This structure permitted more cooperation and
negotiation because issues were not politicized as often. When issues
were politicized, as in the case of emissions, there was much less
room for government and business to maneuver in their negotia-
tions. In addition, the bureaucracy had more respect and influence
under Japan's parliamentary system, which made close and
continuous consultation with industry possible.
Frank Upham shows that administrative rules need not be
formal.6 He suggests that attributes of informality and verticality,
and the broader political and social context of which they are part,
affect the Japanese government's ability to control the pace and
direction of change. While his case studies do not include the
automobile industry, his conclusion that informal, consultative
actions rather than compulsory edicts account for the preponderance
of government actions also holds for automotive-related actions from
the development of protective policies in the 1950s to the implemen-
tation of emissions policies in the 1970s.
The rules continued to change after independence, albeit more
subtly. The changes in the rules in the 1950s and 1960s reflected
constraints put in place by the international environment more so
than any change in domestic institutions. In the 1950s, the govern-
ment controlled foreign exchange allocation, which gave it leverage
in its negotiations with business. It threatened to cut off foreign
exchange for those automobile companies that did not fulfill the
domestic content provisions of the technology tieup agreements, but
at the same time it allocated companies foreign exchange to buy
machine tools. It was able to enact protective policies that
restrained imports and developmental policies that promoted
demand and technological innovation because of its transitional
status under multilateral arrangements and because the United
States wanted Japan to be a bulwark against Communism in Asia.
Business, especially the larger companies, benefited from these
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controls that kept imports (and some smaller Japanese companies)
out of the market.
After Japan joined the IMF, the OECD, and the GATT, the
government lost some control over foreign exchange and had to
liberalize its market. These changes lessened the government's
leverage over industry. The government sought new forms of
influence, which resulted in the ill-fated Special Measures Law for
the Promotion of Designated Industries. Thus, because the inter-
national environment created changes in the administrative rules in
Japan, in spite of the endorsement of the concept by the special
committees, the government could not force business to accept the
merger schemes, and it lost much of its control over foreign capital
investment in the early 1970s. As a result, even though the govern-
ment preferred mergers among domestic companies to tieups
between domestic and foreign companies, Mitsubishi, Isuzu, and
Mazda concluded partnerships with foreign firms.
The administrative rules constrained how government and
business interacted to create policy and affected the amount of
leverage government had over business. Again, interaction and
negotiation remained, but they operated under different constraints
at different times.
Competitiveness
The automobile industry's competitiveness strongly affected its
relationship with government—competitiveness being the ability of
industry to compete globally without government protection or, in
other words, the industry's vulnerability in the international
environment.
A competitive mature industry with wide-ranging influence on
the economy and a vulnerable infant industry with potential can
both be perceived as economically important. However, the
government-business relationship differs in these two cases because
of competitiveness.
The competitiveness of the Japanese passenger car industry
was low and its vulnerability high through the 1950s. In the 1930s,
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler had onshore assembly
plants. Japanese domestic production was small and of bad
quality. The industry survived primarily because the American
companies were forced out of the market. In the 1950s, European
small-car exports and foreign companies' attempts to establish
subsidiaries threatened the Japanese domestic producers again.
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The still uncompetitive passenger car industry needed and accepted
protective and developmental incentives that involved a high level of
government direction but gave it room to experiment with new tech-
nology and to adapt industrial practices to meet local conditions.7
As the automobile industry became competitive, its interac-
tions with the government grew more adversarial. During the
1960s and 1970s, companies increasingly opposed government
policy initiatives that they felt were not in their best interest even
though they still often agreed on the basic problems being
addressed. The Mitsubishi/Chrysler tieup and Honda's decision to
manufacture passenger cars are clear examples of industry opposi-
tion to government wishes. However, even in this period, industry
cooperated with the government in forming policies to delay
liberalization. This cooperation continued until some companies saw
that it was not in their best interest, a decision possible because of
changes in competitiveness and administrative rules.
The industry's competitiveness affected public policy
options. Initially, government and business used protective and
developmental policies to help the automobile industry grow. After
the industry matured, policies expanded to include regulatory
controls on emissions and safety and restraints on exports. There
were fewer incentives for the industry to cooperate with these
intrinsically restrictive regulatory policies than with the earlier
developmental policies. (It is always easier to cooperate when
someone else is being penalized, i.e., a foreign producer, and when
someone else is responsible for implementing an agreed upon policy,
i.e., the government.) After much hesitation the industry did
cooperate with the government on emissions controls, but only after
the smaller companies perceived an opportunity to use the controls
to increase market share. The industry strongly opposed export
controls. It accepted them only to prevent the threatened enactment
of restrictive American local content legislation. The industry's
competitiveness in the 1970s also allowed it to have its own
listening posts in Washington, adding an independent source of
information and yet another dimension to its negotiations with the
government over export controls.
Economic Importance
The automobile industry's importance—real or perceived—to
the economy also influenced how government and business inter-
acted. Those who argue that industrial policy did not affect the
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industry's economic development point out that the automobile
industry was not at the center of economic development plans and
was only one of many "key" industries. However, these facts do
not negate the relationship or the possibility that assistance, even if
not as large as in some industries, was provided because the
industry was perceived as important.
Prior to the 1930s, the industry was so small that interaction
was limited to the military subsidy program. As the industry proved
crucial to foreign exchange conservation and to military strength,
the relationship became more active. The government attempted to
create a national vehicle, the Isuzu. When this attempt was unsuc-
cessful, the government worked with Toyota and Nissan to create a
domestic truck industry.
After World War II, the industry lobbied the government to
support the industry's interests with the Occupation authorities.
The government cooperated but did not place the same importance
on the automobile industry as it did on other more basic
industries. Toward the end of the Occupation, the discussion
between MITI and the financial community on the feasibility of
developing a domestic passenger car industry revolved around
different perceptions of the industry's economic importance.
Ultimately the potential for economic development in the passenger
car industry swayed those who had previously been
unenthused. The government then supported the industry through a
variety of protective and developmental policies. These policies in
turn created an atmosphere conducive to cooperation.
The industry, however, still was not at the center of economic
development plans and received just enough assistance to provide
minimal survival security. The decision to provide only minimal
financial support did not lessen the amount of interaction that
occurred, it just occurred on other issues. By the mid-1950s and
even more so by the 1960s, the government agreed with the
industry that it was central to economic development and, so, shel-
tered the industry from liberalization for as long as possible.
The industry's and government's similar goals in the initial
postwar period contributed to a cooperative relationship and to the
economic development of the industry. Agreement on the economic
importance of the industry, however, could not sustain a cooperative
relationship when substantial disagreement developed about specific
methods and policies at the same time competitiveness had




The major factors that affected interactions between govern-
ment and the Japanese automobile industry were (1) cultural and
historical lessons, (2) the perimeters or rules agreed to or imposed
by force within which the government can make and carry out
policy, (3) the competitiveness of the industry, and (4) the impor-
tance, real or perceived, of the industry to economic develop-
ment. Each factor affected the relationship by creating tendencies
toward continuity or change, and by interacting with one another to
create a dynamic environment. The potential effect of each factor
must be carefully evaluated in relation to the others to discover how
it affected any particular situation.
Cultural and historical lessons provided continuity throughout
the relationship. Two such lessons were especially important. First,
government and business accepted that they each played a role in
policy formation. Both suggested policy initiatives, although the
government drafted the actual policies. Each side's acceptance of
the other's role helped create a tendency to formulate policy through
negotiation. Second, government and business were aware of the
close association between the international environment and
competitiveness. Their awareness of this connection created a sense
of urgency and provided an incentive to work together.
Continuity did not mean that business and government always
cooperated and agreed; quite often they did not. Continuity also did
not prevent change because factors that created change often over-
rode it. The industry's competitiveness, and thus its ability to
oppose government policy initiatives, changed. The rules of the
international environment, and thus the government's ability to
enforce policies, changed. And, the industry's importance to the
economy changed, altering in turn the type of policies needed.
One reason American policy makers are interested in the
Japanese government-business relationship in the automobile
industry is that they see it as more effective than that of the United
States in creating a competitive industry. This perception recognizes
the dynamism that existed in the relationship. It is important,
however, to understand that the effectiveness of the relationship
grew out of its interactiveness and out of the way in which the
various factors affected each other.
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Competitive Implications
The government-business relationship and the policies it
engendered facilitated the development of Japan's automobile
industry by protecting the industry in its formative stages and by
providing developmental incentives. These measures gave industry
the minimal security it needed to experiment and to grow before it
had to test its competitiveness in export markets against foreign
producers. These measures grew out of interactions among many
governmental and private actors, not simply from a prescient
government or a competitive market.
Given this, it is necessary to remember that, just as the
government-business relationship reflects the interaction of several
factors, many factors contributed to the creation of a competitive
automobile industry. The Japanese automobile industry grew
because of strong entrepreneurs, a competitive market, an innova-
tive subcontracting system, an educated population, and develop-
mental timing. The list of possible factors is infinite.8 The industry
also benefited from programs rooted outside Japan such as special
procurement during the Korean War and Operation Roll-Up, and
tieups with foreign companies. Thus, the industry's successful
development did not occur as a result of one factor, be that factor
the market, government direction, process technology, or the
government-business relationship. Rather, it occurred out of the
dynamic interaction of many factors.
However, just as certain factors are more important than
others in shaping government-business interactions, some factors
are more important in economic development. In the case of Japan's
automobile industry, one of the important factors was the
government-business relationship.
The relationship was important to economic development first
because the acceptance of negotiation, and thus the acceptance of
the involvement of both government and business, facilitated the
development and implementation of policies of which both industry
and government approved. There were instances in which consensus
could not be achieved, but most of these occurred after the industry
was competitive.
Negotiation existed in Japan before the postwar period but did
not lead to as dynamic an industry because business initiative was
inhibited during wartime and because the industry was still in an
early formative stage. The creation of a market economy and
changes in administrative rules removed the restrictions on business
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and gave it a stronger role in the partnership. In addition, as the
industry took on economic importance, the government was more
responsive to its needs, leading to more interaction and more
negotiation.
The relationship that evolved contributed to successful growth
and to the implementation of protective and developmental policies
by creating a negotiated set of public policies that provided
minimum survival security for the industry. Without this security,
it is likely that foreign companies would have controlled the market
through imports and onshore assembly plants. The developmental
measures, while insufficient by themselves to create the industry,
accelerated its progress—how much so compared to actions the
companies took themselves is impossible to quantify.
The negotiated set of public policies is the aspect of the rela-
tionship often cited by those seeking protectionist policies. They see
these policies as evidence of a collusive partnership to overtake
world markets. Rather, the partnership was one that recognized a
mutual interest in developing a competitive industry to protect the
home market, which resulted in the added benefit of competitive
exports.
The relationship also was important after World War II when
awareness of the industry's vulnerability to the international
environment, together with a consensus that the industry was
economically important, contributed to, and indeed necessitated,
government and industry cooperation. Cooperation was needed to
build a competitive industry that abided by multilateral agreements
and operated within the constraints of a market economy. Both
government and business were aware of the industry's vulnerability
in the international environment, but, at the same time, they knew
that it was this environment that would provide the stimulus to
become competitive.
Finally, without the acceptance of negotiation in policy forma-
tion, important viewpoints from government and business would
have gone untapped in developing policies to meet the competitive-
ness challenge. Without government interest in ensuring that Japan
met its obligations under multilateral agreements, the industry
would not have felt pressured to become competitive so quickly.
The policies that resulted from the partnership eliminated the
industry's vulnerability by helping to create a competitive
industry. These policies and this solution were not systematically
planned but resulted from negotiation, an awareness of the inter-
national environment, and the perceived economic importance of the
industry. If the factors affecting the relationship had interacted
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differently, different policies with different effects might have
occurred. The interaction of these factors in the case of Japan's
automobile industry was dynamic: a democratic market economy
forced to become competitive by adapting to the international
environment—an adaption aided by policies growing out of a
government-business partnership that was not constrained by
adversarial positions or stifled by the exclusion of either party in
policy formation.
In the 1970s and 1980s, some of the factors affecting the
Japanese government-business relationship in the automobile
industry changed. The elements of continuity remained, but
competitiveness increased and the administrative rules changed. In
consequence, policies changed to stress the achievement of broader
societal goals such as a clean environment and decreased bilateral
trade tension. It is too early to predict if the relationship's
dynamism remains to help meet new challenges to the industry,
such as those posed by its obligations to help insure a free inter-
national trade environment.
In the United States, the impact of factors affecting
government-business relations were quite different. The American
automobile industry until the 1973 oil crisis was protected by
product differentiation and believed itself to be competitive. Cultural
and historical lessons did not encourage negotiation and
consensus. Although it became a cliche in the United States that
government and business must work together to build competitive-
ness and to formulate effective public policy, often the concept was
not practiced in reality. As a result, even though the industry was
perceived as economically important, there was little reason or
incentive for government and business to cooperate in policy forma-
tion. This situation changed in the 1980s, resulting in the growing
interest in industrial policy.
Policy Implications
This study concludes that trade friction will remain as long as
nations' industries are at different levels of competitiveness. Inter-
actions between government and business will continue to take
place affecting competitiveness and in turn being affected by
it. And, factors will combine differently in each nation to produce
unique relationships.
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The study's findings help to specify the perimeters within
which policy makers should take government-business relationships
into account when making trade policy decisions. The study
demonstrates that relationships do have implications for global
competition that need to be factored into policy decisions. If nothing
else, knowing why different relationships exist and how they
interact helps policy makers develop better methods to influence
behavior and to reach solutions acceptable to all parties.
Michael Blumenthal was right in stating that government-
business relationships are different in different situations but wrong
in stating that they are not relevant. They are relevant because
they affect economic development, which in turn affects global
competition. Global competition then in turn affects every country's
government-business relationship. Therefore, unless a country
exists in total isolation, other nations' relationships are important to
understand for their effects on the global economy, on domestic
government-business relationships, and on policies being considered
to influence other countries' behavior. Since government-business
relationships have implications for global competition, what lessons
can be drawn from the history of the Japanese automobile
industry's interactions with its government?
First, ideologically based explanations of government-business
relationships are invalid and culture bound. The trade debate over
industrial policy and the role of government-business relationships
tends to use such explanations to justify policy actions. However,
such explanations fail to reveal the interactiveness of relationships
and fail to take into account differing situations among
countries. Since government-business relationships are interactive,
they reveal the ability of both government and business to influence
each other. More importantly, they reveal that many actors
influence policy through their complex interactions. Ideologically
based explanations miss the richness of these interactions. And,
policies based on them will be fundamentally flawed because they
will not address the real problems.
Policy makers should recognize that ideologically based
explanations restrict the range of policy alternatives just when
imaginative policies are needed to deal dynamically with new situa-
tions. They need to adjust policies to the fact that relationships
change as the factors surrounding them change. Therefore, they
should seek out those factors that promote continuity and discover
how, or if, they will be overridden by other factors that create
change. They should not base policy decisions on outdated concep-
tions of past relationships or on idealized relationships.
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Factors can change, and this implies that nations can gain,
lose, and regain competitiveness. It also suggests that each nation,
because of differences in how factors combine, has to discover the
government-business relationship that best promotes competitive-
ness in its situation. This implication does not mean that policy
makers cannot learn from other nations' experiences, only that
these experiences need to be analyzed and adapted carefully. Just
as there are differences between nations, there are also similarities.
Second, different government-business relationships lead to
different policy choices and to different degrees of success for policy
implementation. Whether or not the resulting policy choices and
their implementation will encourage or discourage competitiveness
is highly dependent on the interaction of many factors, including the
international environment. In the case of Japan's automobile
industry, it was effective and dynamic.
Policy makers need to be aware of these differences in
formulating policy options. Understanding how the government-
business relationship developed in Japan's automobile industry and
how it affected global competition offers the opportunity to discover
what factors affect each nation's government-business relationship
and how it in turn affects competitiveness. It also provides the
opportunity to see what can and cannot be changed in relationships.
Differences also point out the need to decide whether certain
policies are equally permissible in advanced and less-advanced
nations. These decisions are value based and depend upon the
perceived importance of maintaining certain relationships and
aiding less-advanced nations.
Third, the dynamic combination of factors in Japan's
automobile industry that fostered the creation of a fully competitive
industry included a strong awareness of the international environ-
ment. The emphasis by government and business on exporting and
on competitiveness reflected this awareness. The international
environment acted both as a dependent and independent variable; it
affected the government-business relationship and in turn the rela-
tionship affected it.
Policy makers who seek to build competitiveness should not
only recognize international forces but also use them as a challenge
to reinforce competitiveness. They should not use them to justify
permanently limiting an economy's international exposure. True
competitiveness increasingly is found and tested in the global arena,
not the domestic market.
The government-business relationship is an increasingly
significant issue in international trade but remains complex and
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value ridden. In the short term, it is most feasible to continue to
ameliorate the welfare effects of specific sectoral trade conflicts by
using insights into government-business interactions to become
effective players in influencing policy formation. There are some
who might argue that this is one reason why Japanese lobbying,
including that done by the Japanese automobile industry, has been
effective in the United States. Multilateral arrangements continue
to be appropriate to establish perimeters for when, and at what
level of economic development, specific types of policies are
permissible.
Conclusion
This study has delineated the factors shaping the government-
business relationship in the Japanese automobile industry. It found
that the relationship was interactive and consisted of many players
whose actions are bound by factors creating change and providing
continuity.
It demonstrated that the relationship was one important factor
in economic development. The partnership that developed helped in
the creation of policies that protected and supported the industry's
development. These policies allowed companies to experiment with
innovative practices that made them competitive and leaders in the
world market.
It showed the relevance of government-business relationships
in trade policy. The creation of a competitive Japanese automobile
industry reinstated strong competition in the world market,
disturbing existing automobile industries in other countries and
creating trade friction. This change has challenged the Japanese
government and automobile industry to use their partnership to
take on global responsibilities and to cope innovatively with their
effects on global competition in a manner than benefits all nations
and all competitive companies worldwide. Also importantly, it has
challenged the long-held assumption by many in the United States
that government-business relationships arise purely out of domestic
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